

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

A PLATFORM FOR THE FREE DISCUSSION OF
ISSUES IN THE FIELD OF RELIGION AND
THEIR BEARING ON EDUCATION

SEPTEMBER - OCTOBER 1955



THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN THE CURRICULA OF
STATE UNIVERSITIES
A Symposium

HOW DOES COMMUNICATION TAKE PLACE?
COMMUNICATIONS FROM A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE

Book Reviews

Religious Education

Official Publication of the Religious Education Association

Seeks to present, on an adequate, scientific plane, those factors which make for improvement in religious and moral education. The Journal does not defend particular points of view, contributors alone being responsible for opinions expressed in their articles. It gives its authors entire freedom of expression, without any official endorsement. Articles in Religious Education are indexed in the EDUCATION INDEX which is on file in educational institutions and public libraries.

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A NEW LOOK AFTER VACATION

Americans are vacation conscious. This summer millions took trips — by automobiles, by trains, by ships, by airplanes — to national parks, to distant cities in this country and in foreign lands, to cabins in the mountains and to a thousand other places — familiar and unfamiliar.

Highways were jammed this summer, railroads had increased business, ships were booked to capacity, airplane companies expanded already full schedules. Providing for vacationists has been a "big and growing business."

It is no longer news to go on a vacation. The news question is "where did you go?"

But now for most of us the summer vacation is over and we are back to the "daily routine." When one returns from a vacation, it requires but one glance at the daily newspaper to remind him that he is in the same old world, and it requires but a short time in the office to be appraised of the fact that the telephone can again interrupt a planned agenda as well as it can be a useful instrument.

It is easy to think of the advantages of a summer vacation — alternation, relaxation, reading books which one had long hoped to do, having stimulating conversations with new acquaintances and "just doing nothing."

But all advantages of a vacation are finally tested in what one does on the "daily routine" following the summer vacation. As religious educators can we not ask ourselves at least three questions?

- (1) Did my vacation provide me with a wider perspective on my "daily routine?" Are there more implications for service in what I have been doing?
- (2) Did my vacation provide me with a deeper perspective on my daily routine? Is my job a vocation in the sense of ultimate meaning? Did my vacation help my real vocation?
- (3) Did my vacation help me to mature concretely in relation to the opportunities in the work which I have? Is the new look after vacation temporary or abiding? Does this look reveal eternity?

Yours for a permanent new look at abiding realities.

—*The Editorial Committee*

A SYMPOSIUM

The Place of Religion

In The Curricula of State Universities

Under the joint sponsorship of the University of Minnesota and the RELIGIOUS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION a conference on the topic of this symposium was held on April 25-27, 1955 at the University of Minnesota.

The four papers and selected material from a panel which were presented at the conference constitute this symposium.

In addition to the symposium four related articles on religion in higher education are published in this issue.

—The Editorial Committee

I

Historical Developments

AFFECTING THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN THE STATE UNIVERSITY CURRICULUM

WALTON BEAN

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Introduction

A HUNDRED YEARS ago, the subject of religion in state universities was characterized by vexation and anxiety. Today these problems seem on the way to moderately satisfactory solutions in an atmosphere of cooperation and harmony. This article describes some of the remarkable changes in this important aspect of American higher education, and some of the social, economic, political, and cultural developments which have brought these changes about.

American higher education had its beginnings as a result of primarily religious impulses. The nine colleges founded in America during the colonial period—one for each of the muses, as someone remarked—were the products of an interesting mixture of religious and civil purposes and of public and private support. The aims of religion and of government were then generally regarded as inseparable, and the members of a colonial legislature who voted for a charter or a public grant of land or money to a college were usually faithful members of the locally dom-

inant church. In five of the colonies in which colleges were created, a particular religious denomination was "established"—that is, recognized and supported by law.

Harvard College, the first corporation chartered in the Western Hemisphere, was founded as a result of an appropriation of four hundred pounds of the General Court of the colony of Massachusetts Bay in 1636, "towards a schoale or colledge." The aims of the founders were well described in *New Englands First Fruits* (1643):

"After . . . wee had builded our houses, provided the necessaries for our livelihood, reared convenient places for God's worship and settled the Civill Government; one of the next things wee longed for and looked after was to advance *Learning* and to perpetuate it to Posterity; dreading to leave an illiterate Ministry to the Churches, when our present Ministers shall lie in the Dust."

It is true that conflicts over matters of dogma were troublesome from the earliest years. The able first president of Harvard, Henry Dunster, was forced to resign in 1654

because he "fell into the briers of antipaedobaptism." In the first quarter of the eighteenth century, President John Leverett kept Harvard an institution of learning under the spirit of religion but defied the demands of Cotton and Increase Mather that it remain a narrow divinity school for the Puritan sect. Theological disputations also had a part in the troubles which led President Edward Holyoke to remark on his death bed, in 1769: "If any man wishes to be humbled and mortified, let him become President of Harvard College."¹

The College of William and Mary was a symbol of what Herbert Baxter Adams called "an *entente cordiale* between the college, the church, and the state" in colonial Virginia. The president was the Virginia deputy of the Bishop of London. In the language of the charter, reflecting the language of a petition from the Virginia General Assembly, the aims of the founders were "that the Church of Virginia may be furnished with a seminary of ministers of the Gospel, and that the youth may be piously educated in good letters and manners. . . ." The path was not entirely smooth. When the Reverend James Blair, first president of the college, persuaded the King and Queen to include in the charter in 1693 a handsome grant of two thousand pounds, Seymore, the economy-minded attorney general for the crown, was irked at such extravagance and entered a protest which foreshadowed the most extreme spirit of secularism. When Blair observed that Virginians had souls to be saved, Seymore replied, "Souls! Damn your souls! Make *tobacco*!"

Eighteenth Century

In founding the institution later named for Elihu Yale, a group of orthodox Puritan clergymen created the archetype of the privately controlled denominational college, without the complex formal relations with the civil authority that were characteristic of colonial Harvard and William and Mary. Yale was to be the mother or rather the grandmother of dozens of colleges founded

by her sons in the West in the nineteenth century. There were civic as well as religious aims, well expressed in the original petition in 1701 for "a collegiate school . . . wherein youth should be instructed in all parts of learning, to qualify them for public employments in church and civil state." But it was significant that Yale was founded largely because of feeling that Harvard had "fallen under the Tutelage of Latitudinarians." In 1754 President Thomas Clap published a pamphlet on *The Religious Constitution of Colleges, especially of Yale College in New Haven*. "Colleges," he insisted, "are *Societies of Ministers*, for training up Persons for the Work of the Ministry . . . The great design of founding this School, was, to Educate Ministers in our *own Way*."

Several of the colonial colleges were founded partly as a result of the widespread religious revival known as the "Great Awakening," which reached its height during the 1730's. This movement intensified differences of theological interpretation, split old denominations and created new ones, and led to new demands from the faithful of several sects that both ministers and laymen should be trained in the right way. The College of New Jersey, later Princeton, was conceived by a group of ministers of the "New Light" faction of the Presbyterian Church. The College of Philadelphia and King's College were controlled by Anglicans.

The College of Rhode Island, forerunner of Brown University, was founded by leading Baptists of several colonies, but Congregationalists joined in supporting the college, and its charter forbade religious tests and prescribed that sectarian differences in theology should be explained in its classes without bias. Queen's College, later Rutgers, was founded by leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church, and Dartmouth by a liberal Congregational minister.

In the actual teaching of the early American colleges, however, sectarian differences were usually less important than they seemed to zealous persons outside the colleges. In the late colonial period the curriculum usually consisted of Latin, Greek, Hebrew, the

¹Samuel Eliot Morison, *Three Centuries of Harvard* (1937), p. 99.

Bible, theology, philosophy, English, and a little "natural philosophy" including elements of astronomy, botany, and physics. The curriculum was remarkably standardized and was intended to provide a general education appropriate for ministers. None of the colonial colleges required students to subscribe to any particular religious faith as a condition of enrollment, and all of them professed to offer an education for secular as well as religious leadership. The same studies were supposed to be ideal for both. To the influence of the "seven liberal arts" of the Romans and the medieval churchmen, the Renaissance and the Reformation had added an emphasis on the classics of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew literature, the study of which was believed to "discipline" the mind and elevate the tastes of any educated man. In spite of the introduction of a few elements of natural science in the age following the discoveries of Newton, the early American college curriculum remained largely inflexible. Moreover, the values of the classical languages and literatures were often lost through dull teaching. The same books were usually prescribed for all students, and their contents were learned and recited by rote.

The coming of the American Revolution brought a wave of secularism and political liberalism in which several of the states sought to convert colonial colleges into state-controlled institutions. But the failure of such efforts in New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Virginia during the Revolutionary period determined even before the Dartmouth College case that if the states wished to control institutions of higher learning, they would have to establish their own. American state universities began in the southeastern seaboard states in which there had been no colonial colleges to preempt the field.

The failure of the efforts of the Presbyterians of North Carolina to establish a college during the colonial period led them to cooperate with the state in the establishment of the University of North Carolina, chartered in 1789 and opened in 1795. As this collaboration suggests, the earliest American state universities differed very little from the

colonial institutions on which they were closely patterned. In the early development of the University of North Carolina, for example, there was some friction in the governing board between the Rev. Samuel McCorkle, a leading Presbyterian minister, and William R. Davie, a deist and the state's outstanding legislator, there was also a high degree of cooperation and mutual respect. It was significant that in 1795 the Board of Trustees adopted as one of a series of "Laws and Regulations" proposed by Rev. McCorkle the requirement "That the President or other officers perform morning and evening prayer and examine the students each Sunday evening on the questions previously given them on the general principles of morality and religion."² In the curriculum, Davie's pleas for the sciences were overridden by McCorkle's demands for the classics. Davie, however, succeeded in picking most of the faculty, which McCorkle often accused of being too liberal. For decades most of the trustees and all of the presidents were Presbyterians.

Nineteenth Century

In the early statehood period in Virginia, Thomas Jefferson struggled unsuccessfully to make William and Mary College a state institution and to broaden its curriculum, but the college resisted conversion and chose to cast its lot with the new Episcopal Church rather than with the state. Jefferson believed that the Presbyterians and Baptists refused their support for his project because they feared "some design" by which the Episcopalians would be permitted to dominate the college and through it the whole public school system.

When at last Jefferson succeeded in establishing the University of Virginia, in a state law of 1819, he saw to it that there was no professorship of divinity. But certain proposals in his annual report as Rector of the University, on October 7, 1822, made this one of the most interesting documents in the history of relations between religion and

²R. D. W. Connor, ed., *Documentary History of the University of North Carolina, 1777-1799* (1953), I: 375-376.

state universities. Jefferson wrote that in a report of the commissioners in 1818:³

it was stated that . . . provision . . . was made for giving instruction in the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin languages, the depositories of the originals and of the earliest and most respected authorities of the faith of every sect, and for courses of ethical lectures, developing those moral obligations in which all sects agree. That . . . they had left to every sect to take into their own hands the office of further instruction in the particular tenet of each. It was not, however, to be understood that instruction in religious opinions and duties was meant to be precluded by the public authorities, as indifferent to the interests of society. On the contrary, the relations which exist between man and his Maker, and the duties resulting from these relations, are the most interesting and important to every human being, and the most incumbent on his study and investigation. The want of instruction in the various creeds of religious faith existing among our citizens presents, therefore, a chasm in a general institution of the useful sciences. But it was thought that this want, and the entrustment to each society of instruction in its own doctrine, were evils of less danger than a permission to the public authorities to dictate modes or principles of religious instruction, or than opportunities furnished them by giving countenance or ascendancy to any one sect over another. A remedy, however, has been suggested of promising aspect, which, while it excludes the public authorities from the domain of religious freedom, will give to the sectarian schools of divinity the full benefit of the public provisions made for instruction in the other branches of science . . . It has . . . been in contemplation, and suggested by some pious individuals, who perceive the advantages of associating other studies with those of religion, to establish their religious schools on the confines of the University, so as to give to their students ready and convenient access and attendance on the scientific lectures of the university. . . . Such estab-

lishments would offer the further and greater advantage of enabling the students of the University to attend religious exercises with the professor of their particular sect, either in the rooms of the building still to be erected, and destined to that purpose under impartial regulations, as proposed in the same report of the commissioners, or in the lecturing room of such professor. To such propositions the Visitors are disposed to lend a willing ear, and would think it their duty to give every encouragement, by assuring those who might choose such a location for their schools, that the regulations of the University should be so modified and accommodated as to give every facility of access and attendance to their students, with such regulated use also as may be permitted to the other students, of the library which may hereafter be acquired, either by public or private munificence. But always understanding that these schools shall be independent of the University and of each other. Such an arrangement would complete the circle of the useful sciences embraced by this institution and would fill the chasm now existing, on principles which would leave inviolate the constitutional freedom of religion, the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights, over which the people and authorities of this state, individually and publicly, have ever manifested the most watchful jealousy: and could this jealousy be now alarmed, in the opinion of the legislature, by what is here suggested, the idea will be relinquished on any surmise of disapprobation which they might think proper to express.

The proposal, remarkably foreshadowing a twentieth-century attitude toward the problem, was formally written into the university regulations in 1824. But the Virginia denominations were suspicious of it, and none of them came forward to take advantage of it.

The nineteenth century was a period of intense rivalry and frequent conflict between sectarian colleges and state universities. Both types of institutions, though often rich in the devotion of their faculties, were almost always desperately poor in the economic sense. Dozens and even hundreds of small denomi-

³Saul K. Padover, ed., *The Complete Jefferson* (1943), p. 957. This document was quoted at length in the dissenting opinion of Justice Reed in the McCollum case.

national colleges sprang up in the wake of the advance of the frontier across the continent. They were a part of the American system of free enterprise. They were engaged in a bitter competition with the state universities and with each other, not only for predominance but often for mere survival, and their mortality rate was appalling, mainly for financial reasons. Money is the common denominator to which educational policies must be reduced before they can be made effective.

In this struggle, denominational leaders often denounced the state universities as godless, in language like that of the zealous editor who described a state-university entering class as "two hundred raw recruits for Satan!"⁴ Unfortunately, one state university president was brash enough to furnish sectarians with considerable ammunition for attacks of this kind. Thomas Cooper, president of South Carolina College in the 1820's and early '30's, was a brilliant scientist and educator by profession, a materialist by conviction, and an agitator by temperament. He had an open contempt for the clergy as a class, and in his lectures on chemistry and geology he went out of his way to controvert the Biblical account of the formation of the earth and to deny that the Pentateuch was written by Moses or with divine authority. After a formal trial, in which Cooper asserted that the charges against him were part of a sectarian plot to take over the government, he was acquitted by a narrow margin. But he resigned in 1833, and the demoralized college received a thorough reorganization, a new professorship of the evidences of Christianity, and an entirely new faculty.⁵

In the early years, Presbyterians dominated several supposedly state-controlled institutions in North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio and Indiana. At first the Methodists and Baptists were some-

what less concerned in collegiate enterprises than were the Presbyterians and Congregationalists. The Methodists and Baptists stressed evangelical zeal and often regarded the formal education of ministers as human attempts to do what only God could accomplish. Later, however, these denominations greatly increased their interest in higher education, both sectarian and public. In 1834 the Indiana Methodists submitted six memorials to the legislature demanding appointment of a Methodist professor in the state university. Samuel Bigger, a Presbyterian member of the legislature, asserted that there was "not a Methodist in America with sufficient learning to fill a professor's chair if it were tendered him." Bigger was elected governor in 1840, but the Methodists claimed to have been responsible for defeating him for reelection in 1843.⁶

In several states, after the Morrill Act of 1862, denominational colleges sought to secure the land-grant funds for their own treasuries and the new agricultural colleges for their own campuses. In Illinois, private colleges blocked the organization of any state university at all until 1867, when the demands of the farmers forced the legislature to allocate the Morrill funds to a new "Illinois Industrial University." California was a rare exception in that a private college begun by Congregationalists and Presbyterians gave its property to the state to be used as a campus for the new state university, rather than engage in a ruinous competition with it.

The state universities were often on the defensive against sectarian attacks, of which almost innumerable illustrations could be cited. As late as 1885, for example, a traveling agent for a Methodist college denounced the University of Alabama on the ground that its students "had access" to the writings of Robert Ingersoll, a charge which proved to be based on the fact that a student had ordered them from a book dealer. In the same year the Methodist bishop described a proposal for free tuition at the state univer-

⁴Quoted by Charles Kendall Adams in the *North American Review*, October, 1875, p. 369.

⁵Extracts from Thomas Cooper's defense of himself on charges of infidelity, 1831, in Edgar W. Knight, ed., *A Documentary History of Education in the South Before 1860, Volume III, The Rise of the State University* (1952), pp. 247-260.

⁶Willis Frederick Dunbar, "The Influence of the Protestant Denominations on Higher Education in Michigan 1817-1900," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan (1939), pp. 77-78.

sity as a subsidy to "the anti-church sect . . . the most bigoted and intolerant of all the sects," in its efforts to undermine religion. Using the "strong arm of taxation" to provide students with a free classical or professional training was "communism or agrarianism," and comparable to giving them a farm or setting them up in business. A "bad moral atmosphere," said the bishop, had infected state universities until denominational colleges had shamed them into an outward appearance of propriety.⁷

The partisans of denominational colleges often exercised considerable influence in state legislatures, and the governing boards and presidents of state universities often went to remarkable lengths to disprove charges that their institutions were irreligious. In the 1840's the regents of the University of Michigan adopted the policy of giving representation in the faculty to each of the major Protestant denominations, and even of rotating the presidency annually among the professors to avoid charges of discrimination. In the '50's, however, President Henry Philip Tappan, although himself a Presbyterian clergyman, established a vigorous nonsectarian policy. Professor Alexander Winchell, a prominent Methodist layman, was deeply irritated when he was not given the house on the campus which the university had previously provided for the "Methodist Professor," and this and other similar troubles had much to do with the regents' removal of Tappan in 1863.⁸

In an era when what Andrew D. White called "the warfare of science with theology" was raging, the difficult situation of struggling young state universities often put a premium on presidents who could "reconcile" the two. The Wisconsin regents chose President Paul Chadbourne in 1867 precisely for his reputation in this respect. In his Lowell Lectures on *Natural Theology*, published for use as a textbook at Harvard, Chadbourne asserted that "the chemical relation of the elements to each other and the wants of man"

disproved Darwin's theory of evolution and established the truth of revealed religion. "Every tree . . . in its special adaptation," Chadbourne wrote, "shows a personal God." During Chadbourne's three-year presidency, his course in "Natural Theology and Evidences of Christianity" was required of all students at Wisconsin. John Bascom, president from 1874 to 1887, was also a philosopher of "religion and science." Bascom was a dualist, and in his philosophy course, required of all seniors, he taught his students that the theories of Darwin and Spencer could never explain the transition from unconscious matter to the conscious mind.⁹

Such courses, taught by the president and required of all students in the senior year, were a fairly common pattern. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, in fact, state university presidents were frequently men who had been trained for the ministry, and presidents who were not clergymen were usually well-known to be devoutly religious. A professor at the University of Minnesota once remarked of Cyrus Northrop, its second president, that he "sanctified the whole place." No one could reasonably denounce as godless an institution under the care of a man who was so obviously godly.¹⁰

Compulsory attendance at daily chapel exercises was required at many state universities until about the 1890's. It was a source of much friction. After it had been temporarily discontinued at Ohio State, for example, the board of trustees passed a resolution in 1881 requiring attendance at a "daily assemblage" at which there should be "reading of the Scriptures (without comment) and prayers, at the discretion of the President of the University." President Walter Quincy Scott assumed that this regential prose had put at his discretion not merely the question of prayers, but the entire matter of enforcing the resolution. He did not enforce it (partly for the cogent reason that there was no longer any room on the campus large

⁷James B. Sellers, *History of the University of Alabama, Volume I, 1818-1902* (1953), pp. 562 ff.

⁸Dunbar, *op. cit.*, pp. 295 ff.

⁹Merle Curti and Vernon Carstensen, *The University of Wisconsin, 1848-1925* (1949), I: 227-228, 279-281, 407-411.

¹⁰James Gray, *The University of Minnesota, 1851-1951* (1951), p. 84.

enough to hold the whole student body). This was one of the reasons for his removal in 1883. Several years later Thomas C. Mendenhall declined the presidency partly on the ground that he could not and would not pray in public.¹¹

In 1891 an Illinois court held that a requirement of chapel attendance at the state university was not unconstitutional, since any student could be excused who would sign a request to that effect. But by the turn of the century not only compulsory chapel but any religious observances whatever, with the exception of a prayer at commencement, had been generally discontinued as a part of the official exercises of most state universities.

This was the result of a steady trend toward secularization. By this time, most state constitutions forbade "any sectarian instruction," any religious tests, or any "partisan or sectarian influence" in the state university. The sects themselves, in their multiplicity and in the bitterness of their jealousies, had forced secularization upon the state universities somewhat as they had forced it upon the public schools, although not to the same degree.

The general decline in the relative importance of religion in the curriculum, however, was chiefly the result of revolutionary changes in the university curriculum itself—changes which affected church-related colleges and universities as well as state institutions. The old homogeneous classical curriculum, in which religion was central, was gradually replaced by one in which the growing demands of science, industry, and the professions created hundreds of new secular courses. The establishment of the state agricultural colleges under the Morrill Act was only one of many forces which oriented the curriculum toward utilitarianism and specialization. With the rise of the large university, whether public or private, the total enrollment in the professional schools often exceeded enrollment in the liberal arts college. Even within that college the increasing complexity of the curriculum left a

smaller and smaller proportion of time, money, and student interest for religion.

Twentieth Century

The twentieth century, in contrast to the nineteenth, has been a period of gradual but in general remarkably harmonious adjustment. Two definite reasons for this phenomenon may be suggested, both of them resulting from the considerable advance of civilization in the United States during the last hundred years. First, there has been a great moderation in the spirit of sectarianism, and consequently in denominational attacks on public higher education. Many religious leaders realized that, as the Northern Baptist Convention in Michigan resolved in 1910, "to denounce state universities or normal schools as irreligious does measureless harm to Christianity by alienating from it many of the cultivated minds of the country."¹² Second, the twentieth century brought a gradual lessening of the desperate competition for students, on whose tuition the private church-related colleges were heavily dependent. The percentage of college-age youth attending college rose remarkably, and leaders of the two American types of higher institutions, private and public, came to realize that the task of providing higher education for the staggering numbers of students who wanted and deserved it was a task too large for the greatest efforts of both combined.

In recent years American ingenuity has produced a group of interestingly variegated patterns of adjustment to the problems of religion in the curriculum of public universities. To provide a summary view, we may first trace the experiences of one major university over the last several decades, as a brief case study, and then describe the various patterns now or recently in existence at a number of other institutions.

The University of Michigan

The University of Michigan, after the adoption of President Tappan's non-sectarian policy, made a long series of efforts to delegate religious training to leaders outside the university staff. James Burrill Angell, president for thirty-eight years (1871-1909), was

¹¹James E. Pollard, *History of the Ohio State University . . . 1873-1948* (1952), pp. 77-78, 86-87, 134.

¹²Dunbar, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

deeply interested in the moral and religious aspects of higher education. He encouraged the formation of several student Christian organizations. With his encouragement, also, the Episcopalians and Presbyterians made provision for the religious instruction of students at the University, and several other denominations followed their lead. The churches in Ann Arbor established "guild halls" or "student centers," and each named an associate pastor assigned especially to students. The National Conference of Church Workers in Universities was organized at Michigan in 1909.¹³

In the early 1920's the University made an interesting attempt to develop a closely affiliated School of Religion. Charles Foster Kent, professor of Biblical literature at Yale during the first quarter of the century, was a crusader for the establishment of such schools at state universities. Through the work of Kent and later of Professor Clarence Prouty Shedd, Yale also became a major center of training for the new profession of student religious counseling, and did much to encourage the growth of a sense of partnership and mutual respect among all the religious and educational agencies within the college or university community.¹⁴ At the request of the University of Michigan, Professor Kent was chiefly responsible for the planning of a school of religion to be affiliated with the university but separate in property, control, and curriculum. The enterprise was abandoned in 1926, largely because of the deaths of Professor Kent and President Marian LeRoy Burton, but also because several businessmen among the lay subscribers, having been led to expect a very large enrollment of university students in the new courses, cancelled their pledges when less than 200 enrolled.¹⁵

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 323; Edward W. Blakeman, "Developing an Indigenous Religious Program in a State University," *Religious Education*, April-June, 1941, pp. 69 ff.; Wilfred B. Shaw, ed., *The University of Michigan, An Encyclopedic Survey, Part I, History and Administration* (1941), p. 70.

¹⁴Thornton W. Merriam, "Religion in Higher Education Through the Past Twenty-Five Years," in Amos N. Wilder, ed., *Liberal Learning and Religion*, pp. 4 ff.

In 1933, at the suggestion of President Alexander Grant Ruthven, the Michigan regents created an office of "Counselor in Religious Education." This university officer was not only to advise students but also to serve as a contact person between the university and religious agencies, and to advise the university itself in religious affairs. Dr. Edward W. Blakeman served in this position from 1933 to 1948. A committee worked out an interdepartmental degree program with a concentration in religion and ethics, drawn from regular courses in the College of Literature and Science, and the Arts in the departments of English, history, classical, Far Eastern and Near Eastern studies, fine arts, philosophy, psychology, anthropology, and sociology. An interesting development in the professional schools also reflected President Ruthven's concern for ethical and social values and his fear that these values were being submerged in the vocational emphasis apparent in a large state university. In the professional colleges, committees undertook studies of the ethical codes of their professions, especially with a view to collecting case materials for use in connection with existing courses.¹⁶

During recent years, Edward W. Blakeman and his associates have conducted a broad and careful survey of curriculum in religion in the higher educational institutions of fifteen states selected as samples of the major regions of the country. This valuable study was financed by the University of Michigan and encouraged by the interest of President Ruthven as chairman of a committee of the National Association of State Universities, on Religious Agencies at State Centers.¹⁷

¹⁵Edward W. Blakeman, in *Religious Education*, April-June, 1941, pp. 71-72.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 67-76; University of Michigan, College of Literature, Science and the Arts, *Announcement*, 1954-55, pp. 243-245.

¹⁷Edward W. Blakeman, "Curricular Religion in Our State Universities," *Religious Education*, July-August, 1953, pp. 262-268.

Six Patterns

It appears that provisions for religion in the curriculum of public higher education may be classified into six patterns or categories. One is the "area of concentration" or "degree program" in religion, a type exemplified by the plans in effect at Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky, and the Universities of California at Berkeley and Los Angeles. Under this plan religion is regarded as a phase of culture, and the literature, history, philosophy, and psychology of religion are treated in courses in the corresponding departments.¹⁸

A second pattern is that of a department of religion. Such a department is usually maintained in private universities (though Harvard is an interesting exception). Departments of religion are much less common in state institutions, but they do exist, for example, in the state universities of Florida,¹⁹ Georgia, and Oregon. One criticism of this plan has been that it makes religion seem to compete with faculties in philosophy, history, and other departments. It is notable that Iowa State College at Ames has a department of "religious education"—and no department of philosophy.

The situation in Iowa, in fact, has been rather special in that it has permitted an extraordinary degree of recognition of religion in the curriculums of both of the state's public universities. The State University of Iowa, at Iowa City, developed a unique program in the form of an inter-faith school of religion. Under the leadership of Dr. M. Willard Lampe, who became its director, this school was established in 1923 and incorporated in 1928. Though it was placed under a separate governing board, with some members named by the university and others by the religious denominations, the work of the school was carefully integrated with that of the university, and the plan was designed to secure in-

timate cooperation between the university and the religious bodies of the state in both the control and the support of the school. The university provides classrooms, offices, and administrative expenses, while the salaries of a Jewish, a Catholic, and a Protestant professor are paid from private subscriptions. Perhaps the most unique aspect of the school is that it includes some courses with a frankly sectarian label in a program partially supported by state funds.²⁰

A fourth plan has been that of a church college adjacent to the campus, affiliated with the university, and enrolling university students for academic credit, but essentially separate in control and support—a plan in effect at the universities of Missouri and North Dakota, and modeled on similar colleges at the universities of Oxford and Toronto. The Bible College adjacent to the University of Missouri was founded in 1896 by the Disciples of Christ, but since 1919 its staff and control have been interdenominational.

Still another type of provision for religion has taken the form of ecclesiastical "foundations" or "Bible chairs," supported by the various faiths in connection with the faculty-student congregations of their campus churches. This plan offers academic credit for courses taught, near the campus but not on it, by representatives of the various denominations, with academic standards under university control. Such arrangements have been established at the universities of Illinois, Kansas, Montana, and Texas.

A sixth pattern, based on the assumption that all religion is sectarian, eliminates religion entirely from any official provision in the state university curriculum. This, in

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 264-268; William Clayton Bower, "An Area of Concentration," *Religious Education*, March-April, 1947 (on the University of Kentucky program); institutional catalogues.

¹⁹J. Hillis Miller, "Religion in a State University" (the University of Florida), in F. Earnest Johnson, ed., *American Education and Religion*

²⁰Ansen Phelps Stokes, *Church and State in the United States* (1950), II; 626-628; Edward W. Blakeman, "Religious Education in Tax-supported Colleges and Universities," in Philip Henry Lotz, ed., *Orientation in Religious Education* (1950), pp. 367-368; Clarence P. Shedd, "Religion in American State Universities: its History and Present Problems," in Henry E. Allen, ed., *Religion in the State University: an Initial Exploration* (papers read at a conference at the University of Minnesota, October 27-29, 1949), p. 24; M. Willard Lampe, "Teaching Religion in a State University," *Christian Education*, March, 1947.

effect, is something between a denial that religion exists and an elevation of secularism to the state of a religion.

In general it is clear that, to say the least, the influence of religion has not been entirely excluded from American public higher education.²¹ As Justice Jackson remarked in

his concurring opinion in the McCollum case, the "wall of separation between church and state," of which Jefferson spoke in his letter to the Danbury Baptists, has meandered as much as the famous serpentine wall with which he ornamented the campus of his beloved state university.

²¹On related developments, see also Donald D. Parker, "Religion at Land Grant Colleges," *Religious Education*, March-April, 1947, pp. 80-85,

and Henry E. Allen, "Practices of Land Grant Colleges and State Universities Affecting Religious Matters," *School and Society*, December 6, 1952.

RELIGION IN CURRENT MAGAZINES

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As an experiment this department is launched with the thoughts that (1) a tip on such articles may provide material for background and/or illustrative purposes; (2) some excellent articles in popular magazines may go unnoticed; (3) usually no professional or denominational magazines will be scanned since most readers of RELIGIOUS EDUCATION subscribe to and read them. However, Prof. House will appreciate leads on any current articles.

— Editorial Committee

Life has presented a series of articles on The World's Great Religions. Profusely illustrated in color, the articles concern Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucius, Islam, Judaism. Christianity will be the subject of a separate and later treatment. Discussion outlines of the articles which appeared in February, March, April, May and June issues are available at 10c each from Time-Life Education Department, 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20, N. Y.

No religious educator should miss "Confessions of a Sunday School Teacher," by Jerome Ellison in *The Saturday Evening Post*, February 26, 1955.

"A Mighty People of the Rockies," by Rebecca Franklin in the *New York Times Magazine*, April 3, 1955, presents an excellent treatment of the Mormons and their 125th anniversary. They are now 1,250,000 strong and still growing.

A priest, Father John LaFarge, associate editor of *America*; a Protestant clergyman, Dr. Ralph Sockman, pastor of Christ Church Methodist in New York City; and Dr. David Seligson, former president of the New York Board of Rabbis, join forces to furnish material for "Three Faiths Answer the Unbeliever," in *Coronet*, May, 1955. Presented in question and answer form, the article is written by Paul S. Heller.

"Have We a New Religion?" by Paul Hutchinson, editor of *The Christian Century*, appears in *Life*, April 11, 1955. He attacks what he terms "the cult of reassurance" whose chief exponent is Dr. Norman Vincent Peale.

The pro and con of "the cult of reassurance" was also prominent in the September, 1955 *Redbook*. Authors William Peters and Arthur Gordon called it "the stormiest controversy in American religion today."

"Has 'Foxhole Religion' Really Lasted?" is the title of an article by Henry Lee in *Better Homes & Gardens*, September, 1955. Ten years after V-J Day, eight chaplains take a realistic view of religion in America today.

"A Bell for Okinawa," by Bruce Bliven, Jr., in *Readers Digest*, August, 1955, tells of the search for a church bell for a leper colony. The article is condensed from the April 7, 1955, *Christ and Welt*.

"I Can Prove There Is a God," by Lillian Roth, appears in *Coronet*, August, 1955. Miss Roth, an entertainer who staged a comeback after a long seige of alcoholism, says in this article, written in collaboration with Gerold Frank, "I have been atheist, agnostic, unbeliever —." Her autobiography, *I'll Cry Tomorrow*, is a best-seller, now made into a movie.

"Yankee Camp Meeting," by Henry LaCossitt in *The Saturday Evening Post*, August 20, 1955, is the story of the 120-year-old Martha's Vineyard Camp Meeting.

"The Power of Prayer," by Madame Chiang Kai-shek in the *Readers Digest* for August, 1955, is a condensation of her forthcoming book. She describes her "old fashioned" conversion and the influence of prayer groups in Free China.

II

Constitutional Limitations and SUPPORTS FOR DEALING WITH RELIGION IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION

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THE FIRST Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees us some of our most prized civil rights—freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly. It also provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. You all know that at the time of the proposed ratification of the Constitution, it was insisted upon by certain people that there be a Bill of Rights guaranteeing the rights that I just referred to as well as many other rights—freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, fair trial, jury trial, protection against self-incrimination, etc. These people were concerned by the absence of a Bill of Rights in the original Constitution and wanted one as a condition of ratification of the Constitution. Shortly after ratification of the Constitution, pursuant to moral commitment, the Bill of Rights to the Constitution was presented by Congress and ratified by the States.

Of course, in the early years of our federalism and up to the time of the Civil War, it was understood that the Bill of Rights, including its provision in respect to religion, was a limitation only upon the federal government. It had nothing to do with what a state might or might not effectuate. Following the Civil War, to pass quickly over some rather elementary American History, we had the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution which guarantees among other things that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. And since shortly after that amendment went into effect, we have had a more or less continuing constitutional struggle in

the federal and state courts as to how extensive is this guarantee of due process of law. The struggle continues unabated to this very hour of this term of the United States Supreme Court. To be brief about it, the attitudes have ranged from the viewpoint of Mr. Justice Black that the Fourteenth Amendment automatically assimilates all the Bill of Rights so that the Bill of Rights in its entirety is now applicable to State action, to the viewpoint that the Bill of Rights *per se* is not incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment but only those parts of it as are essential to a scheme of ordered liberty, as Justice Cardozo put it in one of his famous opinions *Palko v. Connecticut*, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). And then we have still a third viewpoint, namely: Yes, everything in the Bill of Rights is in the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Bill of Rights isn't the exclusive measure of that Amendment. There may be still other fundamental rights which are not in the Bill of Rights but which are federally protected against encroaching state action. However, for our purposes it seems adequate to say that in any event it is now thoroughly accepted that the guarantee of the First Amendment, Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, is just as applicable against the states and all the departments of state government as it is against the United States government. There is no longer any serious question about that. So that, although it may strike the non-lawyer as strange to have such important restraints on state action determined by reference to a constitutional provision that begins "Congress shall make no law," nevertheless, the fact of the

matter is that the First Amendment might well read now "Neither Congress nor the States" because that is the legal import of it by reason of the mentioned interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In recent years, the constitutional issue as to just what is meant by an establishment of religion, and just what is meant by free exercise of religion, has become a very acute issue, as you all know, that has received careful attention by the United States Supreme Court, among other courts. In fact, I don't suppose very many decisions since the Civil War have attracted more attention, not only from lawyers, but from the press, from scholars, from the citizenry generally of this country, than the Illinois Released Time Case, *McCullum v. Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). It was a sensational decision prompting much vehement as well as scholarly comment and was doubtless the high water mark of the interference in the name of the First Amendment with a state's choice of policy in this very important field of relationship of people to their government.

But before the *McCullum* case, we had *Everson v. Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), which involved whether New Jersey consistently with the First Amendment (and for shorthand purposes whenever I hereafter speak of the First Amendment you will understand that I am speaking about it as assimilated by the Fourteenth Amendment, in respect to State action) could permit its local sub-divisions of government to reimburse parents whose children go to non-profit private and parochial schools for the bus money they'd spend in going to those schools. May New Jersey permit this or is it an unconstitutional interference with the guarantees of the First Amendment? By the narrow margin of one vote, a five to four vote, the United States Supreme Court in that case in 1947 held that there was no violation of the First Amendment in what New Jersey had done there. But that holding was over four vigorous dissenting votes and those who favored the program of such bus transportation aid to non-profit private and parochial school pupils and who took much comfort in the *Everson* case could have done so I

think only by careless reading of the language of the majority opinion. In that very majority opinion Mr. Justice Black for the Court said: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." We might as well get rid immediately of the latter part of that sentence "or prefer one religion over another" because I take it every competent American constitutional lawyer would concur in the proposition that the First Amendment conclusively precludes any preference for one denomination as against any other or all others. The significant portions of that strong statement by Mr. Justice Black are these: Neither the state nor the Federal Government can pass laws which aid one religion or aid all religions. And the very next year the logical conclusion of that philosophy of construction of the First Amendment was fulfilled in the famous *McCullum* Case.

In the *McCullum* Case, the School Board at Champaign pursuant to permission of Illinois law, which provides for compulsory elementary education, adopted a program of permitting teachers from various religious denominations to come to the public school premises. These teachers were paid, not by the school system, but by the respective denominations, but they taught on the public school premises. The children who wanted to go, pursuant to parental direction, to a religious class were excused from the other studies; the remaining children continued in their regular secular pursuits. Thus the pupils who elected denominational instruction got it on public school premises. By an 8 to 1 vote, only Mr. Justice Read dissenting, the United States Supreme Court, which in the *Everson* case had split 5 to 4 to uphold the New Jersey program, condemned as violative of the First Amendment, the Illinois arrangement, essentially on the grounds that it was a use of the compulsory primary education laws of the State for religious purposes Illinois children between 7 and 16 years of age had to be in school. Thus, according to the Court, the Champaign plan was a compulsory use of Illinois law to provide religious instruction and, therefore, an establish-

ment of religion within the prohibited meaning of the First Amendment.

You all know, I am sure, that the *McCollum* decision promoted a vast amount of legal and political science scholarship, from the clergy, academic world and legal profession throughout the country. I happened to be in the United States Supreme Court when that case was argued. The extent and vehemence of the reaction were well anticipated by the nature of the argument, the oral argument, before the United States Supreme Court. I remember the counsel for the school board taking out a coin and in substance saying: "What's on that? In God we trust. Does separation of church and state require that we take that off?" For a thorough review of the history of the First Amendment according to the philosophies especially of Justices Jackson, Rutledge, Frankfurter and Black, you could spend a very profitable day reading their exhaustive opinions, both for the Court and for themselves, in the *Everson* and *McCollum* cases. I personally felt that the opinions in the *McCollum* case (except the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Reed) represented an extremist viewpoint, a doctrine of complete separation, of complete insulation of religion from the state that could stand neither an historical appraisal nor appraisal from the common sense viewpoint of the realities. When one considers all of the interrelationships between government and religion in the country's history—the provision of chaplains in the armed services at government pay, the maintenance of chapels at West Point and Annapolis, the favored position of religion as contrasted with many private enterprises in respect to taxation, the annual Thanksgiving Day proclamation, the very words with which the Supreme Court commences its sessions "God save the United States and this honorable court," not to mention the paying of millions of dollars from the federal treasury to religiously maintained colleges for students' tuition under the G.I. Bill of World War II—considering all these things it seemed quite certain to many thinkers that the *McCollum* constitutional philosophy represented an ex-

tremist viewpoint that could not stand the test of time.

Thus it was that many lawyers anticipated what the Supreme Court did just four years later in the famous New York case of *Zorach v. Clauson*, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). That involved the New York released time program, which in many particulars was essentially the same as the Illinois program. In fact, one of the Justices in the *Zorach* case, dissenting from the result there reached which I will mention in a minute, pointed out that it was almost cynical to base a decision in the *Zorach* case on any distinction between the facts of the *McCollum* case and of the *Zorach* case. But the one big difference was that in the *Zorach* case the students were released from the school's physical premises to attend the religious instructions at their respective religious centers. In the *Zorach* case, by a 6 to 3 vote, again over the vigorous opinions of Justice Frankfurter, Justice Jackson and Justice Black, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court held that the First Amendment is in no way violated by New York's released time educational plan. Now, the Court in the *Zorach* case doesn't purport in any way to overrule the *McCollum* case. It distinguishes it for the reason I have just mentioned (the difference between religious instruction on and off public school premises) and from a very technical viewpoint, at least, undoubtedly the cases are distinguishable. But the significant thing to me in the *Zorach* case is not the precise holding as much as its basic premise. Whereas in the *Everson* case and in the *McCollum* case the language had been that neither a state nor the federal government can pass laws which aid one religion or aid all religions. In the *Zorach* case, the language of six of the justices is this: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Then Mr. Justice Douglas for the Court went on to say "We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal

of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions" (343 U.S. at 313-14). Certainly that is a significant recession in my opinion, on the part of the majority of the Court, at least from the underlying philosophy of interpretation of the First Amendment, implicit and indeed explicit in the *Everson* and *McColum* cases.

Now, of course, all of you may think, there is another professor off on an irrelevancy, because all of the cases discussed concern primary schools. The truth is that there are no pertinent cases construing the First Amendment by the United States Supreme Court, and there are none so far as I know of recent and really significant value by any American court, in respect of a program of religious or theological studies at a state-supported college or university. However, in another connection the United States Supreme Court had occasion to note the legal significance of the voluntary nature of attendance at a state University. In *Hamilton v. Regents*, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) it was held that the University of California's requirement of compulsory participation in ROTC instruction did not unconstitutionally deprive a student who was a conscientious religious objector of his liberty. The Court noted that "California has not drafted or called students to attend the University," thus distinguishing University students from those who attend primary or secondary schools under compulsion of law. So, at least, we have that explicit recognition of the significance of the voluntary nature of attendance at a state university.

Now so much stress has been placed in recent years, and particularly since the *McColum* and *Everson* cases, upon the concept, "What is an establishment of religion within the prohibited meaning of the First Amendment" that I think we're inclined to lose sight of the other provision of that Amendment—Congress shall make no law regarding an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion. I

now want to present to you what is indeed somewhat of a constitutional dilemma posed by the extreme viewpoint of the *McColum* case in relation to the problem of free exercise of religion. The United States Supreme Court as early as 1925, you will remember, in *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) held unconstitutional the Oregon law that in substance attempted to do away with private and parochial schools and compel attendance of all school children aged 8 to 16 years at the public schools. That was an unanimous descision by a Court that included such pre-eminent protectors of civil liberties as Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone. Although not directly pertinent, because, after all, the real rationale of that decision is the inherent right of a parent to educate his child and the case perhaps isn't a freedom of religion case, in the refined sense of the word (it involved both a Catholic Parochial School and a private military academy), nevertheless, it is commonly regarded as one of the great bulwarks of freedom in the field of religion by way of guaranteeing private religious education.

In *Cantwell v. Connecticut*, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Supreme Court in substance held in one of the famous Jehovah's Witnesses cases, that the free exercise of religion part of the First Amendment prevents a state, from requiring a license as a condition to the solicitation of funds for religious purposes. The state cannot do that because it's too much of a previous restraint, so to speak, on the preaching of religion and religious doctrine. And then in 1943, where we were in the midst of the Second war and tempers were inflamed by the issue, in *Board of Education v. Barnett*, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), after a soul-searching re-examination, the United States Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision allowing West Virginia to compel a flag salute and in the name of the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment, held that West Virginia could not compel a Jehovah's Witnesses child to salute the flag, because such a salute was a violation of the religiously predicated con-

science of the child. Remember, when the flag salute case first went to the Supreme Court, *Minersville District v. Gobitis*, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), it was only Mr. Justice Stone who upheld the claim made in religion's name against the claims of the state. But within a few years, and during days of war, a majority of the Court was moved in the *Barnett* case to the view that the right of a child to be free from compulsion of this nature, which violated his sincerely held religious convictions, is a more significant value in our constitutional system than whatever value might be achieved by the state, by way of inculcation of patriotism, by the compulsory flag salute.

It is interesting to note, too, that in more recent years, in the name of the free exercise of religion provision of the First Amendment, the following results have been reached. A state may not arbitrarily or discriminatorily deny the public parks for religious purposes. *Niemotko v. Maryland*, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). And, subject, of course, to reasonable regulation of the streets for traffic and public safety purposes, a state may not constitutionally make the preaching of religion on the public streets conditioned upon the prior procurement of a license to do so. It violates the freedom of religion guaranteed by the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to impose that kind of a license on the preaching of religion on the public streets. *Kanny v. New York*, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).

Now just think of the kind of argument that could be made if one were to take the *McColum* and the *Everson* rationale to its logical conclusion. Of course, in these fields, as you all know, a page of history is often worth a volume of logic. But from the logical viewpoint, to take the *Everson* and *McColum* philosophy to its ultimate, neither Congress nor the states can do anything in aid of religion, would produce the result that the public parks and the public streets could not be used in aid of religion. And yet, the very contrary result is reached in these cases—that the freedom of religion and its exercise guarantee the use of the parks and the public streets for religious purpose. This dilemma

was focused recently not in the United States Supreme Court, but in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which, however, decided the question on the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution as well as on Wisconsin's own constitutional provisions. In *Milwaukee County v. Carter*, 258 Wisc. 139, 45 N.W. (2d) 90 (1950), a Milwaukee County ordinance, summarizing very briefly, prohibited speech in the public parks on religious subjects. But when an attack was made upon that ordinance, the defence seems to have been that the ordinance was not only perfectly constitutional, but in fact was required because of the doctrine that government cannot aid all religions or any religion. So the dilemma was very acutely focused, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court reached the result that the free exercise of religion, the guarantee of its free exercise, rendered unconstitutional, under the First Amendment as well as under Wisconsin's own Constitution, this type of an ordinance. Thus the people there interested were allowed to speak in the public park on religious subjects despite the ordinance.

Now, in the interest of brevity, I just want to say that as a result of the history, and cases I have discussed, it now seems to me reasonably safe to conclude that the federal Constitution in no way prohibits the treatment of theology or religion in public institutions of higher learning in a non-discriminatory manner and on a scholarly level consistent with the intellectual life of higher education. The fears that may have been understandably engendered by the *Everson* and *McColum* cases, in the first place should never have been literally transferred to the field of higher education. In the second place, in the light of *Zorach v. Clauson* and the other cases that I have discussed, provided that we are very careful always to be fair and avoid discrimination, so far as the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is concerned, we have *Carte blanche* to do what we think is morally, educationally, and philosophically sound in this field on the college level.

But we are so accustomed nowadays to looking to Washington that we often lose

sight of the fact that despite the increasing centralization of government of this country, much that intimately controls our lives is still within the competence of the states. And, of course, a state is perfectly free to recognize principles against the establishment of religion even more extreme than those of the *McCullum* case if it so wishes, provided only that in doing so it does not deny the protection of the First Amendment in respect of free exercise of religion.

Let me give you the Minnesota picture. Although I think there are several other state universities in the country which are substantially in the same position, Minnesota's University from a state constitutional viewpoint in relation to most American state universities, is unusual in this sense. Our University proceeds directly from the Constitution of Minnesota and for many purposes is beyond control by the legislature. The territorial act that had incorporated our university was assimilated into our constitution when our constitution was adopted, and it is well established in Minnesota and recently re-affirmed that our university has an independent constitutional status. It's no exaggeration, for example, to say that in many senses our university is the fourth branch of the state government.

In that territorial act of incorporation (Territorial Laws 1851, C.3, 27 M.S.A. p. 616) adopted and assimilated into our constitution (Minnesota Constitution 1857, Art. 8, Sec. 4) is the provision in Section 19 that no religious tenets shall be required for students, professors or officers. This is a rather common provision, common in the

sense that many states have something similar to it. Also, of course, in other provisions of our constitution, not directly tied up with the university, we guarantee freedom of religion and of conscience and provide against discrimination. No man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship or maintain any religious or ecclesiastical ministry. No religious tests for office holders, or voters shall ever be required. But most pertinent to the instant problem with respect to the university is another provision of our territorial act. Section 2 provides that no sectarian instruction shall be allowed in the University. "... no sectarian instruction shall be allowed in such University." Now of course, from other states we have many cases on what constitutes sectarian instruction for the prohibited purposes in elementary schools. But we have no authoritative judicial pronouncement on the subject for our University. At the same time it is important to note that not only would Minnesota, of course, be bound by the cases that I referred to interpreting the First Amendment in respect to free exercise of religion, but there are a number of indications from the Minnesota legislature of an attitude of friendly cooperation with religion. For example, one of our statutes authorizes school boards to provide the use of school houses for divine worship on Sunday, or for Sunday school. M.S. 125.06 (7) (1953). And we also, by statute, authorize a released time program for religious instructions, M.S. 132.05 (3) (1953), not to mention Minnesota's following of the usual American pattern of giving substantial tax exemption to religious organizations and religious purposes.

III

The Crisis of Values IN CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION, And the Responsibility of Higher Education

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I

THERE IS a crisis of values in contemporary civilization. That crisis is massive, comprehensive, and pervasive. To contemplate it responsibly is to risk paralysis of the will. Not to contemplate it is to risk the loss of all that is valued in contemporary civilization—perhaps to risk the loss of that civilization and of human life itself. As between the two risks, I prefer to face the situation than to flee to an almost certain destruction.

(1)

The most important component of our contemporary crisis is the fact of color. False valuations have been placed on skin pigmentation, and true values of humanity have been disvalued. The result is a world which is potentially divided into two great camps of hostility and antagonism.

The whole notion of white supremacy is one of the crueller accidents of history. Two movements, otherwise unrelated, happened to come at the same time. On the one hand, the voyages of discovery, followed by the industrial revolution and the growth of world commerce with its political and governmental and military concomitants, brought the white man into commercial, military, and political control of the darker peoples of the world. At the same time, the Enlightenment and the democratic revolution in this continent and in parts of Western Europe gave birth to the doctrine of the Rights of Man. The fact that these two movements came at the same moment of history led to

an horrendous result: the perversion of the doctrine of the Rights of Man into the dogma of the Rights of White Men. That dogma has not yet run its course nor spread its full crop from evil seed. Tortured South Africa and puzzlingly indignant Southern U.S.A. evidence the fact that the virus which infected the white man three or four centuries ago is still virulent—and no antibody has yet been discovered which can immunize every second grade child against it.

The clearest demonstration of the strength of this false notion of white supremacy is given by the Christian Church in the United States. Catholicism, with relatively a smaller number of Negro communicants, has done relatively better than Protestantism. Yet it must be admitted that more than half of all Negro Catholics in this country are today members of segregated congregations. Protestantism has a record which can be described only by such adjectives as scandalous and disgraceful: well over ninety-eight per cent of Negro Protestants gather by themselves on Sunday mornings. There is a value which is firmly enshrined in the teachings of Christendom: all men are children of One God. So we are taught and so we believe. But that value has been disvalued in ecclesiastical practice. And the record of history clearly shows—beyond the possibility of refutation—that the separate Negro churches were created by men who were refused equality and brotherhood inside an inclusive church.

We take great encouragement from the fact that in secular life some progress is be-

ing made. Indeed, the strides forward during the last twenty years have exceeded anything witnessed in any similar period anywhere in history. Toward economic equality, giant steps have been taken. And the Supreme Court decision of May 17, 1954 outlawing segregation in the public schools actually marks the beginning of a third phase of racial adjustment in this nation. Ninety years after Emancipation and thrice ninety years since man first enslaved man on this free soil, the political conscience of the nation has spoken. The cumbersome machinery of constitutional change is about to be put into action. It will succeed. The day will come in which no public school in this nation will predicate its teaching on the false notion of white supremacy.

But if that day is to come quickly—as it must, in view of the total world situation—and if it is to come peacefully as all would desire, the voice of religious conscience must be heard with a persuasiveness and an impelling clarity equal to that of the secular state. We know that there have been many unequivocal declarations of religious bodies, Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish, demanding an end to the segregated church in a segregated society. We also know that these declarations have not yet been implemented in comprehensive action. The contradiction between what is said and what is done continues. Within the church, the custodian of conscience, one supreme human value continues to be devalued. This is part of our crisis.

(2)

A second component of the current crisis of values is found in what has been called "the erosive effects of misery and suffering." The amazing disparity between economic and physical well being in some parts of the world and poverty and sickness in other parts of the world is illustrated by one simple statistic. Your child, born in this nation, if he passes his first birthday may expect on the average to see his sixty-eighth birthday. But that same child, if born in Southeast Asia, having past his first birthday, could expect on the average never to see his thir-

tieth. When the government of India solemnly sets as one of its goals in the next Five Year Plan the hope that everybody may have *two* meals a day, it ought not to be difficult for the well fed and clothed to understand that bitter fruit grows on the gnarled shrub. We, in this nation, know the meaning of unnecessary and embittering industrial strife. We are devising means to handle the apparent conflicts of interest peacefully and to achieve an ever greater measure of well being for all. And until shortsighted political interests struck hands with chauvinists and opportunists, there was hope that we might be able to minister directly to the underfed and underhospitalized billions of the world, to bring a bit of hope and self respect to stop the erosive effects of misery and suffering. Certain it is that there is here reflected a crisis of values, and that the value to which we ought to hold is one which makes a virtue of feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, and healing the sick. If we are told that there are limits to what we can do, there is an answer. The only limit we dare decognize is the limit which comes when we have done *all* that we can. No one will argue that this limit has been approached. All will admit that we are retreating rather than advancing in our programs of help-for-self-help around the world. This retreat is critically definitive in the current crisis of values.

(3)

A third component has to do with the strange and confusing interchange of values between the Communist and non-Communist nationalism. Before World War II, the Capitalist world was intensely nationalistic and the Communist world beat the drums of internationalism. We emerged from that war with the positions precisely reversed. It is now the Communists who champion the rights of all national groups to be independent political states and it is we who try to bring order out of international anarchy. Let it be recognized that the Communists are cynically using the aspirations of submerged peoples for their own covert purposes. Let

it also be recognized that there are many pockets of bigotry and isolationism within our own land, where people still think it better for the United States to "go it alone" in one supreme expression of national pride and self-containment. Nevertheless, these admissions only accent the fact that the planet can be torn into warring camps because of nationalistic ambitions. Unrestrained nationalism declares the absurd doctrine that absolute national autonomy can be a secure basis for peace. Never in human history has anarchy produced stability. Here, again, is an illustration of the character of the current crisis.

(4)

Let me now add one more dimension to the picture—not to complete the catalog by any means, but merely to indicate the urgency of the crisis of values.

Little by little the horrendous potential of massive destruction is being exposed. The original disposition over Hiroshima wrote the lesson in boiling clouds of atomic radiation fifty thousand feet high, for all mankind to see. Now that the Hydrogen Bomb can be replaced by the Cobalt Bomb, we have reached the means of absolute and total destruction. One Cobalt Bomb on a barge, anchored off the Pacific Coast about a thousand miles can be detonated by a time fuse. In twenty-four hours the prevailing westerly winds carry the intensely radioactive mist to the shore. Three days later the fallout has blanketed the entire nation, from coast to coast and at least border to border—leaving in its wake not one living thing. Or—since the effect of a single bomb is not as great when exploded over land—three such Cobalt Bombs exploded on a line in the longitude of Prague would leave nothing alive between there and the Ural Mountains.

The ancient Greeks believed a legend. Prometheus, they thought, had stolen the knowledge of fire from the gods. For his presumption, he was chained to the rock on Mount Caucasus, and the "winged hound of Zeus" was assigned to tear out his liver and eat it—through eternity. According to this

insight, knowledge is power, but it comes at great pain and great price, the price of eternal agony.

The difference between the legend of Prometheus and the contemporary fact of Promethean man is that that was a legend and this is a fact. Man now holds in his hand the absolute weapon of total and utter destruction. There is no way to evacuate the entire planet. Herein lies the absolutizing of the crisis which is upon us.

II

In this crisis, people do many things. They do different and contradictory things. Let me list a few representative reactions.

(1)

There is the reaction of fear—a massive fright which immobilizes initiative and empties the will. Fascinated by the unfolding story which jeopardizes all the dearly held values of human life under Divine solicitude, the fearful flee when none pursue. They build massive underground retreats and prepare to live like rats in their holes. They move their families to the suburbs, to escape the worst impact of a local atomic explosion. They find themselves jumping at the sound of a siren or waking in a cold sweat in the darkness of night, apprehensive for the children, to toss until dawn on a sleepless bed. They do what most persons do when afraid—they try to blame somebody for what is happening. The pressures of fear mount and the demands for a scapegoat mount with them. So it is with great sections of the world's population today. And the immobilization of the will to act—a sort of frozen fascination of fear—which lies like a pall across the face of Western Europe today is in no small measure explainable in terms of their closeness to the potential arena of atomic war.

(2)

A second dominant overtone of our day is fatigue. Particularly in Western Europe, a generation which has seen the flower of its strength killed in action and maimed in battle, finds little strength to pick up and carry on with zest. "Let the living fight the

living," they argue. "We who are half dead find our future with those others who have at least found escape from the continuing threat of massive death. You who think you are strong may flex your muscles and strike your poses—but don't bother us. We're tired. Perhaps, one day, if our children are permitted to grow to manhood in peace, there may again be virulent and ebullient life among us; but not now. Leave us alone."

And for those billions who, through the centuries of half-survival in the face of privation and sickness, have never known what a full belly and a healthy body might mean for themselves or their loved ones, the characteristic countenance wears but one expression—resignation. It is the resignation born of many generations of fatigue; and it more nearly describes the dominant tone of the vast subcontinent of India than any other single word. Out of that fatigue fierce anger can blaze; and in the midst of that fatigue continuing solace is sought in spiritual contemplation of non-earthly values; but these are deviations from a dominant motif, and the music itself continues to be weary even when it is wild.

(3)

Over against this fear and fatigue there is a third pattern which is no more encouraging than the other two. Those who have sought to do something about the current crisis, who have thrown themselves into the effort with idealism and courage and even with abandon and with imaginativeness, have achieved so little and so frequently tasted defeat that there is among them a mounting frustration. Let this process of frustration continue indefinitely, and (except among a miniscule minority of the incurably dedicated) the result will be a massive and corrosive cynicism. Cynicism is nothing but idealism gone sour in the face of frustration. Let this frustration spread, and there will be no need for an atomic fallout to destroy the hopes of mankind. They will already be dead in spirit, merely existing in body, and descending to the animal level in an ever increasing denial of

the values of the good life. When the avenues of constructive effort are closed for repairs, the traffic flows into the alleys and sidestreets of cynical and negative antisocial conduct. There is little doubt that the current upsurge of what we euphemistically call juvenile delinquency derives in part from the cynicism of a generation of youth which has never known what it might be to find joy and excitement in constructive social patterns. Frustrate the hopes of the good life—do that long enough and impressively enough—and you nurture a cynicism which strikes at the roots of all values in human relations.

(4)

A fourth pattern I find more revolting and less promising than any of the other three. I mean fanaticism. Sometimes this fanaticism is backed by force. Always it tries to force itself and its answers upon others. It moves men of mean stature into positions of political power, from which they launch extravagant and uncautious attacks on civil liberties and academic freedom. It reaches out to adopt totalitarian methods in a wrong effort to fight totalitarianism. The false prophets of this fanaticism have had a little setback in recent months—but they are still with us. Their craft and their unscrupulous cunning continue. Given the moment of opportunity, they will strike again. Neither church nor college nor philanthropic foundation are free of the shadow of their threat. They do not hesitate to pervert the truth or victimize the innocent. They purchase the perjured testimony of willing liars to gain their ends. They pan the streams of popular anxiety for the nuggets of personal prestige. This is the stuff of which nightmares are made. One such was Hitler.

(5)

Finally, in my pattern of erring and errant reactions, let me include the fumbler. These are they who, when the ball is passed to them, do not know which way to run, or run with peculiar lack of certainty—and fumble when tackled.

For example, in confronting the evil of

Communism, those who avoid the error of fanaticism often do so by retreating to a fumbling and bungling pose of academic objectivity.

The tragedy of the situation lies in the fact that the fumblers leave the field open to the fanatics. Perhaps it is the fumbler's fear of being called a fanatic which helps to immobilize him. But there are more ways to flee from a bear than by becoming a jackal.

Nor should the fumbler permit the opponents to confuse him as to which goal he is guarding. The Communists may use the same language we do as they call their signals — speaking of their "peoples' democracies" and arguing for "peaceful coexistence" and for the "liberation of colonial and exploited nations." The transvaluation of values expressed in their perversion of the plain intent of language ought not to confuse anyone except the fumbler and the bumbler. Let us remember that whatever symbols may be used in calling the plays, the goals are diametrically opposite. And no game was ever won by continuously fumbling the ball.

Over against these attitudes of fear, fatigue, frustration, fanaticism and fumbling, I see one — and only one — desirable alternative. The alternative has been called faith. It had better be a fighting faith in this hour of crisis.

III

The content and character of that faith need not be traced in detail here. Or, if delineation is needed let me leave that task to others, and press on to one final comment as I come to a conclusion of this discussion. I have been writing of the crisis of values in contemporary civilization. Let me now consider that discussion in relation to the campus.

Whatever else may be said — and there is much — I wish only to stress one aspect of the learning process as of pivotal importance in determining what higher education may properly undertake in this hour of crisis. Our task is an educational task, to be undertaken with educational processes. The

key question, then, is: What does the student actually learn on this campus?

If my analysis up to this point has any validity, we may assume that the battle for men's loyalties lies in the choices which are continuously being made between the several value systems which we reject and the values of a fighting faith. And my thesis is that the student learns — actually *learns* — only that which he accepts as a basis of action.

Education must, of course, carry a considerable freight of informational content. The unfurnished mind is not our objective. But information is only a small part of the education of any man. Equally important are matters of attitude and conviction. And here we are confronted with the ancient dilemma of how to combine conviction and objectivity: how to espouse a fighting faith without becoming a fanatic; how to hold to the truth one knows while welcoming new insights; how to be tolerant of everything but intolerance; how to be prejudiced against prejudice without prejudging. In short, how to know when one is an educated person.

The answer to these questions is not a theoretical one. It has to be given in practice, or not at all. We learn that which we accept as a basis for action. It is through such acceptance, and the action based on that acceptance, that we hammer out our patterns of character on the anvil of experience. The job of college or university, then, is to provide the learning experiences in which these purposes are to be achieved.

I pass over without argument some of the more glaringly inconsistent practices of higher education as it declares its educational purpose and proceeds to miseducate. It should be clear, for example, that you do not teach students to adhere with conviction to moral values when the college claims to field an amateur athletic team while everyone knows the players are bought with athletic scholarships. It should be equally clear that you do not teach students to respect academic freedom when you refuse to permit unpopular points of view to be expressed on the campus. (Equally serious is

the situation in which the only opinions which get public expression are those which are unpopular—for that is censorship in reverse). It should need no argument to convince academicians that white supremacy flourishes and religious prejudice increases as long as any institution uses a quota system or otherwise restricts its admissions policy in accordance with race or creed. Nor do we need to argue that as long as poverty is a barrier to higher education, it is difficult for the university or college to inculcate in its students a profound concern for the miserable and the suffering. It might even be suggested that the fierce provincialism of many a campus is of the same stuff as national chauvinism—and that it is somewhat difficult to widen the horizons of understanding when the immediate values learned by the undergraduate are sharply restricted and motivated by adolescent boastings. Let me pass beyond all these matters, important though they are, to come to the heart of the whole teaching process as it concerns itself with the crisis of values.

I believe that the heart of the trouble lies in the assumption that different parts of life can be kept in mutually exclusive, logic-tight compartments. The divorce of technics from ethics is importantly illustrative.

Contemporary education tends to assume the pose that there are some fields of learning in which ethical matters apply, while there are others which are outside the realm of values. This, of course, is pure sophistry; but it has an amazingly respectable position in higher education. The divorce of technics and ethics is a matter of historical fact; and that bit of history must be reversed.

It is a truism that our power far exceeds our moral control of that power. And part of the explanation lies in the fact that our civilization has deliberately given free reign to the scientific world, while holding a tight check on morality. No wonder the race is uneven.

The critical turning point in this development came three centuries ago, with the work of Descartes. To be sure, it was his consuming ambition to save the faith, not to destroy it. But the solution he proposed

has proved our undoing. His intention was to save the faith; and everywhere he went, he carried the *Summa* of Aquinas under his arm. He saw the faith endangered by a burgeoning science which, he believed would destroy it. Therefore he proposed a bold piece of cultural surgery. He proposed that science and religion be cut loose from each other, that each be restricted to its proper sphere, and that the faith be saved by permitting science to go its way. For religion, the reserved jurisdiction was to be the areas of first origins, ultimate goals, and the world of spirits in between—while all the world of practical affairs and the whole of human life and the physical universe was to be free game for scientific hunting. To the church of that day, this seemed a happy compromise. Weary of the struggles of the Reformation and the Counter reformation, fearful lest newfound scientific truths should endanger a theology which was too closely enmeshed with the old science, and coveting a degree of peaceful serenity, Christendom cut a troublesome Promethean science loose and lay down to monumental slumbers.

Fortunately for mankind, the men of science are still men; and, as individuals, they still are susceptible to the value of values. That is why Jonas Salk not only gives us the vaccine to end the scourge of poliomyelitis, but also refuses to patent it—giving the fruits of his labors to the world freely. Science can be beneficent.

Unfortunately for mankind, when science itself is declared to be empty of questions of value, there is no way to be sure that the inquiries and findings of science will serve good ends. And now that we have reached the ultimate, in comprehending the nature of atomic energy itself, our cry goes out for controls which will save us from destruction. Cosmic power demands cosmic controls—but a scientific culture has cut itself off from God. And thus it happens that the men of science today are the ones most loudly calling for ethical controls to prevent the use of the knowledge they have mastered, while men of religion stand by unable to speak the wanted word. Knowledge has

proved to be power: but Promethean man is best described in the words of Shelley, "Over all things but thyself I gave thee power."

The truth is that the Cartesian compromise was bad seed, sown in the infancy of the scientific age, like dragons' teeth—and the army of the enemy which rises now from the furrow seems horrendous only because we did not foresee what was to happen. With our twenty-twenty hind-sight, we could wish that values had never been declared off limits for science, and that science had never been excluded from value problems. It is now our lot to recover, in one perilous leap of effort and insight, three centuries and more of amoral science and indifferent ethics.

This truth confronts us no matter in what direction we turn. If we can, for a moment, wrest our fascinated gaze from the atomic mushroom cloud and look at the economic world, the same truth confronts us. It was the father of classical economics, Adam Smith, who built his whole system of economic thought on the religious and ethical assumptions delineated in his earlier work, *The Theory of the Moral Sentiments*. But his ethical assumptions were straight out of the literal and mechanistic ideas of Descartes, with the notion that, as each man pursued his own selfish ends, he was guided by An Unseen Hand so that his efforts served the common good. Indeed, the characteristic Deism of the 18th Century in no small measure determined the sentiments enshrined in the basic documents of the United States—this same idea that God had done everything at the Creation endowing men with their rights and privileges, and

the rest flowed from that as surely as water runs down hill. For the framers of the Declaration, these were fiery sentiments leading to action in defense of the beliefs fiercely expressed. But for too many of their successors, the ideas of the founding fathers have become matters of reference for oratory rather than bases for action. That is why we are so disturbed when the Supreme Court finally calls attention to the clear meaning of the words which our forebears wrote. For so long we have lived without listening to conscience, that it is irritating to be reminded that the voice still speaks.

The crux of the matter lies in the fact of moral freedom. In human history, the fact is that men make choices, and in making those choices they affect the flow of events. These choices inevitably express the values which the choosers hold. Pivotal, the fulcrum of the whole matter, is the values which men express in action as they make the day-to-day choices which shape their destiny.

The job of the university and college, then, is the immensely difficult yet extremely simple one of making sure that those who teach and those who learn are never permitted the erroneous luxury of irresponsible decision. Hour by hour and day by day the educational process must be one which clearly faces men with the consequences of the choices they are about to make. In such an atmosphere we may yet recover the integrity of a fighting faith.

This is the responsibility of higher education in the crisis of values which vexes contemporary civilization.

IV

Our Heritage of Religious Values AND BASIC ISSUES OF HIGHER EDUCATION

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I

THIS DISCUSSION is taking place in a world which is in the middle—if we have yet reached the middle—of a cold and often hot war of cultures and of civilizations; the post-Hiroshima world; the atom-exploding world; a world in which genocide, treason, character assassination, and the use of the Big Lie are taken as a matter of course; a world in which a college boy who today is just another average student at Minnesota or Iowa or Illinois may later be an inmate of a Communist concentration camp, undergoing brainwashing by the most advanced post-Pavlovian techniques.

I call attention to our chaotic and divided world not to introduce emotional irrelevance, but to underline two important points. First, deliberation on the relation of religious values and higher education is not just academic. It deals in the final analysis with real problems which affect the lives of real boys and girls and men and women in an increasingly terrible as well as beautiful and challenging world. Second, the topic involves values; and we understand the values by which we live best when they are under attack. What is, after all, wrong with brainwashing? What is, after all, wrong with the technique of the Big Lie? What is, after all, wrong with rape?

With this introductory emphasis on the vital importance of the topic, let us look at certain basic assumptions. They concern, first, religious and ethical facts and values; and second, the obligations of a university.

II

1. The first assumption is that religion and individual religions are a major part of the current world scene. It is a fact that there are thousands and tens of thousands of

churches in this country and that people support them. It is a fact that there are millions and tens of millions of people in this country who think of themselves as Catholics or Jews or Protestants and whose views of life and emotions and actions are significantly conditioned thereby. It is a fact that in countless ways in the practical life of business and community activity in America today it is important to understand whether a man is a Jew or a Roman Catholic or a Protestant. If a Jew, is he Orthodox or Reformed? If a Catholic, is he a Jesuit? If a Protestant, is he a Lutheran—and if so, is he of the Missouri Synod? It is also a fact that in the world today hundreds of millions of people live in terms of religions which are not widely adhered to in the United States. For a single example, a very important fact in the world today is that Nehru, though he has a Western education, is a Hindu; and not merely a Hindu but a Brahmin; and not merely a Brahmin but a Kashmiri Brahmin.

2. A second assumption is that religion in general and individual religions in particular are not recent developments. They have very deep roots and have played important roles in the history of America, as well as of the rest of the world.

3. A third assumption is that many if not most of the central values of American life are involved in our Judeo-Christian heritage. They are involved in at least three ways. (a) Historically, these values were developed primarily through the experiences and insights of Jews and Christians. (b) These values have come to us as part of our cultural heritage through the life and teaching, generation after generation, of the Jewish synagogues and Christian churches. (c) They are now most actively taught by these organized religious groups. These religions

have emphasized, for example, the value of truth; the sacredness of human life; the potential worth and dignity of the individual man; the value of man as a child of God made from the earth in His image; and the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, with concomitant views of social justice.

Judaism and Christianity are ethical religions. They believe in a God of mercy and compassion and long-suffering; but they are not tolerant or worshipful of evil, as is Hinduism in a number of its manifestations. They believe in a God of righteousness, and in a moral law which is a fundamental fact of human life and which is written in the heart of man. They believe strongly in the central ethical values which have made our present degree of civilization in America possible, and without which as a firm base, a society such as ours cannot realistically hope to continue.

4. A fourth assumption is that a religion involves commitment to a way of life. It is not merely a set of general ethical principles. It involves these, of course; but it insists that life is essentially experience rather than theory; that man's nature is such that, paradoxically, only by giving himself in God's service can he find himself; and that God's nature is such that, again paradoxically, in His service is perfect freedom. This insistence of religion on the human necessity of commitment presents, of course, a rationalistic and academic stumbling block—to the Greeks, foolishness. At the same time, it points at a fundamental fact of human life, the need for commitment, whether the object be the Creator of the Universe or something lesser. This is a fact which universities, overstressing disengagement, have too often neglected, while communists have remembered it.

5. Three more assumptions concern certain responsibilities of a public university. First, a university should help its students understand the society in which they must live, so that they may find a place in its life.

6. In addition, a university should help its students understand their own society both in its historical development and in relation to other societies, so that the students may see

the contemporary society of which they are members in proper perspective and contribute intelligently to the inevitable processes of historical change which they will face during their lives.

7. Finally, the university should do what it can to help its students develop into fully mature human beings. To this end, it should help each student to understand and encourage him to accept as his own the fundamental ethical values which undergird American society and Western civilization; it should help him to understand the psychology of commitment in relation to human life and human achievement; and, without advocating one among others, it should help him to understand the major religious—and non-religious—views of the nature and meaning of human life to which large groups of people in our society have committed themselves. These should be presented as valid, if often mutually exclusive, options from among which he and other members of our society may, and in one sense must, choose without interference by the State.

These last three assumptions are generally recognized, I believe, as responsibilities of liberal education. Even if a state university should consider itself merely a collection of vocational and professional schools—and I do not know any such university—these three would be included as responsibilities of general education, which the higher vocations and professions believe should be basic to specialized training. I assume that a state university should accept these responsibilities even if its only aim is, for example, to educate good teachers and doctors and lawyers and social workers.

III

In addition to the assumptions just stated, which I believe to be true, let me mention two or three others which I believe to be false. So far as I know, no responsible educator actually holds these assumptions openly; but they occasionally creep in as silent premises in arguments about religion in higher education, and hence I mention them.

One is that higher education should limit itself to the teaching of scientific generaliza-

tions which have been established as true beyond any reasonable doubt. This assumption is, of course, nonsense. To follow it would mean that the sciences would simply teach as frozen dogma any scientific generalizations currently accepted as established; they would stop the experimental probing for new truth, even at the expense of established theories; and the universities would have to abandon most of what they are now teaching in the humanities, the arts, the social so-called sciences, and the professions.

Another invalid hidden premise is that the experimental approach to knowledge of quantitative science is the only valid method of apprehending truth. This also, of course, is nonsense. The quantitative experimental approach is of great value; most men and most institutions should use it more frequently than they do. But there are many other roads to understanding and truth, which may be summed up as direct experience, intuition, and insight. And when we have to decide most of the practical questions of life—whom we will marry, what profession we will choose, what decisions we will make day by day; what basic values we will live by; what gods we will worship or refuse to worship—we must put primary reliance on them.

IV

If these assumptions are valid, it is clear that a state university should include the following among its objectives:

1. It should help its students to understand the religious elements in the contemporary world, with primary emphasis on American society. It should, of course, face frankly the religious pluralism of our present civilization; and while showing the large and vital areas of agreement among our religious faiths, especially concerning ethical values, should show also the significant differences between them.

2. It should help the students to understand the historical development of our religious heritage. This historical presentation should help the student to see both how our present pluralism of religious attitudes and institutions came into existence, and how

throughout history religious attitudes have influenced and been influenced by other social factors.

It should go without saying that such presentation should be objective. The presentation should not gloss over errors or mistakes in religious history any more than the study of chemistry should gloss over errors or mistakes in chemical history; but neither should religion be presented as a history of errors, any more than chemistry should be presented as a history of errors.

The importance of these objectives is well stated in the American Council of Education Report on *The Relation of Religion to Public Education*: "We are unable to believe that a school which accepts responsibility for bringing its students into full possession of their cultural heritage can be considered to have performed its task if it leaves them without a knowledge of the role of religion in our history, its relation to other phases of the culture, and the ways in which the religious life of the American community is expressed. An educated person cannot be religiously illiterate."¹

3. Further, the university should help its students to understand and accept for themselves the fundamental values of our society. I stress *fundamental values* here, without regard to whether they have or have not been, are or are not, involved in particular religions. Toward any particular religion a state university should be studiously neutral; toward the fundamental values of our society, it should decidedly not be neutral. As President Harry Gideonse has trenchantly observed: "The idea of the separation of church and state can never mean that public education, or more broadly non-sectarian education, should be neutral about the moral basis of a free society . . . Public education is not neutral when liberty is at stake. Since liberty is itself dependent on the vigor and vitality of the faith of free men and women, it fol-

¹"*The Relation of Religion to Public Education*," ed. by the Committee on Religion and Education of the American Council of Education; published as an appendix to *Religion's Place in General Education*, by Nevin C. Harner; New York, 1949, Page 162. (Chap. XVII).

lows that public education is vitally interested in the growth of the shared values of free society."²

4. Finally, the university should help the student understand the nature of and the human need for commitment to a way of life. The public university should of course not advocate commitment to any particular religion, even if it is the religion of the majority of citizens in the state; but it should help the student understand what such commitment involves and why religions, like marriages, demand it. The university should help the student *approach the problem of commitment intelligently*.

Perhaps two points are most important here. First, the student should learn the difference between abstract knowledge about a way of life and personal dedication to it. Second, he should learn that commitment is not the same as bigotry or omniscience; that it should be closely allied to humility and genuine respect for the ways of life of others; and that absolute commitment may and should go hand in hand with absolute love and respect for others who do not share the commitment. This is a difficult lesson, but is one of the most important for Americans to learn. The student should be helped to understand that a committed Jew may be an excellent man without being a Catholic; and that a committed Catholic may be an excellent man without being a Protestant; and he should also be helped to learn that—as one of my friends remarks—"There are no pretty good eggs."

V

If these should be among the objectives for a state university, how should they be attained?

In the first place, the faculty should be encouraged to think seriously about the place of religion in the university curriculum. I sympathize with those who urge the desirability of making religion the unifying factor in the curriculum; certainly most of our cur-

ricula need a better unifying factor than they have. This may be practical in certain denominational colleges, but my own suspicion is that the diversity of religious points of view in a particular state and among the members of a particular state university faculty is too great and, regrettably, the understanding of religion often too shallow; that the present divided state of our knowledge in the various other arts and sciences is too complex and confused; that the hold of the individual departmental disciplines is too strong to make religion as an integrating factor, an achievable goal in the foreseeable future. I may be wrong, and would not be sorry if I were. I respect Sir Walter Moberly's incisive analysis in *The Crisis of the University*; but I am conscious that he is writing of the university in a culture far more homogeneous than ours; in a culture which has an Established Church; and in a social situation in many ways far less heterogeneous than our own. Hence my first suggestion is simply that we actively encourage our faculties to think about the problem. If they should go so far in the next few years as to center the curriculum around different views of the nature of man, I would consider it a great advance.

Second, each teacher in each department, including the natural sciences, should be encouraged to consider these questions; (1) *Are there relevant religious factors in the field in which I am teaching*—in economics or government or literature or sociology or what not? If so, how well am I helping my students to understand them? (2) If my own personal ethical-religious attitudes are in any way relevant to the consideration of this subject, am I subconsciously (or consciously) trying to indoctrinate my students with my own point of view, my own biases and prejudices and commitments? Or am I honestly trying to help my students see this subject objectively? The members of each department, in other words, should take the responsibility for seeing that the religious aspects of their subject are not overlooked, through neglect, fear of public comment, or a conspiracy of silence, but are presented with true objectivity. The Hazen Founda-

²"Political Education: A Plea for Cultural Parochialism Properly Defined," in *Education in a Period of National Preparedness*. No. 52, Series 1, Am. Council of Ed.; Washington, D. C., 1951.

tion pamphlets on *Religious Perspectives in College Training* will be of value in helping departments approach this consideration.

Finally, the university should have a department of Religion, both to give opportunities for study to those who wish to explore or to specialize in this subject and to represent the study of religion as a serious academic discipline. Some members of the faculty who have followed my thinking so far may demur at this point. We will permit the study of religion, they may say—but only if it is secondary to something else. If the department of history finds it necessary to discuss the rise of Christianity so that it can explain certain stages in the decline of the Roman Empire, it may; if the department of Fine Arts finds it necessary to discuss religion so that it may explain significant phases of Italian painting, it may; if teachers of English literature find it necessary to discuss religion to explain certain phases of the work of John Donne or John Milton, they may; if teachers of American civilization find it necessary to discuss religion in relation to early settlers in New England or the settlement of Pennsylvania or the founding of Maryland, of course they may; but as for the study of religion as a subject in its own right—well, the university has other things to do. A similar attitude toward physics or sociology or anthropology or chemistry, we would now regard as academically barbarous; in our present schemes of university organization we realize that they need separate departments if they are not to be neglected or overlooked and if the serious study of their field is to be advanced; and I suggest that within a few years we will regard a similar attitude toward religion, which would relegate it to in-

ferior, sub-departmental status, as equally beneath serious consideration.

A university should, I believe, have a department of religion which will have special responsibilities comparable to those of other departments. The chairman and the other teachers in the department should be chosen on the same general basis as the members of other departments. They should be chosen, that is, on the basis of (1) as full knowledge of their subject as their age permits, with good indication that they will continue to learn; (2) devotion to their subject and belief in its importance (I want a chemist who believes in chemistry; I don't want a teacher of music who doesn't like music); and (3) demonstrated scholarly objectivity, with a proven capacity for appreciating points of view divergent from their own and presenting them sympathetically and objectively. A well balanced department should, if practicable, have teachers who are committed to different faiths. Ideally, I would like to have on the faculty of the department of religion representatives of all the major faiths, and in practice it is often possible to attract guest lecturers from many different faiths, Eastern as well as Western. One important warning note here is that the administration of the university must establish firmly the principle that *it* chooses the teachers (even if people outside the university are willing to pay for them) and must hold firmly to it.

In sum, I submit that religion and religions are important facts of knowledge and personal life concerning which the graduate of a state university should not be ignorant; that it is the responsibility of a state university to help its students learn about religion and religions; and that it can be done.

V

A Panel

Religion As A Discipline and

Religion in the Disciplines and Professions

Representatives from six disciplines presented their points of view in a panel under the chairmanship of Buel G. Gallagher, President of the College of the City of New York. Their statements have been condensed and are given under the names of the panel members.

*Moses Barron, Professor, Medical School,
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis*

We are concerned with the need of religious discipline in our youth and the place of religion in the curricula of state universities as a means of improving the personalities of our students and making them better qualified to contribute to the welfare and well being of the community. Our discussion involves a very select group of young people—university students. My part in the program is to deal with the super-elect class of university students—those who attend the medical school for the chosen profession of physicians. I approach this problem as a physician and as a Jew. . . . As such I feel keenly the need of discipline in the life of the students and in the life of all men and women in their respective fields. As a physician I speak from the experience of one who has mingled with his colleagues for more than 40 years and has been in that period also a teacher of medical students both full time and part time at this university. I therefore had the opportunity of observing both students and practicing physicians either social and sociological as well as scientific reactions. It has often been disappointing to me to find in both groups an insufficient degree of social consciousness. One would expect to find the most social consciousness among men who have chosen a profession devoted to the betterment of his fellow beings. A field calling for sympathy, understanding and compassion. A physician stands so often with his patient on the brink of the most critical moment in the life of man. With him and for him the physician is an active witness to the beginning of life or of death. . . . If the

physician is to be properly qualified to meet the exigencies of the situations which will confront him he must have more than scientific knowledge of the cause and cure of disease. . . . The oath of Hippocrates and of other ancient philosophers reveal what is to be expected of the physician in such words and phrases as truth, purity, humility, charity, compassion and freedom from selfish gain. A refined spiritual note in the oath is shown by the reliance on a Supreme Being to whom they take this oath. These oaths are characterized not by their scientific content but by their moral ethic and spiritual quality. It is further to be noted that there is nothing sectarian about this religious aspect and that in my mind is as it should be. Those of us who are open minded and familiar with the world of great religions know that certain fundamental concepts are basic to all civilized religions, the cosmic religion as it is called. Love thy neighbor as thy self is mentioned in Leviticus as well as in the New Testament. We find love of fellow men referred to as the golden rule of Confucius and Buddha. . . . These religious precepts are necessary for the development of our young and the guidance of our old. Certainly religion is basic in the discipline of professions. The very justification of the university presupposes moral and spiritual values. But religion in itself has no place in a curriculum. It is not correct to assume that universities neglect religious values though obviously they do not favor any denomination or doctrine—not only because it is illegal but because it is undesirable for by establishing religious curricula in state universities we are removing responsibility for religious

training from where it rightfully belongs, the home, the Sunday schools, the churches, synagogues and the religious foundations associated with universities. . . . I believe our best contribution toward religious training of the youth would be to suggest and urge those institutions which have now this responsibility to emphasize along with their own special religious teachings the ideals which we have spoken of as the cosmic religion — truth, purity, humility, compassion, brotherly love and a passionate sense of social justice. And those individuals and institutions which have the responsibility of instructing their youth in religion must be eminently fitted themselves for only the pure in heart who seek truth can succeed in leading and not misleading. . . . The home, the church and the synagogue are the proper places of religious teaching. They are the natural sources of religious inspiration, they teach the way of life as indeed religion is. The religious foundations of various groups associated with the university have the virtue of making religious training adequate because they have social life. They offer opportunities for character building and self-expression — an opportunity for religious study, inculcation of ideals, an expression of those ideals as no classroom curriculum could offer. Obviously, this method of bringing religion to youth has the additional merit of eliminating the irritation and uneasy suspicion of possible sectarianism which is bound to exist should religion be taught in state university classrooms. I mentioned that only the pure in heart who seek truth can succeed in leading without misleading. Shakespeare in one of his immortal plays, *Hamlet*, made the silly old man Polonius, giving expression to his sublime thought, say, "This above all to thine own self be true. And it must follow as the night the day, thou canst not then be false to any man." If we inculcate that in our young we are then giving them the very essence of religion.

*George Forrell, Professor, School of Religion,
University of Iowa, Iowa City*

Why should we teach theology in the state university? First of all I should like to give

you what I consider the motives for doing so. It should be lay theology. It should not be the training of specialists, but an appreciation and understanding of theological issues just like we teach lay history. Not everyone who takes a history course is expected to become a professional historian. Theology is important intrinsically and necessary for an understanding of the aspirations of man and because it is important for an understanding of our culture. It is almost impossible to understand western culture without knowing something about the theological issues that have motivated western man many times. As far as the method is concerned I believe it could be taught as a point of view. . . . Anybody has a point of view, it might as well be a good one. This means, however, that it should be taught with a sympathetic understanding of other points of view, not because everybody is right, but because honest and intelligent people can disagree and teaching of religious issues in state universities should be clearly distinguished from indoctrination. There are some very real difficulties. The greatest difficulty that confronts us is the fantastic ignorance. Before I started teaching at the State University of Iowa, I knew there were lots of people who did not believe in the resurrection. I found out that there were more who hadn't even heard of it. . . . The ignorance of religious issues is greater than in any other field because of the silence of the public schools and the basic incompetence of the Sunday schools. The result is that we are confronted by a group of religious illiterates. . . . The second problem is the lack of competent teachers. . . . A third problem is the basic misunderstanding of the task of the department of religion or the administration, by the college and by the students. The administration of the college sometimes take the position that the school of religion, or the department of religion or the teacher of religion is a morale builder. I don't think we are any more morale builders than other people and I hope you all consider yourselves partly morale builders and do not relegate this responsibility exclusively to the people who teach religion. The stu-

dent attitude is strange because it is the attitude that it is already a meritorious work to take a course in religion and that he should automatically pass because of the extreme good will of our religion. Students have sometimes had a very real disappointment at this point when they found they didn't pass any more easily in a course in religion than in any other course. This situation created a very real difficulty because of the "person's loss of his religion" and the people at home take the attitude there is something wrong with the student. If he flunks in religion they think we must do something, something has gone wrong with the State University. These are problems that do confront us and I hope you will be sympathetic with them in case religion is being taught in the university.

*Wilbur Katz, Professor of Corporation Law,
Law School, University of Chicago*

Lawyers cannot avoid the concept of human nature. Law is concerned with human nature particularly in two different ways, (1) because law deals with man as the subject of law. Men are responsible before the law. (2) Men are also makers of law and men have a responsibility for the law. . . . Law, in considering man as the creature for whom law is made, is dealing of course in the Judeo-Christian tradition with man as fallen man. There are people of course who could decide human nature without using any such term. But law is concerned about human responsibility. . . . A lawyer can't avoid getting deep into the difficulties concerning human responsibility. . . . A lawyer may find that what the law is doing when it declares that we are all responsible for our acts is to put it to us that we have the duty to assume that responsibility regardless of the degree to which those acts are determined by factors that are beyond our thought. The criminal law is only one portion of the law which more pointedly than others raises these difficulties concerning responsibility and in the criminal law there is constantly before the judges the question of drawing the line between the responsible and those who are to be treated as not re-

sponsible because of varying degrees of mental illness. . . . We are dealing with fallen man and the process by which man is redeemed — the process through which individuals come to accept full responsibility for themselves. . . . Discussing the criminal law of course constantly vacillates between reformation and deterrents as basic objectives and any serious student of the law in worrying about those objectives finds himself at the very center of moral theology. But on the other hand, and as I have suggested, man is not just the creature for whom the law is made but the positive law of the state is made by him. Here we are dealing with aspects of human nature in the virtue of which man is made in the image of God; not his fallen nature but his original nature, his nature before the fall as we speak in temporal terms. . . . Let us just indicate very briefly, for individuals to advance morally and spiritually there has to be a degree of social peace and security that requires the harshness of the institutions of the law to the extent that they must be harsh in order that the impulses of individuals may be held in check through the fear of law penalties. The notion of human beings as fallen suggests also the need for a degree of impersonalities in human institutions in order to keep individuals from getting into each others hair too constantly. If individuals had by joint agreement to negotiate with themselves about everything from day to day chaos would be the result. . . . But the difficulty one finds most frequently in dealing with law in the way that makes it connect up with some reality with religion is the belief or prejudices or functions which have already been secured elsewhere with respect to human nature.

*Julian Kimp, Professor, Atomic Physicist,
Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa*

It is certainly a fact that modern science has for the most part cut itself off from religion. It is not very much concerned with religion and to a very great degree modern science regards religious experience as not a valid experience. . . . It is my view and my conviction that science is not the whole of

experience and therefore, for this reason, I am greatly concerned with matters religious. . . . Very few physicists consider themselves philosophers, very few physicists therefore have any view whatsoever, have little understanding of their subject as far as the larger body of experience.

I would therefore suggest as a partial answer to the predicament, namely the fact that science is so cut off from the rest of experience, that science should join hands with philosophy and try to integrate, to orient itself with all experience. . . . I also suggest that the scientists learn from history, that they learn from philosophy and I likewise urge that they learn from theology. My problem in regard to physics is not so much the problem of religion in physics as it is the problem of the relation of physics and religion. In physics as a part of science is a certain part of experience and the question is, "How does one relate this experience to that experience which we call religion?" . . . The modern physicist looks with great contempt on alchemy. Does he consider that theology is still in the same position that it was when physics was alchemy?

W. J. McKeatchie, Professor of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

From a number of the side comments today I gather that I represent one of the problems of religion. It is significant that there are other psychologists present in our conference. In thinking about the panel tonight I became curious not only about what our colleagues thought about us but what students thought as being the impact of social science on their religious values. I wondered broadly which discipline in the university would most likely respect the students' religious belief. . . . So I asked the students in my Psychology of Religion class last week this question. My students don't ordinarily agree but this was one discussion in which they did agree. For one thing they thought there weren't any courses in the university which changed their religious beliefs very much. Whether or not this is something to be grateful for or to be sorry about I am not sure. But they said there were certain courses which

caused them to question their religious belief, that forced them to think about basic assumptions they had made and these courses were philosophy and social sciences. . . . The wave of scientific thinking has advanced into the social sciences and has passed through the natural sciences and biological sciences and today large parts of psychology and sociology have been changed by the emphasis upon scientific methods and has shaken up political science, anthropology, economics and even to some extent history. So that there are still groups of social scientists who have comfortable older ways of looking at our discipline as well as a great many people who feel we need to advance greatly in the application of scientific methods to problems of social science. With this cutting ourselves off from our background of philosophy and molding ourselves after natural sciences it is natural that some of the questions we ask and try to do research on are questions which can be answered by objective and scientific experimental methods. As a result our attempt has been directed away from the problems which formerly might have been most relevant and our teaching also has tended to de-emphasize these areas. We tend to try to inculcate in our teachings something of the doubting attitude. . . . In itself this questioning attitude probably isn't a dangerous thing. I think we do, in our actual teaching, have to go beyond the stage of trying to ask questions to actually putting into our discussion of facts and principles certain valid assumptions. Let me give you some examples from our own field — psychology. One of the areas we talk about a great deal in our basic psychology course is concept of adjustment or mental hygiene. And we talk about some of the conditions which we believe to be related to good adjustment or to mental health. Embodied in our thinking about this is the assumption that mental health is a good thing. Now this doesn't seem like a dangerous thing. Most of us agree that physical health is a good thing, why shouldn't mental health be. But when we define mental health here we are bringing in certain concepts which are essentially value concepts. Usually we define mental health as such things as

happiness, productivity and acceptability of a person's behavior by members of his group.

. . . If the mentally healthy person is happy and his behavior is acceptable to the members of his group and if culture norms differ from society to society then what is mentally healthy in one society may not be mentally healthy in another society. It is not surprising that our students often go away with an attitude of cultural relativity. . . . One of the things the beginning student of psychology learns is that the way he sees the world about him, the way he interprets it, his beliefs about that world are influenced to a large extent by his need, his motivation and that when the motive becomes strong enough a person may actually distort or invent a conception of the world which doesn't accord with that of other people and of course we can find examples of that in mental health, in delusion. Then we also frequently talk about religion and its functional relationship to human motivation. We demonstrate to our students that religion does satisfy certain basic human motives. That religion changes somewhat from culture to culture as the needs change, or as they differ from culture to culture. It is not surprising whether or not the teacher points it out, that our students draw the conclusion that religion after all is very much like a delusion — something that man has invented in order to satisfy these needs which he can't satisfy any other way. What is the solution to this problem? . . . I think it was pointed out by William James in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* that our difficulty is that frequently we fail to distinguish between two kinds of truth — facts and value truth. That is the distinction between what is and what ought to be, between the real and the ideal. . . . If our students and our social science professors can be made aware of the differences between a statement that learning is facilitated by reward and the sort of statement that everyone should make an attempt to be well adjusted to his society, I think we have much less conflict between social science and religion. To some extent I think our students do get these sorts of distinction. I am not arguing however that

either the professor in the classroom or the students should cease making value judgments. . . . But if the teacher can make a distinction between which are value judgments and which are to some extent based upon theory or research in the field I think there is less likely to be conflict between the social sciences and religion. When this conflict is ended I think social science can actually contribute a good deal toward our religious thinking. . . . I think that social science can do a good deal in telling us what the consequences of various actions are likely to be. As we learn more and more about the nature of human behavior and of social behavior and our social institutions we should be better able to predict what the consequences of certain choices are. And once we become aware of these consequences we are in a much better position to make the value of religious choices of our behavior. Thus I would see the social scientist contribution to religion in his study of what is, but at the same time gaining from religion his conception of what ought to be.

*Allen Tate, Professor of Literature,
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.*

It seems to me that in the modern world, in the world of the educational institution and the society at large there is not any question of eliminating theology. We can't do it. It is all a question where we are in theology or whether we are ignorant of theology. Everything man does has theological implications in the sense that every pagan man is subject to rational investigation in so far as that is possible in determining man's relation to some supernatural order or divine order. . . . The point I am going to make next has already been made. The teaching of theology is very different from the teaching of religion. You can't teach religion. I take it that if one has religion it is not anything to be proud of. It is simply that the Grace of God gives it to us. And that if we teach religion in an educational institution we are perhaps exceeding what the law will allow. . . . It is not merely the question of separation of church and state, that is a different matter. All Americans believe in that and I should think if all of you gentlemen

haven't come across the writings of the Jesuit, John Courtney Murray, the subject would be very warming. It seems to me he has the most powerful arguments for the separation of church and state I have seen by any theologian. Man in the United States must keep his religion apart from his politics. What has happened is that by and large religion has gone into the ground — has gone so far in the ground that our students when they come up are like moles — they are blind, they can't see. Now the next point that I have in mind is related to the notion of the Cartesian split. . . . It seems to me what has happened has been that man is not only divided into two parts within himself; we have had development since the 17th century in which subjects of society have been divided according to that plan. We are not only divided materially but have a whole powerful and valuable group of men called the scientists who represent one-half of the Cartesian split that is nature in which the whole man does participate. . . . It is the intellectual climate in which we live. Our politics would tell the same story. When the doctrine of the acceptability of man really began to tri-

umph in the 18th century on down to our time that doctrine became assimilated to this worship of intellectual power and man could be perfected through gadgets, social adjustments and also other external techniques and the more he perfected himself the more he engaged in disastrous war with which the whole human race can be destroyed sooner or later. Utopian politics it seems to me are a direct result of this split. This doctrine of perfectibility for one-half of man — his intellect. . . . It seems to me that in the split we have on the one hand philosophy and on the other science. . . . Most scientists are very specialized people and much of their suspicion of philosophy and religion comes from a complete lack of knowledge. But the whole of experience includes theology as a discipline. . . . However this is to be distinguished from religion which can't be taught as such. . . . Theology can be taught. . . . We have philosophy and religion on the one hand and religious experience along with it. On the other hand we have the scientific approach to the whole human being — operational techniques. . . . These two areas need to be explored.

Youth Looks At Faith and Learning

The Reactions of Three Students to the Study of Religion in a State University

ROBERT S. MICHAELSEN

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THE SCHOOL of Religion at the State University of Iowa is unique. It provides an opportunity in one structure for the study of religion on a credit basis under Jewish, Catholic and Protestant teachers.¹ Many times we are asked how the students respond to this opportunity. During the spring semester of the 1954-55 academic year over 500 students enrolled in courses in the School. Three of these students, representing the major faiths, were asked to indicate to an audience gathered for the School's annual luncheon just how they felt about the study of religion in the curriculum of the State University. Their remarks were prepared independently of each other and without supervision by the staff. What follows is a resumé of the main points made by these students.

I

All three students recognized that exposure to college can be upsetting to a student religiously as well as in other ways. "In the process of 'getting an education,'" said Barbara Behrens, a senior member of Phi Beta Kappa who intends to do graduate study in psychology,

perhaps for the first time students are asked to think beyond what is offered in a textbook, to question authority—to look beyond the obvious. In a course or maybe even in a dorm "bull session" the student may begin to ask ultimate questions. . . . Often it is easy to become so impressed with the scientific method that it tends

to become one's religion. In courses he may become acquainted with alternatives other than the particular faith accepted by his family.

Sandra Levinson, a freshman who plans to be a teacher, pointed out that there are many reasons why a student is not fully prepared to cope with the religious and intellectual atmosphere of the college or university. A "lack of adequate religious training in the home, church or synagogue, and school, by people who really know and understand . . . the subject of religion" is a major contributing factor. A superficial acquaintance with one's own religion, or the religion of one's family, does not form a solid foundation for college life. Furthermore, a failure to have any understanding of other religions than one's own, coupled with a shallow faith, may leave the student openly exposed to the shifting winds of doctrine. Thus Miss Levinson spoke on behalf of better and more training in religion in home, church or synagogue, *and* school.

Don Templeman, president of the Newman Club and a senior in commerce who has been accepted as a student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, also pointed out that "when students enter a state university they are sometimes exposed to ideas which are, or seem to be, contrary to their religious belief. What is needed to compensate for this danger," Mr. Templeman indicated,

in a form of religious instruction which is on an adult and *academic* level equivalent to that which the student receives in his other college courses. The School of Religion meets this need by providing courses which are on this adult level. (It helps)

¹For further information on the School consult M. Willard Lampe, *The Story of an Idea: The History of the School of Religion at the State University of Iowa*. Revised 1954. This can be obtained by writing: School of Religion, SUI, Iowa City, Iowa.

to show students that higher education and religion are not only *compatible*, but *complementary*.

"Although we would never think of solving a difficult problem in analytical geometry with eighth grade arithmetic," Miss Behrens suggested, "we often try to solve our problems with an eighth grade faith." The need in the university is for courses and other avenues which will help the student gain maturity in his understanding of his own faith and in his outlook on the world.

Students take courses in religion for various reasons. It has been my experience that the reason which is uppermost in the minds of most is a concern for their own orientation. Their approach is existential in character; it springs out of a strongly felt personal need to know more about the faith of their fathers and to find answers to the multitudinous questions they have about life—its meaning, purpose and ultimate goals. The skillful teacher will draw upon this personal concern in an effort to help the student achieve a greater maturity, to attain a critical outlook which enables him to gain some understanding of the role religion has played and does play in human culture and experience. Such a broadening experience can aid the student in gaining a better understanding of himself. "The professor teaching a class in religion," Miss Levinson pointed out, "needs to highlight the importance of understanding and appreciation of the religion of others, while also deepening one's understanding of, and commitment to, his own." The student should be constantly encouraged to look in "two directions: toward understanding others and toward a greater depth in self-understanding."

Mr. Templeman expressed the opinion that

A survey of the students would reveal that the popularity of the courses taught in the School of Religion is a reflection of the fact that there is a close *personal* relationship between the professors of the School and the students in their classes.

A teacher in religion cannot ignore the student's religious interests and concerns.

These can be meaningful points of contact between professor and student. A personal interest in the student can serve as a basis for drawing him out and helping him grow in both faith and learning.

II

"The School of Religion is designed to help students in an understanding of religion and in a deepening of their own spiritual awareness." This statement from the State University of Iowa catalogue indicates something of the broad purpose of the School. Understanding is a primary goal, understanding one's own faith and the faiths of others.

I would consider myself a poor psychology major if I were not acquainted with the contributions of such men as Freud, Hull, Watson, and such schools . . . as Gestalt, Functionalists, etc.,

said Miss Behrens. "As a Protestant Christian should I not also be familiar with the contributions of men like Luther, Calvin, Melancthon, Hooker and others?"

"What is most needed in the relationship between various religious groups is understanding," asserted Miss Levinson. Tolerance is not enough. "No members of minority groups want to be merely tolerated—they want to be understood, and respected for their religious convictions." The study of religion can help one gain "an outlook which scoffs at tolerance, and strives instead for knowledge, understanding, a respect for all sincerely religious people."

The second important goal of the School of Religion is that of deepening the student's spiritual awareness or awareness of spiritual values. The School is concerned with religion as a living reality. One might say that it is guided by the assumption that all men live by faith *in something*. The university has a responsibility to help the student understand that religion is a vital factor in the lives of men and to enable him to grow in the maturity of his own orientation, to help him achieve an intelligent faith.

"To be a true intellectual, one must be an atheist, an agnostic, or a scientific humanist—or so has been the belief of some col-

lege students . . .," Miss Levinson recognized. Or, as Miss Behrens put it: "Somewhere along the way the student may get the idea that it is sophisticated to be an agnostic—that religion may be all right for the uneducated but not for the intelligentsia." Such an attitude, however, does not really show much depth of intellect. What life calls for is a deep and vital faith, one that will be a harbor during the times of storm and a sure guide in periods of perplexity. Such a faith will not necessarily be in opposition to learning; it may well be its worthy companion.

"One's religious convictions, whatever they may be," maintained Miss Levinson, "should be *strong*, not wishy-washy beliefs, believed only so as not to anger or arouse the people around him. They should not be particles of beliefs picked from various and sundry religions to please everyone else."

III

Miss Behrens closed her remarks with these words:

As with most students, I have certain goals which I intend to attain while attending college, and as with others, I have a conception of the educated person I am striving to become. Included in this conception is the development of my religious faith. . . . To a large degree the church I attend and the student group of which I am a member have contributed to my spiritual growth. However, I am certain that I have benefited greatly and gained immeasurable insight into my own faith through the courses I have taken in the School of Religion.

"I cannot over-emphasize the significance of what or *how* I have learned this year," reported Miss Levinson.

I have learned about the religious beliefs and practices of Taoism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Judaism. I learned of religion's relationship to, and the part it plays in, politics, economics, social and natural sciences, philosophy, psychology, the fine arts, and other fields. . . . But, even more, I have seen a group of people—both teachers and students—working together toward a common goal: that of helping themselves and others to gain an intelligent outlook toward one of life's most important aspects—man's search for truth through God.

"I have come to appreciate what a unique opportunity students at the State University of Iowa have in obtaining education in religion," concluded Mr. Templeman.

In attending Newman Club conventions on a provincial and national level I have heard many students express the wish that they could have the opportunity to take credit courses in religion. . . . (Recently) I attended a forum on religious education and was not only questioned about the School of Religion, but was asked to send printed information on it.

Many students from other state universities, Mr. Templeman informed us, were anxious to indicate to their school administrations "that religion *can* be taught successfully in a state institution on a basis acceptable to Protestants, Catholics, and Jews," and, he might have added, to the university also.

SPIRITUAL VALUES IN COMMUNITY COLLEGES

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HIGHER EDUCATION in the United States may be said to have shifted its center of gravity each decade. Forty years ago the elective system promised much. Thirty years ago pre-Law, pre-Medicine and other methods of specialization were to save us. Twenty years ago Columbia began "to orient" freshmen, and Chicago, Harvard, Yale and Princeton validated the "general education" idea. Ten years ago the separate Junior College was certain to perfect every university situation. Today we ask, "Can the Community College become our salvation?" If volume and income were the answer the reply might be made in the affirmative.

The Growth

General Education (the introductory years in collegiate work) is now fairly well institutionalized in the home-town colleges. In addition to orientation, these institutions cap the local high school with college work. They disperse the otherwise large university enrollment, give freshmen and sophomores two years in smaller aggregations, and supply in-service courses for citizens who delayed their higher education. The enrollment, 67,000 in 1930, has become 463,200 as of 1950. However, the number of colleges climbed to 637 in 1940 and in 1952 had receded to 586.¹ Most colleges have a 20-40 staff and a 400-800 student body. But the large units have reached, in Los Angeles 295 faculty and 12,333 students, in San Francisco 265 faculty and 6,408 students, and in Pasadena 457 staff and 4,794 students. The in-service enrollments on a part-time basis lift these totals. In 1950 Modesto reported that one third of the citizens took at least one course.

¹Jesse P. Bogue, *American Junior Colleges*, Washington, D. C.; American Council on Education, 1952, p. 9.

In Texas the movement has the patronage of ear-marked tax support from oil industries. In California, where there are now sixty junior and community colleges with free education for youth within the district, Bogue states: "Yearly budgets in the millions are a commonplace; of the 46 which replied as to income, 15 reported in millions and only one fell below six figures." The numbers of institutions include, fourteen each in Kansas and Illinois, twelve in Oklahoma, and nine in Minnesota. The city of Sacramento, says this report, shows an "attendance of 3,518 full-time students and 13,710 irregular-hour students." The ratio of full-time, presumably "college-age" who are also employed is similar to Sacramento in Mason, Iowa, Long Beach, California, and Corpus Christi, Texas. In the county in which this writer happens to reside, Contra Costa, California, the junior college, but six years old, gave as the reason for a local college that in 1948-49 their 600 youth who attended elsewhere, in seventeen different institutions, paid tuition to the amount of \$148,970. To-day, operating in two sections, Contra Costa Junior, has 8,719 regular students, a staff and faculty of 282 and a budget of \$1,558,543. How such a movement is approaching the legitimate objectives, as definitely re-stated during the past decade, should challenge all educators.

The traditional administrative mind, which assumes mistakenly that sect and religion are synonymous is illustrated by the following statements by two public educators.

1. Trustees feel that "to remain unbiased there must be no provision for religion, as such."
2. The dean feels that there should be no provision for religion in a municipal

Junior College, else biased situations will arise. "Influence on the student body is that of indifference."²

Those are constructive statements, showing administrative awareness. They were significantly American. But do they not spell out religion impotence? One has to ask, can it be true that the ancient discipline of saints, scholars and martyrs is being done to death by its friends, first by devout Christians who in the process of living, worship, and church life perpetuate the sectarian fragmentation of believers, and secondly by educators who believe themselves to be absolved from responsibility as to this problem? The issue turns on "sect" and not on either "spiritual" or "religious." Spiritual and religious transcend sect. They are basic to learning itself. Many educators assume that separation of Church and State means a legal separation of "education" from "religion." Such is not true. But through such assumptions the religious values in our American tradition are being maltreated academically. Or possibly, some administrators have been assuming erroneously that churches actually teach religion well and communicate spiritual values adequately, hence the whole area known as moral and spiritual values may properly be omitted from the public education plan.³

Today, however, we are in an entirely new situation. Two court decisions, the McCollum case from Illinois and the Zorach case from New York, have given us the conclusions of the Federal Supreme Court. The American Council on Education in two statements have printed the findings on the function of public schools in relation to religion. The Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association in 1951, made a one hundred page statement upon the *Moral and Spiritual*

Values of the Public Schools.⁴ Here then are the basic goals for current implementation by all public educators. But teachers will have to be re-educated. Most of them have already begun to retrain themselves. How do those of us who have served as religious educators within State Universities view the present situation? One of the most eloquent succinct statements as to spiritual values to be found in American literature is by Carl Becker:

To have faith in the dignity and worth of the individual man as an end in himself.

To believe that it is better to be governed by persuasion than by coercion,

To believe that fraternal good-will is more worthy than a selfish and contentious spirit,

To believe that in the long run all values are inseparable from the love of truth and the disinterested search for it,

To believe that knowledge and the power it confers should be used to promote the welfare and happiness of all men rather than to serve the interests of those individuals and classes whom fortune and intelligence endow with temporary advantage,

These are the values which are affirmed by the traditional democratic ideology."⁵

Fearing lest that enumeration might fail to lay claim to universality, he added:

"They are older and more universal than democracy and do not depend upon it.

They have a life of their own apart from any particular social system or type of civilization."

Becker goes on to say "they are the values which since the time of Buddha and Confucius, Solomon and Zoroaster, Plato and Aristotle, Socrates and Jesus, men have commonly employed to measure the advance or the decline of civilization." These are the values that "readily lend themselves to rational justification, yet need no justification." Here, then, are the spiritual values

²Hart Cantelon, *Religious Influence in State Junior Colleges*, Alberta, Can. and California. Unpublished thesis, 1949, Pacific School of Religion, Berkeley, California.

³Philip Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, New York; Harper and Brothers, 1931; Vol. III, pp. 653 ff; C. Moehman, *School and Church*, New York; Harper and Brothers, 1944; pp. 43-50.

⁴N.E.A., *Moral and Spiritual Values in The Public Schools*, Washington, D. C., 1951.

⁵Carl Becker, *New Liberties for Old*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941, p. 149.

on which all can unite. The tragedy lies in the fact that in these United States, education is least certain of its footing just where traction is most needed. What of the current goals? As we move from the remote University situation, where students live in vast dormitory quadrangles, to the home-town college the two issues, — distance from customary parental controls and youth volume will be simplified. The hilarity occasionally apparent among youth far from home, as in the absurd Pantie-Raids reported two years ago, will be less. Parents will simplify controls. However, as the college moves close to home, the church, the local club life, and post-high-school associations there will appear a series of negatives. The faiths, congregations and sectarian units which stress institutionalism, creedal emphasis, sacramental features and propaganda, are conspicuously at hand.

While clergy and church units are seriously eloquent and at times emotionally intense in behalf of ideals, including such high aims as forgiveness, social vision and love, educational techniques are seldom used so as to bring to parents the guidance in religious education which any public school might supply. Clergymen are theologically trained, schooled in biblical lore, church history and other so-called contact subjects. They are less skilled in educational psychology. Many clergymen would write-off such theories as non-religious, artificial, and showing doubt as to the saving grace of God, or wholly deceptive.⁶ As a result, down on the street, so to speak, our denominations may be problem areas. Functional religious education talks a language understood by the public educators but persistently misunderstood by a discouragingly large percentage of our churchmen. William C. Bower is definitive as to our view:

It is to functional religion, which by its nature is a valuational experience that we must look, as the supreme source of values. It is concerned, not only with particular values in the varied areas of

living such as economic, intellectual, social, political, aesthetic and moral, but with the whole of life—with its meaning and worth in relation to total reality.

In the classical language of all historic religions this reality, however intellectually interpreted, is represented by the word God, the most heavily freighted word in human language.⁷

The sectarian institutions in the home-town present several problems. One is that religious experience is intimately personal and thus holds a priority. A second is that religions are rooted in tradition and are accepted as sacred. And a third is that clergymen are ordained by denominational bodies and preside over parallel bands of loyal disciples which bands girdle the globe. In our town, as in your city, these bands are mutually exclusive. Public educators know how on occasion they can destroy social solidarity. And a fourth is that each experience which is ecclesiastically oriented has its freedom guaranteed. The law of the land sets police protection about that guarantee which we enjoy as freedom of worship. Thus the church-clergy structure, even where managed by conscientious citizens, is set to fragment the community while public educators are trained for and the educational structure is designed for solidarity with a view to unity.

While it may seem an injustice to unload on the public educator the sad results brought on by our western sectarian expression of religious convictions (Jewish, Roman Catholic, Protestant and others), the youth of today and our American democracy must be extricated from the anti-social forces now apparent. The Community College is where the four institutions—home, school, government and church-unit are inextricably joined. Let us look at the prospect, ahead.

Goals and Emphasis

In their Report to the President in 1947,⁸

⁷William C. Bower, "A Program In Public Education For Achieving the Role of Religious Education," *Religious Education*, July-Aug. 1955, p. 211; also John Brubacher, *Modern Philosophies of Education*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939, Ch. XIII.

⁸See *American Higher Education*, Chap. I.

⁶Bernard Meland, *Higher Education and The Human Spirit*, University of Chicago Press: Chap. II.

the Commissioners on Higher Education boldly asserted that "we must bring our social skills quickly abreast of our skills in natural science." They spoke of "new workable patterns of association." Also they called attention to the fact that schools and colleges have taught "the concept of common humanity and brotherhood." But "in the past these things have been done too indirectly," and they declared, "Now we must do them directly, explicitly, and urgently." The commission therefore aimed to deepen educational purposes in all civic colleges.

The traditional public attitude toward college has been to think of the first area, (1) intellectual grasp, and the second one, (2) vocational training, as embracing all there is to higher education. The areas: (3) moral commitment, (4) social maturation, (5) inter-cultural and international understanding, (6) aesthetic appreciation, and (7) spiritual insight have been mistakenly thought of as types of growth which every young American acquired automatically.

But these commissioners state:

To educate our citizens only in the structure and possessions of the American Government, therefore, is to fall far short of what is intended for the fuller realization of the democratic ideal. It is the responsibility of higher education to devise programs and methods which will make clear the ethical values and the concepts of human relations upon which our political system rests.

These commissioners as we understand them were referring to the necessity of teaching both the source of our morality and the current dynamic motives which guarantee new levels of achievement as persons, as groups, and as institutions. They continue:

Otherwise we are likely to cling to the letter of democracy and lose its spirit, to hold fast to its procedures when they no longer serve its ends, to propose and follow undemocratic courses of action in the very name of democracy.

To the educator specific goals of this nature are dependent upon the communication

of spiritual values and the concepts involved. Ours in an intellectual topic. Henri Bergson seemed to set religion and the analytic duties of the mind at variance. He pointed out that the religious soul insists upon unity in spite of the fragmentation brought on by intelligence.⁹ Is there a problem here? Rather we believe he was relating the person both to itself and its task. That emphasis is profoundly the one for colleges. He seemed to find the soul longing for compactness and a sense of direction. That insight has been abundantly validated.

In the language of present day theories of learning, the mind must exercise observation, differentiation, selection, identification and integration.¹⁰ Certainly, but Bergson wisely was keeping the eye focused on the person as such. He was sensitively aware of the inner demand of the person for mastery of itself in function. Alfred N. Whitehead in like insight ventured to assert that reality involves both a world of activity and a world of value. He spoke of the latter as "the essential unity of the many." To-day a definite corroboration of that theory is found in Personalistic and Gestaltian psychologies. As an introduction to any current appraisal of an education in spiritual values, therefore, one may do well to reread Gordon W. Allport's list of fifty definitions of personality and his strong chapter on "Unity of Personality." Referring to the Gestaltians he says:

Roughly stated, the field theory of personality regards the total environmental setting as well as the inner structure of the person as decisive in the shaping of conduct.¹¹

Thus, according to Allport, as with William E. Stern, the earlier Personalist, the "fragmentation" to which Bergson referred arises both within the self in learning and without

⁹Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1935; p. 130 ff.

¹⁰Ernest R. Hilgard, *Theories of Learning*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, pp. 350 ff.

¹¹Gordon W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*, New York: H. Holt and Co., 1937, pp. 24-49 and 344 ff.

due to environment. The philosopher and the psychologist seem to be at hand, therefore, to reorient the teacher who must now guide his sensitive collegians at these deeper levels. The public educator will have to set his will to move reverently into the religious (but non-sectarian) aspect if he expects to communicate values spiritual. Even the scientist of significant inner solidarity is present to aid him. The late Albert Einstein, when asked to state his views on religion, wrote:

My religion consists of a humble admiration of the illimitable superior spirit who reveals himself in the slight details we are able to perceive with our frail and feeble minds. That deeply emotional conviction of the presence of a superior reasoning power, which is revealed in the incomprehensible universe forms my idea of God.¹²

And Einstein added, "This knowledge, this feeling is at the center of true religiousness." That same basic conviction was strikingly expressed by Whitehead, who seems always to see the person as within striking distance of the needed cosmic support, where he says:

The religious insight is the grasp of this truth: That the order of the world, the depth of reality of the world, the value of the world in its whole and in its parts, the beauty of the world, the zest of life, the peace of life, and the mastery of evil, are all bound together—not accidentally, but by this truth, that: the universe exhibits a creativity with infinite freedom, and a realm of forms with infinite possibilities; but that this creativity and these forms are together impotent to achieve actuality apart from the completed ideal harmony, which is God.¹³

Thus the educator's task is to understand how we may permeate the whole college experience — assignments, reading, faculty-

student interchange, guidance, stimulation, challenge, and the subtler aspects of learning — with a comprehension not only of the spiritual significance of growth but of unity itself. Both the formal education by means of courses and the informal education by means of counselors will be involved. Also, both the college courses of the teaching faculty and the reflective ceremonies of religious agencies must be held at the center of attention. Certain rare skills will be needed in this decade of anti-intellectualism for the college to approach its objectives and to get results in the field of moral and spiritual clues. Let us therefore relate the issues to Community Colleges starting with leadership.

Leadership in Spiritual Insight

The leader will ask, Who is to be led? Here is the value issue in life itself. What sort of human animal is this Junior College student? Animal? Yes, and also the potential creative leader. The basic urges must be taken into consideration, even though parents, play leaders, group activity in wholesome projects, and the happy learning of habits all may have done their constructive work. The consideration of those urges at this level of necessity must include his own proud efforts to understand his personal responses and to reach into those "valences" or the attraction and repulsion of goal objects cited by Lewin.¹⁴ To the young American becoming a person at the level of collegiate experience a certain sense of involvement takes place. This is both an asset and a liability for the college. For the youth himself it should be at once an adventure and a discipline.

Youth themselves spell futures. The network of aspirations is matched only by the wilderness of behavior wholes, personality spheres and psychic units which a versatile youth leader can detect operating in every group project or responsive class situation. Persons when they move intelligently are moved by potential considerations. The power to determine the act from within the

¹²a) *The World as I See It*, pp. 263 ff; b) *N. Y. Times*, 26 April 1929, p. 60; c) *Mein Weltbild, Meeting Place of Science and Religion*, pp. 11-17, or *Forum and Century*, Vol. 84, pp. 193 ff.

¹³F. S. C. Northrop and Mason W. Gross, Editors, *Alfred North Whitehead, An Anthology*, New York: Macmillan, 1953, p. 512.

¹⁴Kurt Lewin, *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935, p. 63.

mind, by an ideal forecast, is quite another kind of causation from that which would serve in a limited mechanized world. Archbishop Temple defines freedom to be "determination by what seems good as contrasted with determination by irresistible compulsion."¹⁵ Youth who arrive at college can readily be challenged to orient their thinking to reality itself and to repudiate immediate desires. But they must be given the confidence of more experienced persons.

To communicate spiritual values at the college level, our *ought* must go beyond what is. Only so can we push the line of victory a little farther forward. Thus more important than either teacher or student will early comprehend there is freedom — one area of autonomy — open to every sensitive adolescent student and group of students who are adroitly encouraged.

Rufus Jones while active as one of a rare teaching colony which we know as Swathmore, speaking of freedom and creativity, wrote:

It can hardly be open to debate, I think, that ideal forecasts — visions of what ought to be — do make events happen. Men like us live, and sometimes die, for ideal goods which are not yet actual anywhere in the world of molecules, the realm of space and time.

It is the forward look, the attractive power of the ideal rather than an outside causal nexus which accounts for the act. A person with a different ideal in the same setting of external environment would pull off a very different deed.

Here (or nowhere) we create something. In our little spheres we are originators. We make a unique contribution to life.¹⁶

Student Decisions

First: This college youth must select a life calling. In earlier years occupations belonged to others. Now they offer him a challenge. He does not ask the question his parents and teachers ask, namely, What

are you going to do? Rather he is entering into a different psychology. He asks, "Just how shall I give over to the universe my talent, or by what procedure is the universe going to receive that peculiar gift which I have to make?" Most youth able to reach college bear this condescending attitude. An awareness of certain personal powers is the absorbing new experience. As yet, no failures of dramatic impressiveness have blighted the sense of strength. Such youth are generous, to be certain, but they expect humanity, the culture and the future to meet them halfway and to receive them with gratitude. Vocation-election is ego-involvement number one. Can it be reverently entered into or shall the entire experience go forward as barter and conquest? Ward Madden in *Religious Values in Education* may have the secret. He says:

The creative social act (Wieman calls this the "creative event") produces what man in his finiteness does not intend.

The "group spirit," says Madden, has qualities which cannot be fully accounted for by the combined individual personal qualities of the participants. We talk of esprit de corps. That morals helps determine the outcome of the common effort. Of group teaching and group learning, Madden insists that students and leader enter the social act to contribute their finite and particular values, and are so caught up in the power of the process which they help produce that they undergo radical transformation of outlook and personality. Where college teaching is creative, there is produced in them a wider and deeper vision. At the college level the learner by a group process which includes reflective thinking becomes aware that — to quote Madden again:

The creative social act is a product of the cosmos of which man is but a part. Man's body and brain are organizations of natural energy. Nature, not he, produced them . . . There is the soil to be tilled; the sun, rain, wind to be utilized or adapted to; the rivers to be dealt with; the electro-magnetic energy of the universe loosed or in some small measure controlled . . . Man is involved for better or

¹⁵Archbishop William Temple, *Nature, Man and God*, London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1934, p. 229.

¹⁶Rufus Jones, *Some Problems of Life*, Nashville: Cokesbury, 1936, p. 153.

worse with nothing less than the movements of the universe itself . . . Creative social acts emerge within the vast ferment of the cosmos. It is appropriate that man approach the creative act in the spirit of hopeful humility, with a profound sense of dependence upon the forces that generated him and with which he must work in trying to shape his destiny.¹⁷

The Junior College years are marked *secondly*, by the status problem. That is, each youth manifests his degree of dominance-submission. He will make those person-to-group decisions which indicate whether he will be a leader or chiefly one who complies with status quo as a follower. Heretofore he will have accepted the family program, family church, family neighborhood, family orientation and family leisure. During these two years youth moves to "my program," "my social set," "my orientation," "my leisure." To have this experience in the matrix of the home town rather than at a distant university is all to the good. It is good also for the families, businesses, and associations which tend to stagnate in provincial patterns. The crux will appear at the point of personnel and leadership. This is the break from parent, but also it will mark youth's status in another particular.

The many in every community enterprise will lean toward submission. The few will be venturesome, independent and creative. Hunger for approval will type the former, but outreach, insight and sensitivity will be the mark of the latter. General education will advance the latter to the university. The former will recede into the skills and arts of general society and become the local leaders or at least the semi-trained solid citizenry which are the pride of our democratic life. For both types, spiritual values including functional religion have a service to perform. Unless that service is performed the future college or university man and woman will become danger agents instead of leaders, seers, and saviours. And the

home-town citizens with a Junior certificate, if religion, broadly considered and refined, fails them in this period, will become petty dupes, unable to understand their decade or opportunity. They only will understand the local obligations of America's march to world greatness and a free worldwide social order who have attained those spiritual values for which every consecrated democrat should proudly live, or even dare to die.

The well-known *third decision* of this period normally comes with greater intensity than either the selection of a vocation or the attaining of status. We refer to the anticipation, and perchance the selection, of a mate.¹⁸ This husband-wife dimension is of the essence in America today. In society spiritual values are brought to bear through a subtle complex of ideals, standards and customs. As play, contest, and movement challenge youth, and as the sexes mingle according to the culture-ways, each youth develops a view of adulthood. Youth emerges from the romantic events with a view of life which, in our culture, can be fulfilled most normally by marriage. Significant in its own right, the selection of a partner takes on added importance because romance loosens the imagination along the avenues of the ideal. The youth, both boy and girl, long before anything so specific as an engagement takes place, will have hammered out the desired future both for themselves and their children. In spite of the pessimism about those few youth who tangle with the law and our commuter parents who fail to team with the teachers, we saw as most educators agree that, contrary to many predictions, our American youth in World War II proved themselves superior to the previous generation of World War I. They excelled both in holding to perspectives and in mastering techniques as well as exhibiting loyalty and courage.

Granted that the patterns these young

¹⁷Ward Madden, *Religious Values in Education*, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951, pp. 49-50.

¹⁸One State College in California has deliberately oriented its curriculum toward "The Home and Marital Relations." A thorough counseling program, related study, sociality and achievement will aim to facilitate campus life itself as a spiritual area.

collegians anticipate sufficiently to put into words will suffer many alternations, this is the first time adolescent youth, well nigh universally, verbalize life's meanings and reshape their behavior in accordance thereto. Here is deep struggle. This is when youth look to society, to country, to the age, and to God expecting Utopia. Our most dynamic and alert youth seem impelled to will Utopia into existence. They do this with an abandon both beautiful and foolhardy. By such youth Utopia is requisitioned, as it were. They project the will that Utopia shall become true in this, their own generation, but if not for this one, then for the next. Already they think of their own children. The spiritual values they exercise and those held by the community, home, school, camp, team, club, associations and the heroes they read about, play the role of silent partnerships in all of this. But those partnerships are determinative.

In our revolutionary era abroad and cold war epoch at home with their cruelties, uncertainties, military obligations, and dangers, our youth are ready to embrace love and religion as two very specific allies. To such a young adventurer his lover or possible mate is offering the needed full understanding. Also, through religion he can presumably commandeer the powers beyond us. Here is prayer, mystically perceived but very practical, a social force. Youth, as we have known them in state universities, very generally insist upon embracing not some tradition but that just future which his democratic public leaders as well as his home and church religious training have taught him ought to exist. For youth with imagination the better life must come to pass. These are those who possess that *fourth pattern* called sensitivity or insight discovered by our study, *From School to College*.¹⁹ Whether school codes, community customs, formal religion, spiritual agencies and philosophers of faith appear or not to discipline them, these dreamers are inclined organically and aesthetically to lay hold on

heaven here and now. Such is their prevailing ethos. To live dynamically within college life, defining and redefining goals and implementation, is therefore to determine futures and enrich the race.

John Dewey supported this thesis. He wrote:

Intelligence, as distinct from the older concept of reason, is inherently involved in action. Moreover there is no opposition between it and emotion.²⁰

Here Dewey introduced us to distinctions which often are overlooked, namely:

Intelligence differs from reason in that it associates more intimately with action. Also, the custom of setting emotion opposite reason cannot hold between emotion and intelligence.²⁰

for, as Dewey further states,

There is such a thing as passionate intelligence, as ardor in behalf of light shining into the murky places of social existence, and a zeal for its refreshing and purifying effect.²⁰

In these passages Dewey is lecturing on religion, and making a distinction between religion and "the religious." Following much the line of thinking used by Bergson, as above referred to, he thinks of the self as follows:

Religionists have been right in thinking of it [an adjustment process] as an influx from sources beyond conscious deliberation and purpose.

Also, added Dewey.

It is pertinent to note that the unification of the self throughout the ceaseless flux of what it does, suffers, and achieves, cannot be attained in terms of itself. The self is always directed beyond itself and so its own unification depends upon the idea of the integration of the shifting scenes of the world into that imaginative totality we call the Universe.

In like vein, A. Campbell Garnett recently declared:

¹⁹Lincoln Hale, Hugh Hartshorn, et aliae, *From School to College*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939, pp. 218-224.

²⁰John Dewey, *Common Faith*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934, p. 79.

Without religion in this broad sense, that is, an attitude of devotion to something beyond the self which is held worthy of supreme devotion, life can never be at its best and most effective.²¹

And Garnett says:

To have a multitude of interests, or objects of devotion, beyond ourselves, without any object to unify them, is simply to be nonreligious.

But it is in the religious life, extroverted and unified by devotion to a supreme and worthy object beyond itself, that personality attains its maximum effectiveness and value.

Garnett wisely quotes Dewey, at this point, as follows:

Were men and women actuated throughout the length and breadth of human relations with the faith and ardor that have at times marked historic religions, the consequences would be incalculable.²²

It is Bernard Meland who says of college teaching: Students are not there to learn arguments or to develop immunities to them. Students are there to develop reflective powers, to inform the mind, to widen the imagination. But all this is so they may sharpen their capacity for insight.²³

Staff in Religion

It is customary to think of staff in religion, *professionally*, whereas in higher education we should think of them *functionally* and not professionally. Here is a distinctive difficult to popularize. The state campus situations or community college will never be understood until we frankly admit that it is the professor, the dean, the president, the counselor, none of whom receives any part of his monetary compensation from religious organizations, who are the chief religious influences.

The two types of religious leaders are:

(1) the faculty adviser or counselor, and (2) the directors, secretaries, pastors, priests and rabbis outside the staff and faculty. The former, those faculty advisors, being teachers primarily, may wish to repudiate the title "religious leaders." They are of course, historians, sociologists, philosophers, scientists, psychologists, who pursue studies to make the metaphysical views of sages, the faiths of mankind and the enduring truths they know best give deep and profound meaning to the democracy and social integrity which we try to live out in America.

These faculty persons in Community Colleges will teach how there is a value connotation to all group activity, as well as in the subjective world wherein arise private tensions or responses, joys or sorrows, defeats or victories, faiths or fears of the soul. They will be advisers, directors, counselors of honor societies and language groups, and sponsors of the religious association, of art groups, of choirs and of worship units as well as of many other clubs and projects. The human relations constitute a significant phase of their educational work, under distribution of functions. Before turning away from this first type of religious leader within the college, we must point to the fact that the coming of an intermediary staff, known as Personnel and Counseling, may mark the transition to a democratized and student-centered higher education.²⁴

In the N.E.A. meeting on Higher Education, 1947, Dean Hawkes defined counseling as "the total process of understanding and dealing with the individual student to the end that he is helped to a self-determined solution of his problem or a resolution of his need."²⁵ The student's religious need should be included but never permitted to be dwarfed among measurements in counseling. If the teachers we are referring to as religious leaders, type one, can be placed

²¹A. Campbell Garnett, *Moral Nature of Man*, New York: Ronald Press, 1952, p. 261.

²²Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

²³Meland, *op. cit.*, Chap. I.

²⁴See A. J. Brumbaugh, "Meaning of Values," *Hazen Conferences*, 1944-45, pp. 25 ff. and Ordway Tead, *A Dynamic Quest for Unity*, Hazen Foundation Pamphlet No. 19.

²⁵Mrs. Herbert Hawkes, *Current Problems in Higher Education*, Washington, D. C., National Education Association, pp. 111-122.

at the creative heart of such an administrative transfer, then education in functional religion will be possible of attainment.

Faculty-Student Associations

Historically, the professional leaders, for state student centers, emerged during the past seventy-five years from the creative work of the Student Christian Associations. These Associations are not ecclesiastical hence are "lay" leaders just as parents are "lay" believers. We need to remind ourselves that a long list of campus services and procedures were explored and partly standardized by such associations.²⁶ They now are at hand ready to be employed by community college faculties. No Junior College, while attempting to do a thorough work in formal education and also attempting to introduce counseling either as intellectual discipline or integration of ideals, can afford to ignore the vast fund of experience and the stimulating insights of the Christian Association. There could emerge a synthesis of the insights which religious groups develop, with the techniques and methods of goal selection, plus evaluation in which Community College faculties now specialize. That synthesis could engage values as we have been interpreting religion. Sectarian individualism, by some such education in spiritual values, may soon be reduced to scale. Freedom in religiousness will then perform its proper unifying function in public education. That renewal, long overdue, should come about first in public community higher education and later at the secondary and elementary levels.

It is the Community College faculty

which is nearer to the several issues involved, as well as more directly concerned with learning and growth within the family as well as within the community than teachers at a remote University. Here is the strategic opportunity in this decade, to redirect the course both of American public education and our western life. When creative general education becomes functional religion we shall arrive. But it will require creative historians, philosophers, social scientists, and psychologists at work under spiritually motivated administrators to lead the way. Here and there are to be found faculties nobly demonstrating for us how it can be done.

The subject of Curricular Religion is treated in *Religious Education*, July 1953. Our findings in research and experience after three decades in ecclesiastic status in higher education and then fifteen years in the administrative staff of a State University,²⁷ indicate that every Public Junior or Community College may deepen any subject matter to religious significance and teach courses of religious content if the instructors have learned to refrain from the promotion of any given sect, group of sects, church or synagogue; and that to stop short of such teaching in a college is to deny to our culture the chief food on which our democracy must subsist.²⁸ That is, if the teaching techniques are academically adequate, religion and other spiritual insights can be freely studied, frankly experimented with and taught in the curriculum.

²⁷See "Developing an Indigenous Religious Program In a State University," *Religious Education*, Apr.-May, 1941.

²⁸Conference Resolutions, *Current Issues in Higher Education*, Washington, D. C., N.E.A. Association For Higher Education, 1953.

²⁶Philip Henry Lotz, Editor, *Orientation In Religious Education*, Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1950, Ch. XXIX.

THE SAINT XAVIER PLAN OF LIBERAL EDUCATION

OSCAR WILLIAM PERLMUTTER

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I

A QUALITATIVE revolution in education, with the consent of faculty and students, is peacefully taking place on the campus of Saint Xavier College in Chicago. The college, one of twenty-two throughout the nation selected by the Fund for the Advancement of Education in 1952 to undertake "self studies" was not only dissatisfied with contemporary trends in American education but particularly concerned about the quality of liberal education in religious institutions of higher learning in America. The Self Study was completed in 1953 and a well-worked-out theory of liberal education was privately published under the title *The Liberal Education of the Christian Person*, a work which has already had several printings and is now being revised for formal publication. Although the study is theoretical in character, bold plans were immediately laid and the implementation of the new program has proceeded with great dispatch. This article is an attempt to present a brief summary of the basic ideas, aims, and practical achievements of the *Saint Xavier Plan of Liberal Education*, to date.

Church-related colleges in America have indulged mediocrity for too long and one is forced to admit that the great achievements in American education have come, for the most part, from secularized institutions. The pattern in American higher education has been to drop religious affiliation or to make it nominal; to isolate religion or to dilute its content as an academic activity. Historic circumstances may have justified such action. In the history of higher learning in America, religion has frequently been regarded as an inhibiting influence rather than a source of liberation; in popular thinking it is often associated with repression, timidity and anti-intellectualism. Sincerely religious professors often prefer to teach in a secular insti-

tution to one of their own denomination and one of the first questions put to a professor in a church-related college, justly or not, is whether he enjoys genuine academic freedom. The forced marriage of the spirit of inquiry and religious devotion has resulted in numerous instances of incompatibility, separation, and divorce. Yet both are ideally suited to one another however shocking this may sound to many liberal minded scholars. The historical warrant for these assertions is clear even though it comes as a surprise to some educators to learn that the tradition of liberal arts education and academic freedom is a product of the great Christian schools and universities of the middle ages and renaissance. Hastings Rashdall, the definitive English historian on the subject, writes as follows in his *The Universities in the Middle Ages*:

"The universities and the immediate products of their activity may be said to constitute the great achievement of the Middle Ages in the intellectual sphere. Their organization and their traditions, their studies and their exercises affected the progress and intellectual development of Europe more powerfully, or (perhaps it should be said) more exclusively, than any schools in all likelihood will ever do again."

The faculty of Saint Xavier is determined to take its standards from the outstanding achievements of Christian educators in the west and to abandon the parochial sense of inferiority and its concomitant wail of righteous exhortation so characteristic of many religious educators in America. The way to begin reforming American education is for each institution to reform itself.

Colleges have precise functions as do hospitals. No one in his right mind would be satisfied with a hospital well equipped with ministers, chapels, and a genuine religious atmosphere if it failed to cure patients. Yet

religious educators seem to think the curriculum is automatically provided for if a religious atmosphere prevails on the campus or if "religion is taught." The main concern of religious educators should be to provide the best liberal education available and not merely an environment; if it is the best, a proper place will be found for religion, theology and related subjects. A school is not a church and when pastoral and professorial roles are confused it can be as damaging as the confusion of pastoral and medical roles. One man can, of course, perform both offices, but training in only one does not automatically confer proficiency in the other. Albert Schweitzer, the theologian, studied medicine before he opened his clinic.

II

It is against this broad historical background, as well as a long institutional history of educational pioneering that the faculty of Saint Xavier set about to resuscitate the rich liberal arts tradition of the west on its own campus. The much lamented fragmentation and disunity of the overspecialized curriculum was the first problem attacked and the means used struck right at the roots. A decision was reached early in the Self Study to consider the school system in its entirety—from first grade through college. The education of the person is an organic whole and the conventional divisions of school levels must serve as means and not as fixed impediments in the educational process. Fortunately, the college is also part of an educational system conducted by the Sisters of Mercy. This school system consists of over sixty elementary and secondary schools and about eight hundred teachers. The College, therefore, was in a favored position to carry out this basic decision. A flexible and enlightened personnel policy made it possible to bring in educators from all levels and all fields as part of the initial Self Study. The early intention of simply studying the college curriculum gave way to a comprehensive study, and eventual revision, of the program of studies of an entire school system. First grade teachers and college professors sat side by side as peers and a rich and free exchange of ideas was made possible. Since 1953

every educational proposal has been treated in the light of the curriculum of the entire school system. Some of the professors have been teaching or working out courses for the lower schools and teachers from the lower schools have been shifted to the college. Educationist observers have been referring to this as "a vertical approach," but let no one overrate such organization arrangements. Organizational unity can conceal much confused thinking and, for us, this arrangement is merely a scaffolding. The most important step taken was theoretical in character: it entailed the formulation of a coherent and consistent body of philosophical, psychological, and sociological principles into a solid theory of liberal education. This job was not turned over to an endless procession of committees and councils but to individual professors who make such inquiries a full time vocation and who have special competence in educational theory. It also meant going outside the faculties of the school system for additional help. In this connection, individual Dominican Fathers from the House of Studies in River Forest, Illinois, were of tremendous assistance.

Clarification at the level of principle has given a razorlike sharpness to the whole plan. We can only allude to some of the basic ideas and treat them incompletely in this article. First, the role of theology and philosophy were carefully delineated, with special attention being given to their integrative functions. Secondly, sharp, precise, and operative distinctions were drawn between liberal education, general education, and liberal arts education. Lastly, the psychological order affecting teaching and its relation to the ordering of the materials of the curriculum and the sociology and politics of education were all carefully studied. The above listing is in order of importance. We reversed the usual drift of curriculum builders who begin with the sociological facts and work back (in our opinion) to implicit principles and assumptions. We began with general ideas—ideals—and realistically modified these to fit existing historic situations. It was, and is, our explicit contention that you cannot get an adequate educational theory from *raw*

sociological data any more than you can get a theory of medicine from the sociology of medicine. Sociological data are essential but it is important to distinguish the cart from the horse and determine which comes first.

III

In the Saint Xavier Plan, liberal education is conceived as a configuration of general education, the liberal arts, and scientific education, all unified and ordered by a philosophical and theological habit of mind. Although it is an ideal that few people can attain it sets a norm for teachers and students.

General education is thus only a part of a liberal education, although a major part. It may be described as a level of competence in the major areas of knowledge (rather than specifically differentiated sciences) below the level of a scientific habit of mind. It lacks the rigor, sharpness, precision, and generative character of science. On the side of logic, a generally educated person should be competent to judge the internal structure of an exposition and determine which parts are satisfactory and which are not. It might be called an executive ability in the sense that the experienced executive must make decisions on the basis of conflicting and alternative recommendations drawn up by experts. He must sift their arguments although not an expert himself. The average man makes such decisions when he consults several doctors in the case of illness, reads accounts by economists, scientists, critics, architects, and other specialists. Since few persons can command all the sciences, the dispositions of general education must be cultivated. In general education a conscious attempt is made to provide the person with a rich background of facts and experiences which are selected from two points of view. On the one side, the scientist as pedagogue must determine what background is necessary for the eventual study of his particular science and then prescribe the specific content of general education. On the other side, the practically wise man must determine what a man must know to function well in a specific period in history. The educator has to make a judicious union of both in his general education curriculum. General education must

also provide a description of the methods of acquiring knowledge and wisdom; a historical view of man; an enhanced view of specialized knowledge by placing it in the context of all learning; and finally, general education must cover all the major areas of cognition.

The liberal arts are sciences which are called arts because as Aquinas puts it: "they not only involve knowledge but a certain work which is directly a product of reason itself." They are the necessary instruments for the study of the sciences, philosophy, the humanities, and theology. They are prior in the sense that they deal with the methods of the aforementioned and therefore should be studied first.

Because the liberal arts are intermediate between elementary and higher education, the Saint Xavier Plan calls for the establishment of a Liberal Arts High School specifically dedicated to the proposition that every young person in a democracy should have the opportunity to study these arts to the full extent of his capacities.

Science and wisdom are the proper domain of higher learning, bringing science to a high level of achievement and at least making a beginning in wisdom. To what extent the American college can go beyond the liberal arts and general education is an existential problem that requires a separate discussion. The liberal arts in this Saint Xavier Plan comprise formally only part of one of the academic divisions of the college.

Theology is formally distinguished from religion in the college curriculum and although for a long time the predominant sentiment was to treat it as a scientific habit in the college, there is now a strong view in favor of approaching it as a disposition to be treated under the aspect of general education. Required for four years in the college, its integrative function differs sharply from its parallel role in the lower schools.

Each division in the college has its own philosophical dimension: philosophy of nature, social and political philosophy, and the philosophy of art. Philosophical study is undertaken at three different levels: first as providing a unifying framework of intro-

ductory principles for a given area of study; secondly, as reflexive and integrative, after the formal completion of specialization. In such an approach, books like Meyerson's *Identity and Reality*, Whitehead's *Science in the Modern World*, or Maritain's *Degrees of Knowledge* would be studied. And lastly, philosophy is studied as a formal and specialized discipline in more conventional fashion.

Under this program each student receives a philosophical and empirical introduction to each of the major divisions of knowledge, specializes in one area of science, considers his specialty philosophically at the termination of formal study, and pursues a continuous general education in theology.

Students are advanced through the program at their own rate of achievement. There are not set time limits or fixed periods for promotion; the key is progression in strength. The elementary school is non-graded with a strong emphasis upon language arts (a second language is begun early), and a historical approach to human culture. Science and technology are subordinated to fine art at the lower levels and social study is not formally differentiated from effective approaches to human action.

For a fuller description of the program, the reader is referred to *The Liberal Education of the Christian Person, A Progress Report Submitted to the Fund for the Advancement of Education*, and available through the college.

IV

As a practical program the plan has devolved into two major projects. Since no plan of liberal education can succeed, not even if co-authored by John Dewey and Thomas Aquinas working in cordial harmony, if its implementation depends upon poorly educated teachers, we have established a Center of Liberal Studies in Education. This Center will function in three fields: teacher preparation, educational research and communication, and adult liberal studies. The Center is also the means of disseminating the educational theory and practice of the Saint Xavier Plan. Last summer it conducted a six-week Institute in Curriculum and Teacher

Development which was attended by one-hundred-twenty teachers, administrators, professors, and interested lay persons from twelve school systems. The Institute conducted workshops in the theory of the liberal arts and the philosophy of nature, seminars in educational theory, and study groups in curriculum building. The third successive Institute was held June 22 to August 3rd, 1955, which, in addition to the above, had workshops in the Organization and Unity of the Social Sciences and also in Theology and Philosophy in Relation to the Liberal Curriculum.

The second major project is the establishment of a pilot program in what we regard as a Model Liberal School System. The college, a liberal arts high school, and one elementary school are wholly committed to this venture while certain limited aspects of the program are being implemented in a number of other schools. At last nine schools are currently engaged in this project.

The transition from the old program to the new is gradual and is paced by the readiness and willingness of faculty and students. According to present calculations it will require at least one school generation to implement the entire plan.

V

Liberal education as expounded in the Saint Xavier Plan is considered as only a part of the total education of the person. Its primary concern is with intellectual virtue, its goal is wisdom and contemplation. The task of such a school system is to transmit and advance Christian learning, providing its students with a unified view of the best in the cultural heritage. It stipulates that the liberal arts be made available to all students as the capstone of secondary education, and that higher learning in America concentrate on the arts and sciences under the aegis of wisdom. Such a school system is designed to help the person acquire wisdom. It seeks to overcome the intrinsic agnosticism and intellectual despair of contemporary academic specialization and to restore a harmonious balance in the minds and hearts of men.

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE AND ITS MISSION¹

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I SUPPOSE WE are all agreed that the Christian college has a mission. But are we equally agreed on what that mission is? Do we who work in or for supposedly Christian colleges try from time to time to redefine for ourselves the mission of our own particular institutions? Or is it one of those things we take for granted without reflection? If so, I suspect we are failing in one of our first duties.

The Socratic doctrine that the unexamined life is not worth living seems to me to constitute the basic justification for higher education—at any rate if it is *liberal* education and not a purely pragmatic business of developing and transmitting technical skills. How can we, without hypocrisy, encourage our students to develop a critical capacity for forming value judgments—without which they will be poorly equipped for life—if the corporate life of the college that purports to train them is itself unexamined? How can we turn out men and women with a sense of purpose if we are not clear about our own purpose?

Twenty years or so ago, when the Indiana Council on Religion in Higher Education came into being, those of us who were concerned with Christian higher education were very much alive to the need for conscious recognition and explicit statement of our mission. We had every reason to be. The secularist offensive was at its height. The humanities were on the retreat. Our central positions seemed to be threatened. In the words of your own Statement of Purpose:

" . . . in many points the thinking of young folks no longer was based on a rational concept of the relation of man to God and the application of the Christian concepts as applied to the relations between men. The spiritual values of the

Founding Fathers have apparently ceased to be the guiding force to provide the measured concepts of youth's responsibilities for living by and developing a broader understanding of these great fundamentals of religion. . . . The philosophy of material things conquered and held in toil the spiritual function of man's mind."

Times have changed—or at least are changing. In the last couple of decades—if you will allow me to use rather cynical-sounding language—religion has become fashionable again. Perhaps the bitter experience of depression and war brought people face to face with harsh realities they had found it easier to forget in times of peace and prosperity. And with the return of peace, without tranquility, the hideous menace of atomic war has forced us, in the words of the old revivalists, to think of our sins. Perhaps a growing sense of helplessness, inspired by the failure of our political wisdom to keep pace with scientific discovery and technical ingenuity, is leading man to turn again for salvation to a power beyond himself. Perhaps after half a century of revolt against the "Victorian" virtues we are beginning to suspect the hollowness of a life of "self-expression," expressing itself in mechanical pleasure-seeking, and to look for a deeper purpose in our existence. It may be that, through the leavening influence over twenty or thirty years of the graduates of church-related colleges, our own re-affirmation of our mission, as symbolized by the establishment of this Council, has helped to foster a revival of the Founding Fathers' ideal of America as a Christian nation.

To whatever combination of causes we may attribute this change, there is no denying its existence. On the campuses of America, no less than its churches, its homes and its market-places, there is evidence on every hand of a renewed quest for ultimate values,

¹Delivered before the annual luncheon, Indiana Council on Religion in Higher Education, May 14, 1955, Indianapolis Athletic Club.

a revived interest in the eternal truths of Christian Faith.

Does this give us cause for complacency? On the contrary, I believe it conceals a more subtle and therefore more deadly peril than the direct assaults of pagan materialism. If we are not on our guard, we may mistake appearance for reality. Those of you who were present at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Colleges in Washington last January, when we were discussing "Liberal Education and America's Future," will recall that we were forcefully reminded that there is more to Christianity than "turning to God" when the going gets rough; that we are not entitled to speak of a religious revival merely because books about religion are on the best sellers list and Hollywood finds it expedient to cover the familiar cheesecake with a thin layer of biblical frosting. The religious revival is only in the making: the quest is still in progress. Materialistic hedonism, if less brazen, is scarcely on the run. There are still plenty of "heathen hearts that put their trust in reeking tube and iron shard."

At such a time we can less than ever take our mission for granted. It is incumbent on us to re-examine that mission for ourselves and proclaim it to others. If we do not, I fear we shall be under the condemnation of failing to feed the hungry when they come to us, or of offering them stones instead of bread.

The mission of the Christian college is by no means easy to define. In a church-related, liberal arts college which I happen to know very well, an attempt was made not long ago to define the nature of the Christian college. Six committees were appointed to consider the general question "What Is a Christian College?" and to formulate answers by addressing themselves to specific areas and searching out the marks of a Christian college in each area. One committee examined student and campus life, another the faculty, still another the administration. What, they asked, would a Christian college necessarily be doing in these areas? Three other committees studied the curriculum, off-campus relationships, and the definition of

the Christian college itself. The results of a whole winter of committee sessions were made known at a faculty dinner held in the spring of the year. I wish I could say the findings were highly illuminating. But what they lacked in illumination they supplied in wise, commonsense observations that left one with the impression that it is as hard to be Christian, whether as an individual or an institution, as it ever has been.

If we are trying to arrive at our own definition of the mission of a Christian college, it will be helpful to look at some features that emerge when one reads the history of the Christian colleges of America. Anyone who inquires into the origins of these characteristic and pricelessly valuable phenomena in our national life may be led at certain stages of his inquiry to recognize a number of obviously partial truths about the Christian college, what it is, and what it aims to be. I do not intend to go into these origins, which must be familiar to you already, but would simply remind you of a few of the partial truths appearing in one phase or another of the development of the American college. Each one of these truths requires correction or supplementation in the light of later developments.

Perhaps the first such partial truth is that the Christian college is a pre-theological institution. It is, of course, a fact that the oldest colleges of the country were founded primarily to educate preachers: but I know you will agree with me that this is now a partial truth only. Today the Christian liberal arts college should require its Department of Religion to advise pre-theological students enrolled in the college and should by this means help the pre-theologue, as he is called, to choose a curriculum which will prepare him both for his studies in a theological seminary and for his life work generally, but the Christian college has other objectives than the preparation of students for the ministry, important as that may be.

A second partial truth: it was not long after their founding that the American colleges became pre-professional institutions whose aim was to provide men of sound Christian principle and practice for law,

medicine and teaching, as well as for the ministry. In some cases the aim of preparing students for the ministry, which had been the first aim, actually came to stand last. The pre-ministerial student received no special attention. It was presumed that the Church would look after him, but the budding lawyer, doctor and teacher were especially looked after, with more or less of an attempt to see that they got into a post-graduate school without difficulty or else into a good job. As the older educational institutions took this turn, and as the nation at the same time expanded westward, other colleges arose with more precisely religious purposes.

It would be a third partial truth to say the Christian college has in most cases come out of and would therefore naturally be controlled by and exist exclusively for, a denomination or other branch of the church, Protestant or Catholic. I do not know of any Christian college that has not at some point in its history, and almost always at its beginning, been controlled by a denomination or a particular organ of a denomination, such as a board of foreign missions. Many colleges have in the course of time become more or less autonomous, and the tenuous character of their relationship to a particular denomination is usually not concealed by their reaffirmation of their "church-relatedness." In other cases the church relatedness of the college has again become a vital matter. In some other instances church-control of the college has never been in doubt. In these cases it is the function of the college to teach a particular version of the Christian tradition, regarded as the true one, and to convey this particular version in the vehicle of the arts and sciences, insofar as the latter are consistent with it. From this point of view the college must be evangelical; that is, it must expound, and win students to, a particular set of Christian doctrines and practices. The faculty and the administration must be predominantly, if not wholly, composed of members of the denomination or branch of the Church that has established and controls the college. Many persons honestly feel that no college can be called genuinely Christian unless it is constantly supervised and controlled

by the Church; which to all practical purposes means a denomination or other branch of the Church universal. Is this really true? Or is it possible that a college not actually controlled by a church, but loyal to *the* Church, and earnest in its aim to follow the principles of the Christian religion and to serve the Church through the educational process, may be Christian in the fullest sense of the word? I will not enlarge on this question now, for I shall return to it later on.

A fourth partial truth emerges when, without relinquishing the evangelical point of view, the strictly denominational or sectarian aim is abandoned and the touchstone or criterion of truth is found in pure Biblicism. The Christian college is, from this standpoint, an educational institution that tests the validity of the arts and sciences by the revealed and infallible Word of God. Whatever appears contrary to this infallible Word must of necessity be called false or wrong and should not be taught; whatever is according to, or not contradicted by, the Word of God may be taught. This point of view may be maintained with varying degrees of rigor. I am not a theologian, but I know that the Word of God may be identified, as the Fundamentalists identify it, with the exact words of the Old and New Testaments, literally taken as the inerrant revelation of God to man; or, secondly, the Word of God may be identified, as the Barthians do, with the spiritual experience of hearing God speak to us directly when we are reading the Bible, God speaking as it were between the lines or breaking through the sentences like light breaking through clouds and shining into the understanding, in a fresh illumination. Now as I understand it, if the first of these two interpretations, the Fundamentalist interpretation, is the one that is held, then whatever in biology or geology, appears contrary to the literal meaning of Scripture is either to be omitted or else briefly presented and fiercely attacked; but if the second interpretation, the Barthian interpretation, prevails, then biology and geology are accepted as a word of man, and the Word of God to us about them is awaited as a fresh and living experience of the judgment of God upon the works of man.

But as I said I am not a theologian, and I want simply to draw the conclusion, that founding a college on the Word of God is not as simple as it sounds, and that two different types of college may rest upon such a foundation.

A fifth and final partial truth about the Christian college is that it provides its students with knowledge of the world in which they live and fits them for their responsibilities in society. It has the broad aim of furnishing its students with the means of a full and thorough education in the sciences and the humanities. Not only does the college try to present facts in the classroom as objectively and truthfully as possible, it also seeks to develop in its students the maximum capacity for useful work in the world. As you are well aware, the twentieth century has seen the rise and rapid development of many trade schools, state universities and technological institutions whose sole purpose is to do what we have just outlined. In them religion has no official recognition, and the question may well arise whether they are Christian institutions. They are certainly not avowedly un-Christian; they just do not attempt to teach or to practice religion, so far as their educational objectives are concerned, but neither do they take a position against religion. How then would an avowedly Christian institution be differentiated from them? Would it not be at this point: that one group of institutions teaches values, and specifically the Christian values, while the other group does so only indirectly or accidentally, if at all?

I find myself thinking again of the committees at the college I know, and especially of the committee that attempted to define the nature of the Christian college. Since what they reported bears directly on the point I am discussing, I quote this passage:

"A Christian college that is true to its name is sincerely dedicated to the interpretation and practice of the Christian religion; but its function is specifically educational. It is primarily an institution of learning, and as such it provides its students with knowledge of the world in which they live and fits them for their responsibilities in society. . . .

"It would be unrealistic not to acknowledge the difficulty of maintaining a wise balance between presentation of fact and adherence to value. The college should distinguish between an impartial, objective presentation of fact in the classroom and the cultivation of Christian values."

To my mind, this is a somewhat cautious statement, but it brings out a real problem. Facts are objective. Values are subjective. The Christian college must manage somehow to be both objective and subjective at the same time. Even though we have been talking only about a Christian college, any college of whatever nature could hardly have a program in true liberal education which did not provide for its students knowledge of the Judeo-Christian tradition and its influence on Western civilization and culture.

To summarize what I have been trying to say, it would seem that a Christian college, judging at least from its history in this country, founds itself upon the Word of God; serves the Church, either at large or in some particular form, such as a denomination; makes special provision for students for the ministry; strives to send out into the world, whether into the professions, into business or into other vocations, men of sound Christian principle and practice; and endeavors in its education program to transmit knowledge of the world in all its aspects, to develop the capacity to perform useful work in the world, and along with facts to impart a sense of Christian values, so that the Truth may be brought to serve the Kingdom of God as Christ proclaimed it.

This is a wonderful program. In it are implied not only departments of religion, zealous to teach students the facts concerning the background and origin of Christianity and the major changes that have taken place in the Christian religion during the centuries; not only chapel services and religious convocations where the Christian religion may be heard evangelically proclaimed, but also faculty, administration and students all aware, whatever their private beliefs may be, of an atmosphere, and beyond that of a perspective and a spirit, that are Christian and

that pervade the whole college, communicating to everyone the sense of something vital.

For implementing such a program a college may, I believe, base its policies on either of two doctrinal assumptions. Each of these assumptions has its own distinct logic, which will govern the life and teaching of the college.

The first of these alternative assumptions is that God's message to man, once for all given in Christ, is correctly interpreted only by Christians of a certain group: other Christians misconceive it and thus put the Christian cause in jeopardy. Since the salvation of the world hangs in the balance, the correct interpretation and implementation of the Word of God is of such capital importance to the fate of mankind that no one who has glimpsed it can regard it with indifference: it must be preached as an evangel and as many as can be reached must be won over to it by conversion. The churches that hold this view of the gospel must of necessity proclaim it and seek converts by such proclamation, but they must also provide education for the young. Schools and colleges must train young men and women who will exercise leadership in accordance with the Word of God, by teaching them how all knowledge and all skills are to be harmonized with that Word and made instrumental to carrying it out. This, it seems to me, is the characteristic assumption of the college that is avowedly and of set purpose sectarian or denominational.

The other assumption, on which a col-

lege may equally well base its policies is what I may call the assumption of ecumenicity. That is to say the assumption that the Word and the Will of God are so far beyond our finite human understanding that a great variety of interpretations is inevitable. Partial and incomplete as they must necessarily be, all have a right to be set forth and to present themselves for the conscientious choice of the individual soul. Only in the practical union of many earnest minds, independently seeking knowledge of God's Word and Will, can the Will of God be done. Those who hold this view naturally believe that to insist on the exclusive validity of one single interpretation of the Word of God is to close the door to possible ways by which, under God, truth may be discovered, and to imperil the brotherhood and cooperation of sincere and earnest Christians.

The life and work of a Christian college may reasonably and justifiably be founded on either of these assumptions, but in either case, I believe, the essential elements of its mission will be the same. It must teach the history of Christianity and its central role in the development of our civilization. It must expound and exemplify the fundamental values which are the common heritage of Christians. It must give its students the experience of membership in a Christian community. If it does these things, its graduates, whatever their personal beliefs or affiliations, will leave its campus able to say with conviction and with truth: "I know what it means to be a Christian."

HOW DOES COMMUNICATION TAKE PLACE?¹

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The Significance of Communication

IT SEEMS appropriate to begin with a tribute to the object we are studying—communication. I know of no more eloquent tribute than that given by John Dewey. Yet Dewey's statement is more than a tribute. It is also an appraisal and an evaluation. Communication is placed, justly as I see it, as the central function in the building, maintenance and reconstruction of human minds and societies.

"Of all affairs, communication is most wonderful. That things should be able to pass from the plane of external pushing and pulling to that of revealing themselves to man and thereby to themselves; and that the fruit of communication should be participation and sharing, is a wonder by the side of which transubstantiation pales. When communication occurs, all natural events are subject to reconsideration and revision; they are readapted to meet the requirements of conversation, whether it be public discourse or that preliminary discourse termed thinking. Events turn into objects, things with a meaning. They may be referred to when they do not exist, and thus be operating among things distant in space and time, through vicarious presence in a new medium. Brute efficiencies and inarticulate consummations as soon as they can be spoken of are liberated from local and accidental contexts, and are eager for naturalization in any non-insulated, communicating part of the world. . . . In addition to their original existence . . . [events when named] are subject to ideal experimentation: their meanings may be infinitely combined and rearranged in imagination, and the outcome of this inner experimentation—which is thought—may issue forth in interaction with crude or raw events. Meanings having been de-

flected from the rapid and roaring stream of events into a calm and traversible canal, rejoin the main stream and color, temper and compose its course. Where communication exists, things in acquiring meaning, thereby acquire representatives, surrogates, signs and implicates, which are infinitely more amenable to management, more permanent and more accommodating, than events in their first estate."

"By this fashion, qualitative immediacies cease to be dumbly rapturous . . . [as in sensations and passions]. They become capable of survey, contemplation and ideal or logical elaboration; when something can be said of qualities they are purveyors of instruction. Learning and teaching come into being, and there is no event which may not yield information. A directly enjoyed thing adds to itself meaning, and enjoyment is thereby idealized. Even the dumb pang of an ache receives a significant existence when it can be designated and descanted upon; it ceases to be merely oppressive and becomes important; it gains importance, because it becomes representative; it has the dignity of an office.²

The Complexity of Communication Studies

Wider recognition among students of man of the central place of communication in human affairs has led to vast numbers of studies and researches into communication during the past several decades. And these researches have been conducted out of many perspectives and in the languages and idioms of many disciplines—linguistic, including semantic, studies; logical analysis; neurological, anthropological, psychiatric, mass communications studies; cybernetics; social-psychological studies into the organizational and personal conditions of communication; along with penetrating critical analyses of

¹Based upon a paper presented at the Professors and Research Section of the Division of Christian Education at Cincinnati, Ohio, February 6, 1955.

²John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, Chicago and London, Open Court Publishing Co., 1926, pp. 166-167.

artistic experimentation with communication in many media.

I suspect that this lavish concentration of study upon communication reflects also an anxious response to deep barriers to communication which have become more and more evident as social fragmentation and specialization have proceeded in our society, along with the growth of new and unprecedented demands for participation and interdependent collaboration; and as personal neuroses and psychoses have thrust themselves into wider recognition, if not into actually greater prevalence, as dramatic and painful instances of communication failure and breakdown.

The Limitations of This Paper

This very wealth of meanings, knowledge and speculation concerning communication processes should be encouraging to us in our study at this time. We have much to talk about. But it is also embarrassing. Rigorous delimitation of focus and approach is necessary. Selection from among these treasures is essential. Both because of my limitations and my predilections and, hopefully, because the choice defines a central concern of religious educators, I propose three delimitations (without denying the great value of all that I am leaving out):

1. To focus on communication as directed toward learning and re-education;
2. To think of communication as occurring within a face to face situation where direct testing of communication effects by initiators and receivers is possible (if not always practiced or practical);
3. To emphasize the social-psychological determinants, rather than the symbolic-linguistic determinants, of communication.

Communication is a complex relationship, among persons and events, not an isolated event or happening. It is a mode of interaction between at least two people—a speaker (for the time leaving out non-oral communication) and a hearer; it presupposes some organized group (more typically groups) to which these persons belong and

in which they have acquired habits, tools and standards of speech. Communication also requires something in common between the persons involved, some context independent in part of the persons concerned, a *situation* in and through which a common intent is to be realized. What happens in this setting is an exchange of meanings, of significance, from the perspective of one person to that of another. This exchange of meanings, if successful, enhances the clarification and implementation of the common intent in the situation, or, what is just as important, the clarification and appreciation of differences and conflicts in intent. If learning takes place, some generalization beyond this situation of the clarified and tested meanings which result from communication is also accomplished. As I am dealing with it at least, communication always occurs within a context of participation in a joint quest for relevant, common and valid meanings. It assumes that currently available meanings are inadequate to release and guide the participation which the situation somehow requires.

Now what of the social and psychological conditions which function as determinants of processes of communication? A further distinction may suggest a useful classification of those determinants. *This distinction is between the conscious task determinants of communication processes and the normally more implicit determinants involved in the maintenance, building and alteration of the systems involved in the participation—the systems of persons and the systems of relationships—group(s) and/or audience(s), directly or representatively related to the participation.*

Conscious Task Determinants of Communication

1. A common goal or problem is required as a primary control upon the relevance of communication attempts—both the initiation of communications and their reception. Without some common goal to which to refer the meanings enunciated, conversation becomes what Rebecca West has somewhere called a succession of barely intersecting monologues. There is a horror in

"communication" which can find no common aim. No funding of meanings, no progression toward clarification occurs. Actually a deepening of apartness ensues. The loss of confidence in the possibility of communication means a return to the whimsical brutality of the pushes and pulls of powers out of which communication arose to create the humanity of man. Some common goal (or problem) is necessary not alone to shape and release initiations of communication but also to motivate and direct listening to or reception of these initiation attempts. If no clear, common substantive goal is available, ideally the goal comes to be the clarification, discovery or creation of such a goal.

2. Roles within the communication situation must have or acquire some clarity of definition and this definition must be commonly perceived and accepted by the participants, if fully effective communication is to take place. The role structure of the communication situation legitimizes certain expectations of communication behavior on the part of various parties to the collaboration. We talk to roles and respond in roles. An effective communication involves simultaneous taking of our own and other's roles within any unit of participation. Without some measure of role, as well as goal, definition, communication is likely to be vague, diffuse, indeterminate.

3. Standards of appropriateness with respect to both objective and affective content of communication, as well as to its manner and method, are present in every group. These may or may not be compatible with goal and role requirements. When they are compatible, we pay little attention to them. When they are incompatible, they become sources of frustration and, ideally, objects of conscious attention and targets of change in the interest of more full communication.

Maintenance Determinants of Communication

People in effective communication, we have said, are moved and controlled in part by a conscious common task, a goal or problem, along with a social organization shaped appropriately to the particular task. But, in addition, they are concerned, normally more

implicitly, with building and maintaining the systems which support their present problem-solving attempt and others like it or different from it in the future. Personal and social systems must maintain themselves over time and cannot be shaped with complete malleability to the task demands of a particular situation. There are structural as well as situationally functional requirements to be served within the communication process. For the task-minded, these maintenance requirements may show up in the processes of conversation as intrusions, and irrelevancies, as resistancies to reason and intelligence. But for those tuned to listen to the implicit as well as explicit significance of communication, they furnish important clues both for the diagnosis of the communication situation and for its effective treatment.

1. Some communications are directed toward establishing, maintaining and rebuilding the system of relationships in the group (and/or audience) which both present effort and continued common living require. People talk to reassure each other that they are still together, despite the issues that divide them. They talk to clarify hidden motives, their own and others'. They talk to maintain or change power relationships in the group, to enhance the influence of themselves and their side, to diminish the influence of those who are opposed, to bring wavering and unattached persons and subgroups into their alliance. People talk to build and restore common confidence that they are capable of meeting the demands of their situation, to celebrate victories, to exorcise the paralyzing doubts which failures tend to bring into the community. People talk to defend outside group identifications from being lost or disrespected in the present conversation. And these contributions are woven into the more task-oriented contributions. Frequently, both the initiators and receivers are unaware of the influence which the requirements of social maintenance exercise upon what is said, how it is said, what is heard and how it is heard. Seen in relation to a larger meaning of rationality, these contributions are far from irrational, at least potentially. They appear and become irrational

only as their functions are ignored, as their relationship to social maintenance fails to be seen or is denied, perhaps because of an inadequate identification of *rational* communication *solely* with *task-oriented* communication.

2. Other communication efforts are directed toward the maintenance and rebuilding of the personal systems of members within the communication network. Threats to one's own self-image are involved in many communication situations. All deep learning or reeducation involves some clarification, testing, reorganization of the self-image. Others don't treat me and my convictions as I (and my "friends") have been accustomed to view and treat myself and my convictions. And this is threatening and anxiety producing. Some secure support to an honest facing of myself and of others is a requirement, if deep-cutting communication is to take place and if requirements of personal maintenance or re-building are to be respected and accomplished in the process. The group in which reeducation takes place can give the necessary security only if its members become aware of the personal need to all members for support during the threats of significant communications and remake the group's operating standards where they thwart the giving of such support.

The Task of Communication in Reeducation

In general, the task of communication for optimum learning effect is to bring more of the relevant but implicit processes of communication into a status of public responsi-

bility and objectification. This means legitimizing the weaving of expression of honest feelings, doubts, and emotional negative reactions, as well as positive, into the fabric of public processes of communication. Without this, communication tends to remain shallow, uninvolved and trivial. With it, communication that leaves deep imprints within the value systems and personal commitments of the participant or learner, as well as in his stock of available informations and skills, becomes possible.

But the basic teaching and learning task goes still deeper. It should result in effective revelation to participants of the conditions and determinants of full and effective communication. It should quicken the motivations of participants to extend the area of communication, it should equip them with skills for establishing the necessary conditions of effective communication, in their social environments, wherever it has become conscious of its importance and its responsibilities.

This last goal involves more than the communication of means and methods, important as these are. It involves also an invitation and passport to the final values of communion, which whatever else it may be, is communication enjoyed and pursued for its own inherent values. This will seem contradictory only to those for whom appropriate sharing and objectification of previously private "meanings" and significances detracts from rather than enhances their importance and enjoyment. For me, there is no contradiction.

COMMUNICATION FROM A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE¹

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MAN HAS BEEN described in a great variety of ways: as toolmaker, rational animal, political animal, communicating creature, child of God. Each of these refers to a very real characteristic of man, but none is more involved in the whole of man's being than his capacity and need for communication. He shares this capacity with other creatures as an instrument of survival in his natural environment. In the presence of danger he expresses fear as a warning to others. In favorable circumstances he makes clear his pleasurable reactions. He learns by trial and error and exhibits or denotes what he has learned to those dependent on him. Communication is a common elemental capacity in the world of nature.

With man, however, this capacity to communicate becomes not simply a property common to much of the animal world, but one of his most striking differentiae. For man can communicate not simply through denotation, but through connotation. He can communicate meanings abstracted from denotable objects or events. It is the depth and richness of such meanings that express the qualitative dimension of his existence. Here is man as man, communicating not simply to survive, but because he cannot keep the deeper meanings of his existence to himself. His life is lived in the sharing of meanings. Cut off from the possibility of communication, he is deprived of the means of normal personal development, indeed, of health and sanity. Man is essentially a communicating creature, and there is no understanding of the other aspects of his being apart from this fact.

Communication has become one of the critical problems of our contemporary life.

¹Based upon a paper presented by the author at the Professors and Research Section of the Division of Christian Education, N.C.C.C. at Cincinnati, Ohio, February 6, 1955.

In a world that is technologically one, men struggle to speak across lines of vast cultural and ideological difference. We struggle, even within our western society, to transcend a slowly developing cultural atomism. Not only are the barriers social and economic, linguistic and religious, but psychological as well. The neurotic personality wants to communicate, but often cannot; nor can others break through to him through ordinary rational means.

One might suppose that the Christian religion would provide a common context for and language of communication. Yet even within the framework of the World Council of Churches the difficulties in communication are enormous; and outside there are Christian groups that so mistrust the Council that breaking through the barriers has seemed almost impossible.

Studies of the problem of communication are being made from many different points of view. We may well be a long way, as yet, from any definitively comprehensive study. Yet it is possible for each approach to be mindful of other approaches. Our concern here is, first, with the philosophical problem of the perspective character of communication; and second, with the theological problem of the meaning of communication from a Christian perspective.

The Perspective Character of Communication

Difficulties in communication are often dealt with as though they were primarily linguistic. People use the same words but mean very different things by them. Some differences yield, of course, to translation; but others are very stubborn and become insuperable barriers. The reason most commonly advanced is that a word which is regarded as essentially cognitive to one person is thought of as simply emotive by an-

other. That such semantic difficulties do plague us is obvious, but why? What lies back of such differences? Is it simply a matter of difference in presuppositions? Such an answer is perfectly possible and valid as far as it goes, but it tends to be overly rationalistic.

Our presuppositions are never merely logical formulations. Rather they are deeply rooted in our existence as individuals. They represent implicit evaluations of what has become for us matters of decisive significance. Manifestly they reflect the cultural influences that have played upon us, together with our response to any particular philosophic point of view that has appealed to us. Such evaluations of significance involve two dimensions: range and depth.

Is the whole of our experience important for the understanding of the real world or only some part of our experience? Is the level of observation and scientific generalization the only level that is cognitively significant? Or do we intend cognitive meanings at the level of value, and freedom, and ontological interpretation? Do we believe that these levels are important for our understanding of the real world? One can say that the answer which anyone makes will depend upon his particular philosophy. But no one will look through the eyes of a particular philosophy unless those eyes are also the eyes of his own personal experience. One looks out upon the world from the point of view of his own actual experience of significance. If his philosophy does not correspond to his actual experience, what he sees in the world will reflect his experience, not his philosophy.

The dimension of range in our evaluations of significance is not nearly so important, however, as the dimension of depth. Two minds may agree, in principle, that the *whole* of experience is important for our understanding of reality, yet view the world very differently. The reason is simple: we see ultimate meanings in terms of depth, that is, from the point of view of whatever has become of decisive significance for us. There are many naturalists, for example, who would agree with the idealist on the

rational necessity of synopsis, that is, on the need of viewing the whole range of experience, but they see the whole very differently. The decisively important matter for the naturalist is our natural environment; for the idealist it is consciousness or mind.

In every case the range of cognitive meanings which we recognize is viewed from the point of view of the assumed primacy of some one or ones of those meanings. Such an evaluation of decisive significance constitutes the perspective through which a mind looks at (*perspicit*) the objects of his world.² It determines the primary category or categories in terms of which he interprets his world. It determines the relative cognitive significance of the words one uses in communication.

All of this is simply to emphasize that our difficulties in communication are never merely logical or intellectual. They root in our personal evaluations of decisive significance. In the deepest sense such evaluations are existential. They represent those meanings that have become of primary concern for us in our actual existence. To be sure the rational function is involved in any whole-response of the self; we may speak, therefore, of such evaluations as those of existential reason. Certainly such evaluations are no merely arbitrary responses of the individual to his experienced world. Whatever of reflective capacity and concern one may have is involved in such evaluations. But whether one, through philosophic training, is conscious of the kind of evaluation that is affecting his rational stance and therefore constituting his point of view in communication, it is clear that such evaluations are implicit in our thinking. And they can be distinguished and formulated as propositions. Just as certainly they can be criticized, compared and defended. The point to be stressed is that such criticism, comparison and defense is seldom very effective at the purely intellectual level. No one is capable of understanding the point of view of another unless and until he can

²For a fuller analysis of rational perspectives see Chapter I of the author's *The Christian Perspective* (Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950).

somehow enter into the evaluations that constitute it. And this requires imagination and empathy. Not until one can really look at the world from the point of view of another has he any real basis for judging whether his own perspective permits as true a grasp of the meanings of that world.

*Communication From a Christian
Perspective*

Is the analysis here suggested to be understood as meaning that one perspective is as good or as valid as another? Definitely no. Any thorough-going relativism is itself a perspective; it is to say: nothing ultimate really matters. Christian faith, on the other hand, is the conviction that something ultimate does really matter, that God's love in Jesus Christ is indeed the decisive key to our existence and to our understanding of the real world. We may speak, and must speak, of the Truth in Christ.

Christian faith has always been regarded as "a way," indeed as *The Way* (cf. Acts 9:2; 19:23 and 24:14). It is a way of life, of life redeemed by God's holy love, of life made new in Christ. But just because it is a way of life it is also *a way of looking at life*. It is a perspective constituted by the evaluation of God's gracious goodness manifested in Jesus Christ as the supremely important matter both for the living of life and for our understanding of it. Faith in Christ is *the way* which is at once *the truth* and *the life* (John 14:6). That there are differences among Christians is clear, differences in emphasis and interpretation, differences in the cluster of meanings constituting the perspective. Yet Christians within the Ecumenical Movement are discovering a unity deeper than all differences. Across our denominational lines there stands, at the apex of our various ways of expressing Christian truth, a common evaluation of Jesus Christ as God's decisive *communication to man*. It is this faith which constitutes the Christian Church.

The faith which constitutes the Church lays upon it the task of communicating the Gospel to the world. Theologically, this requires of the Church at least four things. First, it requires repeated clarification of the

meaning of the Gospel. Second, a recognition of the truth common to all men which the Gospel presupposes. Third, the exhibiting of the Gospel in its cultural and existential relevance. Fourth, a recognition of the way in which all profound communication must become self-communication. Within the limits here specified it will be possible only to suggest the development of each of these parts of the Church's theological task.

The first task of the Church is, without question, that of preaching the Gospel. Yet in every generation there is the responsibility of clarifying the meaning of the Gospel for that generation. This need is a perennial one for two unmistakable reasons. For one thing, the Gospel is a unity of elements whose balance is preserved only as God's love in Christ is kept at the center. If some other element is stressed at the expense of that central motif or at the expense of any other element, the balance is upset. This peril has always been manifest in the life of the Church and is the key to the theological controversies that have marked her history. Only in Ecumenical fellowship, where each seeks to speak the truth as he sees it in love, can the real order of importance among the elements of the Gospel reaffirm itself within the mind of the Church.

Another reason for the perennial need of clarification of the meaning of the Gospel is that that meaning is bound to be seen with varying import in the light of constantly developing knowledge and experience. Not only must the Gospel be exhibited in its cultural and existential relevance, but we discover that the cultural and existential situation helps the Christian mind to *see* implications of the Gospel that would not otherwise be evident.

"Such clarification of the meaning of God's truth in Christ for each new generation is to take seriously the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. It is to recognize that the communication of the Gospel can never be separated from the leading of the Holy Spirit. It is just this recognition that safeguards the Church against any rigidifying of the Gospel or any reducing it to any doctrinal scho-

lasticism. Christian faith can never be truly presented as a closed system. The very nature of Christian truth requires our openness to constantly unfolding knowledge in God's world. Here is the exciting possibility that we will be led of the Holy Spirit to see, in the light of new experience and new historical situations, implications of the meaning of God's love in Christ that the Church has not previously sensed. Indeed it is just this kind of insight that has come again and again to those devoted to the Ecumenical Movement.

Surely the most important single clarification of meaning that has come in our day is precisely that of the nature of our underlying unity in Christ. Important as respective emphases of our various traditions are, there is something still more important: our unity in Him. He is the common core of meaning for all branches of Christendom. And that common truth is being expressed in our day in a rich variety of ways. In Christ God communicates Himself to man. In Christ God has come and continues to come. In Christ we find the New Being which alone can overcome our self-estrangement and sense of meaninglessness. In Him we find the meaning of God's gracious goodness as the healing which we need at the center of our being and the light which alone can illuminate the deep ills of men. In Him we find the key to truth, truth in which we can live and walk, truth which integrates and illuminates the whole of our experience.

Just such clarification of the meaning of the Gospel is in itself a communicating of that Gospel. It is communicating at the existential level of that which is, in fact, of decisive significance. This is the truth that concerns us unconditionally. Man can neither understand himself nor find answer to the deepest needs of his existence apart from his relationship to God. This is the ultimate objective fact, though its truth can never be apprehended in an attitude of detachment. Rather it is a truth which lays hold upon one. The love of God draws one to Him and invites unconditional trust. One

apprehends because he knows that he has been apprehended.

A second part of the Church's theological task in communicating the Gospel is really presupposed by the first. It is the recognition that we could not communicate at all if there were not some common core of meaning and truth. We live in a common world. We live as common creatures within that world. Man could not be drawn by God's love unless he had been created so to respond. This is the dignity and worth of man. It is God's purpose for him, as expressed in the doctrine of creation in the Image of God. Man distorts that image by his indifference and idolatry, but he cannot destroy it. In all the forms of man's religiousness he has been intuitively certain of the reality of the divine. What he has not understood has been the character of God. Even the agnostic and the atheist have at the center of their lives a feeling of unconditional concern, whether they acknowledge it or not. It is this kind of apologetic that Tillich is so strikingly undertaking in our day, even as Schleiermacher did in his. Or we may express this unacknowledged religiousness in terms of man's being, at the center of his life, a worshiping creature. He has to exalt something as of primary significance. In no other way can he realize his own personal unity; nor is there any other way in which he can find rational meaning in his world. The understanding of our world is possible only through that which is acknowledged as its decisive key. The Christian Gospel points to the Creator, rather than to the creature or the created thing. In His gracious goodness is the unity of all truth.

A third part of the Church's theological task in communicating the Gospel is that of exhibiting its cultural and existential relevance. We have already intimated the importance of such relevance for the clarification of the meaning of the Gospel itself. The fuller import of this part of the task appears in the rich studies of civilization that have been made in our time from a Christian point of view. In them Christian faith appears as a means of profound illumination of the problems of man's cultural

life. There is no more compelling form of communicating the Gospel than that of exhibiting its cultural relevance. A similarly effective kind of apologetic is being carried on in the area of man's personal, existential need. Depth psychology and Christian theology are discovering important mutual concerns. Psychologically informed, the Christian Church can speak to man's need for healing at the motivating center of his being; it can mediate the promises of God in Christ of acceptance and forgiveness. Nothing can really speak to the ontological anxiety of man's existence except the healing Word of God Himself.

Finally, and this too can only be mentioned, communication from a Christian perspective always involves self-communication. One needs careful knowledge of the social and economic barriers that cut across our common life; yet knowledge alone is not enough: personal skill and dedication to the task are likewise indispensable. One needs knowledge of the neurotic barriers that cut individuals off from their fellows; yet only the concerned, the dedicated, can use his knowledge and personal skill in any effective breaking through of barriers. Everywhere knowledge is needed, objective, scientific knowledge. Yet such knowledge alone never establishes communication across the real barriers. There must be real

concern. Communicating from the Christian perspective becomes communication at the existential level. The meanings which one shares as he speaks of the Christian Gospel are not meanings that can be apprehended in detachment. We speak effectively of the healing power of God's love only as we ourselves know it deeply within. And in sharing it we cannot help giving of ourselves.

There can be no real communication of the Gospel apart from our real concern for others, and any real concern for others is self communication. It is a reaching out to them, not merely at the intellectual level, but at the level of the depth of our common being, where we feel our need of God and where the grace of God becomes an experienced reality. Even where we do not find another ready to understand the meanings which we are seeking to share, we can keep the lines of communication open at the dynamic and interpersonal level. It is only at the intellectual level that men become impatient of the barriers to communication and, in effect, give up the task. At the level of personal concern we are communicating ourselves, by God's grace, and preparing the way for a deeper mutual understanding of the meanings of the Gospel. It is at such a level, and only here, that we ever come truly to realize our unity in Christ.

THE RELATION OF CHURCH ATTENDANCE TO HONESTY, AND KINDNESS IN A SMALL COMMUNITY

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Purpose

MOST EMPIRICAL studies such as those of Hartshorne and May, and Havighurst and Taba, have shown that there is either small or no positive relationship between formal religious activities and those character traits which might be supposed to be stimulated by religious exercises. Where a positive relationship is discovered it can usually be shown to be a function of membership in a certain social class rather than church activity or teaching. In other words, conclusions suggested are that both church activity and the ordinary virtues result from the desire of the citizen to conform to the mores of his class rather than from a drive generated by his personal religious experience. Most of these studies have been carried out in communities large enough to represent the gamut of social classes from upper to lower-lower. It was the purpose of the present study to carry out an investigation in a small, predominantly one-class community. If the results of other studies were to be confirmed, we would expect to find correlation between church activity and character traits to be low or lacking.

The Community

"Crossroads" is a rural township located near a large city in upper New York state. Its nucleus is formed by the intersection of two state roads, each corner of which represents an aspect of village life. On one stands the Presbyterian church and its manse, on the second a general store housed in Crossroads only apartment building, on the third a gas station, and on the fourth an ancient farmstead. The village proper consists of

approximately 60 houses and 250 people. The facilities are used both by outsiders and by people from all over the township, but the social life of the community is concentrated among residents of long standing, formerly farmers for the most part, though now many are neglecting their farms to commute to the city, where lucrative employment may be had. These residents are closely knit and well known to one another. It is this group on whom the study was focussed.

The institutions of the community comprise the Presbyterian church, the Catholic church, the Grange, the Central school, the Odd Fellows, and the Rebeccas. At some distance from the center is the small Methodist church, formerly more important than it is today but nevertheless still very much a part of the community. Representing the wiles of Satan are two taverns, frequented by some members of the community and centrally located though not a part of the village nucleus. Activities at the churches are confined to the conventional religious observances with an occasional church supper or dance serving as social variations.

Procedure and Results

The two character traits chosen for investigation were those of kindness and honesty, as most representative of those enjoined in the Christian ethic. Fifteen members of the community, mostly residents of long standing well acquainted with its inhabitants, were asked to rate 72 people on a five-point scale with respect to these two traits and church attendance. The 72 were chosen as those whose habits and personal-

ities would be most likely to be well known by the fifteen. The instructions asked the raters to compare the individuals with other members of the community and not to consult with other people or with each other in making the ratings. Using Warner's social rating scale¹ to determine social class the 72 were found to be grouped as follows:

Lower-middle	58
Upper-lower	8
Lower-lower	6

Thus it is seen that our population was very homogeneous, and it is to be expected that class membership had relatively little influence on the differences found between individuals. Religious affiliation showed 53 Protestants and 15 Catholics, while in the case of four, denominational affiliation, if any, was unclear. 42 of the group were men and 30 women. When the ratings had been made it was found that one rater had very poorly differentiated between individuals so that his ratings were discarded, leaving fourteen. Of these fourteen three were regular church-goers, three average in their attendance, while the remaining eight were either very scattered in their attendance or non-attenders. When the ratings of two raters taken at random were correlated² for reliability, rho for church attendance was .74, kindness .59, and honesty .57. It was thought that perhaps halo influence would heighten the relationship between church-going and desirable character traits in the minds of those who themselves attended church and so reduce reliability. Accordingly the ratings of the seven most regular attenders were pooled and correlated with those of the least regular attenders. Rho for church attendance was .86, kindness .82, and honesty .79. Thus reliability would seem to be sufficient for the purposes of this study.

The results of the correlations of the pooled ratings of church attendance with the

pooled ratings of kindness and honesty were as follows:

	<i>rho, church attendance and kindness</i>	<i>rho, church attendance and honesty</i>
Total group (N = 72)	.41	.64
Men (N = 42)	.48	.58
Women (N = 30)	.38	.72

All of these correlations were significant at considerably better than the one percent level of confidence with the exception of the figure of .38 between church attendance and kindness for the women, where it was significant at the two percent level.

Thus we see that in a community where the influence of class difference is at a minimum we have a positive relationship between church attendance and the two personality traits chosen for study. Since our results are at variance with those of other studies it should be noted that our population is small, and the results should simply be taken as suggestive of the need for further exploration along these lines. Also, lest defenders of the churches should too hastily conclude that our study demonstrates that church attendance *caused* increased honesty and kindness among the people under investigation, it should be pointed out that such a conclusion would be gratuitous without further study. Another speculation of equal validity might be that both church-going and the two traits under study may be subsidiary to a more inclusive trait of social responsibility tending to produce both church-going and other socially approved virtues. Still another speculation is that religion may be more of a reality in the lower-middle class and therefore more effective in its influence on conduct. But all that we are entitled to conclude is that in this population we do have the positive association between church attendance and the two traits of honesty and kindness. In such a limited study this would seem encourage-ment enough.

¹As described in L. E. Raths and S. Abrahamson, *Student Status and Social Class*. New York: Modern Education Service, 1951.

²All correlations were computed by the rank-difference method.

The differences in the correlations between the two sexes are not significant. However, they are suggestive and if a study with larger numbers showed them to be significant this would confirm what might be expected. Temptations to depart from religious teachings are not the same with respect to a particular virtue for the two sexes. It is the woman who is more likely to be tempted to be unkind through gossip and scandal mongering. On the other hand with respect to honesty it is the man, with his concern for bread-winning and business, who is more likely to be tempted.

The differences between correlations between church attendance and kindness on the one hand (.41) and honesty on the other (.64) are significant. Hence one might ask why this should be so. Perhaps the answer lies in the greater concreteness as to what constitutes honest behavior. If the association with church attendance is the result of the teaching of the church then one would expect that a more concrete virtue would be taught more effectively. On the other hand if it is some more subtle factor, such as social approval, that operates both in causing attendance and stimulating honesty, again the greater concreteness of honesty would help to explain its higher correlation. Finally, that church attendance should be rated more reliably than the other two traits is not surprising since it is more concrete than either.

Summary and Conclusions

1. Forty-two men and thirty women in a small, substantially homogeneous lower-middle class rural community were studied to discover the relationship between church attendance and the two traits of kindness and honesty.

2. Ratings of these traits by fourteen other members of the community were used as data.

3. These ratings were found to have satisfactory reliability.

4. Differences between sexes were not significant in this study, but such differences as were found were in the direction of a higher relationship between church attendance and kindness for the men, and between church attendance and honesty for the women. Theoretical considerations suggest that a wider study might support the findings.

5. The relationships between church attendance and both kindness and honesty were found to be significantly positive for this population.

6. While this limited study does not prove the theory that desirable character traits are a result of church attendance and instruction, it would appear to lend it some support particularly for the lower-middle class.

7. Since positive results such as these are somewhat unusual in the literature it would seem that further investigation of the subject is called for.

Significant Evidence

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The purpose of this column is to keep religious educators abreast of the relevant significant research in the general field of psychology. Its implications for methods and materials in religious education are clear. Religious educators may well take advantage of every new finding in scientific research.

Each abstract or group is preceded by an evaluation and interpretative comment, which aims to guide the reader in understanding the research reported.

All of these abstracts are from PSYCHOLOGICAL ABSTRACTS, and used by permission of that periodical. The abstract number is Volume 28, Number 9-10, September-October, 1954.

I. ABSTRACTS OF GENERAL INTEREST

The evidence in this abstract indicates a need to study the exchange program more thoroughly.

7362. RIEGEL, O. W. RESIDUAL EFFECTS OF EXCHANGE-OF-PERSONS. *Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 1953, 17, 319-327. — An evaluation study of a program to sponsor sojourns of Belgian students and teachers in the U. S. is summarized and sample findings presented. Interviews with 150 former exchanges, 135 Belgians (of comparable status and occupation) who had not stayed in the U. S., and 15 more who had visited Britain reveal that exchangees are not lastingly more friendly toward U. S. national policies and behavior, do have a greater desire to emigrate, and have a relatively small influence on the attitudes of the general population toward the U. S. An inventory of political parties shows that exchangees are influential in only one. While former exchangees are ordinarily successful in their vocations, there is little evidence that the exchange experience was a major determinant of their success. — (H. W. Riecken)

An excellent demonstration that the way the environment seems to a person is more important than how it is.

7342. HASTORF, ALBERT H. (Dartmouth Coll., Hanover, N. H.) & CANTRIL, HADLEY. THEY SAW A GAME; A CASE STUDY. *J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 1954, 49, 129-134. — When the Dartmouth football team played Princeton in 1951, much controversy was generated over what actually took place during the game. Basically, there was disagreement between the two schools as to what had happened during the game. A questionnaire designed to get reactions to the game and to learn something of the climate of opinion was administered at each school and the same motion picture of the game was shown to a sample of undergraduates at each school, followed by another question-

naire. Results indicate that the "game" was actually many different games and that each version of the events that transpired was just as "real" to a particular person as other versions were to other people. — (L. N. Solomon)

II. ABSTRACTS RELATED TO CHILD DEVELOPMENT

The value even of a new paint job is seen here.

7946. KEPHART, NEWELL C. (Purdue U., Lafayette, Ind.), & FLOYD, WILLIAM. CLASSROOM ENVIRONMENT AND PUPIL WELFARE. *J. educ. Psychol.*, 1954, 45, 52-59. — Pupils in two classrooms which had been re-painted and refurnished according to the room design of the "co-ordinated classroom" recommended by Harman were compared with pupils in classrooms refinished with traditional coloring, furnishings and arrangement. Those who spent the school year in the experimental environment were found to be superior in achievement quotient and to show a slightly greater reduction in extraneous body movements or nervous habits. Head-tilt, which was taken as a sign of posture, was present in fewer of the children in the experimental group. — (E. B. Mallary)

This abstract provides some indication that it is well to teach our children both sides of issues.

7458. LUMSDAINE, ARTHUR A., & JANIS, IRVING L. RESISTANCE TO "COUNTERPROPAGANDA" PRODUCED BY ONE-SIDED AND TWO-SIDED "PROPAGANDA" PRESENTATIONS. *Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 1953, 17, 311-318. — High school student subjects were given one of two recorded speeches that contended it would be five years before Russia would produce A-bombs in quantity. One version of the speech presented only supporting arguments, the other also discussed the principal opposing arguments. A week later, some groups received

a "counter-propaganda" speech in which the opposite view was taken. The students who had been given the "two-sided" speech were found to be less affected by the "counterpropaganda." The authors discuss the rationale of their findings. — (H. W. Reicken)

Information in the following abstracts are helpful for understanding children.

7266. CONGALTON, A. A. SOCIAL CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS IN ADOLESCENTS. *Victoria Univ. Coll. Publ. Psychol.*, 1952, No. 3, 107 p. — Analysis of responses to a 35-item questionnaire, administered to 100 New Zealand secondary school boys suggests that although a well-defined social class consciousness was found to exist among this sample of students, the social classes themselves are not rigidly defined. "Generally speaking, wealth (including property and income), occupations, titles, and residential districts, in that order are considered by these boys to be the criteria most indicative of social class membership." — (S. E. Newman)

7298. POPE, BENJAMIN. (Spring Grove State Hosp., Catonsville, Md.) SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTRASTS IN CHILDREN'S PEER CULTURE PRESTIGE VALUES. *Genet. Psychol. Monogr.*, 1953, 48, 157-220. — A "Guess-Who" test consisting of descriptions of 25 social behavior traits was administered to 400 sixth-grade children in order to obtain information about possible sex and/or socio-economic differences in prestige values within such peer cultures. It is concluded "that there are socio-economic differences in the prestige values of the peer cultures of 12-year-old boys and girls in several Grade VI classes; and that at each socio-economic level there are definite sex differences." These differences point to a higher value on conformity to adult standards and conventional rules of conduct among boys and girls of higher socio-economic status. Boys and girls of lower socio-economic status place a value premium on self assertion and aggression. 29 references. — (G. G. Thompson)

7960. BRYAN, FRED E. HOW LARGE ARE CHILDREN'S VOCABULARIES? *Elem. Sch. J.*, 1953, 54, 210-216. — In all, 6,780 free association tests were administered to 2,260 different children. A total of 6,870 stimulus-response tests were taken by 2,290 different children. Combining the number of words written by children of grades 2 to 6 inclusive, in both the free association and the stimulus-response tests in an accumulating manner, it was found that they had written a total of 9,469 different words. The author concludes that when writers of textbooks for children base their material exclusively on the existing word lists compiled by former investigators in the field they are starving the average or better than average children by the narrowness of their reading material. — (S. M. Amatora)

7288. MILLICHAMP, DOROTHY A. (Inst. Child Stud., 45 Walmer Rd., Toronto, Can.)

ANOTHER LOOK AT PLAY. *Bull. Inst. Child Stud., Toronto*, 1953, 15(4), 1-13. — The child's play helps him comprehend and control the world about him and develop as a person. Correct facilities for play are those that offer a child opportunity to exploit his present skills and interests and his future potentialities. Adults are needed to guide, but not direct, the child's play. In healthy children, expressing emotions is only one of several aspects. They do not display only one theme or persevere in one activity but, rather, progress to others. It is the unhealthy child who does these former. — (I. M. Streisel)

7289. MILLICHAMP, DOROTHY A. THE CHILD DOES HIS OWN GROWING UP. *Bull. Inst. Child Stud., Toronto*, 1953, 15(1), 9-12. — From the scientific study of children certain facts emerge: (1) to understand a child one must know his present developmental level; (2) development proceeds from the immature to the mature; (3) this progression must not be hurried; (4) each stage presents an aspect of the child which may deviate from his past ways of reacting; (5) the child "... seeks to find in his world a way of life suitable to his then self and the world"; and (6) "... every child's development will necessarily be unique to him." — (L. M. Steisel)

III. ABSTRACTS RELATED TO THE AGED

These two abstracts describe some of the changing capacities and living conditions of the aged.

7316. CLAY, HILARY M. (U. Cambridge, Eng.) CHANGES OF PERFORMANCE WITH AGE ON SIMILAR TASKS OF VARYING COMPLEXITY. *Brit. J. Psychol.*, 1954, 45, 7-13. — Sixty-four subjects under 25 years of age and 64 subjects over 55 years of age were required to arrange counters of different values in rows and columns on a board to match a marginal total for each row and column. "Four problems were used, in which 9, 16, 25 and 36 counters respectively were presented. Each subject was given one problem only. The results showed that the performances of the two groups were similar on the simplest problem but, as complexity of the task increased, the older subjects had greater difficulty compared with the younger." — (L. E. Thune)

7322. SMITH, WILLIAM H., JR. (Pennsylvania State Coll., State College.) FAMILY PLANS FOR LATER YEARS. *Marriage Fam. Living*, 1954, 16, 36-40. — "A survey of 490 urban Pennsylvania families ... planned to explore some of the problems ... as related to providing for later maturity and old age ... Attitudes about aging and retirement ... Informants were much more ready to suggest what the government should do than what either individuals or families might do ... Families, it was most frequently suggested should ... help as they can." — (M. M. Gillet)

BOOK REVIEWS

Christian Ethics: Sources of the Living Tradition. Edited with Introductions by WALDO BEACH AND H. RICHARD NIEBUHR. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1955. 496 pages. \$5.00.

This volume offers a carefully selected group of readings representing the moral implications of several types of Christian commitments. Each selection is prefaced by a commentary on the author's position in the historical development of Christian moral theory.

Certain standard criticisms are invited by any anthology or source book. Why, if "the Bible has always been and will doubtless remain the chief source book of Christian ethics" (p. 10), is there not a more extensive treatment thereof? Niebuhr's characteristically perceptive essay on the motifs of Old and New Testament ethics seems unduly constricted by the total plan of the book. Why were selections from Tertullian, Hooker, Schleiermacher and Ritschl omitted? And why not selections from Luther's "Treatise on Christian Liberty," from Edwards' "practical sermons," e.g. "Charity and Its Fruits" or from Rauschenbusch's earlier works? Is Butler sufficiently distinctive to warrant space that could have been used for one of the authors mentioned above? Obviously, this type of book cannot reproduce the total field but this reviewer confesses to a certain disappointment that the energetic Tertullian and Ritschl — so clearly a focal figure for liberalism — were dropped, albeit reluctantly, by the wayside.

The introductions are uniformly first-rate with the possible exception of the overlap between the Calvin and Puritan prefaces. The Kierkegaard introduction seems the weakest of the group. There are, of course, ample opportunities for divergences of interpretation along the whole line. The comment that S.K. "was quite content to let the church stand as it was" (p. 421) is misleading. "Though Edwards was a master metaphysician, his primary interest as it appears in these works (the Stockbridge treatises) was ethical" (p. 386), is a judgment that may offend the scrupulously philosophical mind. Christian mysticism of the west "never" becomes a "pantheistic faith" nor an identity of self with God (pp. 176 ff.), it is affirmed but Eckhart almost undoes Dr. Beach's emphatic "never." However, for clarity and comprehensiveness these introductory interpretations are excellent. They genuinely introduce the reader to the source material and show its relation to the broader context of the total ethical development.

This volume will prove a boon to college and seminary Christian ethics courses, especially where the instructors have not succumbed to the flighty notions that Christian ethics is merely a minor subspecies of philosophical ethics or that Christian morality is a kind of hastily baptized "applied sociology." Here are some of the roots of Christian moral affirmations. With that basal theological area the Christian moralist must deal, not as an optional intellectual skirmish but as affording the rationale of his field of inquiry and the justification of the service which presumably flows from it.

Beach and Niebuhr have given ready access to this foundational inquiry in a lucid manner. And the Ronald Press has added another to its growing list of excellent books in the religious field. — *Clyde A. Holbrook*, Professor of Religion, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio.



Christian Theology: An Ecumenical Approach. By WALTER M. HORTON. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. 304 pages. \$3.75.

It were hard to think of anyone better equipped than Professor Horton for writing this book. As he says, his mind has always been non-sectarian. He has always been a liberal, a man with an open mind and catholic sympathies. Through the years, as his books show, he has been interested in theological movements everywhere and of every kind. Add to all this Dr. Horton's constant and fruitful participation in ecumenical discussions, and you have a theologian whose duty it was to write this book.

Professor Horton's method is to state a subject as a universal religious problem; to set down the "Christian consensus" concerning it; and then to present the "unresolved issues" as seen in present day controversy. The eight chapters of the book which deal with standard theological topics, are solid treatments of the relevant issues and of the writers who have made genuine contributions to the matters on hand. For instance, in a fairly short chapter on the Christian Hope, Dr. Horton has managed to include substantial references to John Baillie, Emil Brunner, L. Harold De Wolf, Paul Minear, J. E. Fison, as well as to the various publications of the World Council. He knows the issues, the agreements and disagreements, and the task ahead. Hence he has been able to produce a very useful handbook of theology with an ecumenical orientation and content. Dr. Horton's almost too conciliatory treatments of Mariology (pp. 196 f.) and Unitarianism (pp. 191 f.) are excellent demonstrations of a spirit and method which make this book well forth the reading. We are all indebted to Dr. Horton for this product of his special virtues as a theologian.

Every theological method has its shortcomings, and Dr. Horton's is no exception. His conception of Christianity as an answer to universal religious problems, quite under the influence of Paul Tillich, introduces an element of confusion into his thought and makes his book less integrated than it might have been. It nowhere is clear as to how a Christian doctrine, say of Christ or of the Church, is related to a corresponding aspect of "natural religion." Is the Mediator of the Christian religion in fact an answer to the problems of the knowledge of God as found in Greek or Hindu philosophies? Does the Christian Church really satisfy a universal need for fellowship? Is the Christian Hope in fact the answer to the natural man's questions about life after death? Can one in fact go to a Moslem and say, "Here is the Trinity, the God you have been looking for?" As Dr. Horton himself knows, the Christian faith is a judgment upon man's religiosity as well a Gospel to the world. No man,

whatever his religion, becomes a Christian except by conversion; and conversion is the possibility of a radically new way of putting religious questions. In any case, I do not see that much is gained by introducing each chapter of this book with a glance at religion in general. I think this method makes for a certain intellectual dispersion.

Dr. Horton is eager to argue that there are many important matters about which Christians of different types of church life and piety are agreed one with another. He thinks much disagreement is a matter of emphasis and misunderstanding. He writes with the constant suggestion that much that divides us, the Catholics from the Protestants, the Fundamentalists from the Liberals, the Conservatives from the Radicals, could be ironed out by mutual understanding, generosity and a will to unite. Now we share Dr. Horton's concern and his hope. The Ecumenical Movement itself is a living witness to the benefits we all derive from coming together under Christ and engaging in free and friendly discussion. But it is well to remember that the various meanings we give to the words we use in common are what we severally mean by what we say. We cannot jump out of the living contexts of our several traditions of church life. Our traditions form our minds and our minds give meaning to our words. Agreement on words is not agreement on ideas. There will be no agreement on ideas except as there comes to be a common life of the church. Let us indeed come together and try to arrive at a common mind. But let us not forget that we shall not go far towards a common mind unless we have a common life and a common responsibility in our world. And let us do all things with the knowledge that the reunion of Christendom we all hope for will come about as God's work. So, we shall not be afraid to draw lines where they have to be drawn, if we believe that no line we draw can prevent God from bringing us together as the Body of Christ. We cannot do without Dr. Horton's irenic spirit. But it is God who makes peace! — *Joseph Haroutunian*, Professor of Systematic Theology, McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, Illinois.

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Rediscovering Prayer. By JOHN L. CASTEEL. New York: Association Press, 1955. 542 pages. \$3.50.

Men and women engaged in Christian education are bound to like this book. In some hands, the discussion of prayer has become either an abstraction or the sentimental repetition of hackneyed platitudes. Pastors, educators and Christian followers of the Way are, therefore, bound to welcome this basic discussion of prayer done with more than a touch of originality.

Obviously, the author is himself a teacher for the book is clearly outlined. Since Dr. Casteel is Professor of Homiletics at the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, we would naturally expect this clarity.

Beginning with the understanding of prayer as communication and fellowship with God, the author brings new insights to such forms of devotional communication as the adoration of God, our confession of sin and weakness to him and the search through prayer for the gift of forgiveness. The levels of thanksgiving are explored and the realms of petition and intercession.

Very helpful, too, is Dr. Casteel's discussion of the practical matters regarding prayer, such as the orderly arrangement and discipline of our days that prayer may be given its proper value, the places which may support the devotional experience, the various retreat, congregational and cell groups with whom we may pray and the whole fascinating possibility of making through prayer a vocation of our life's work. Church school teachers and other religious educators will find of unusual interest in this practical discussion, the chapter on "The Communal Life of Prayer." — *Clarence Seidenspinner*, First Methodist Church, Racine, Wisconsin.



Judaism in Islam. By ABRAHAM I. KATSH. New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1954. 265 pages. \$7.50.

In the year 1833 the then 23 year old pioneer of Juedische Wissenschaft and exponent of the Jewish religious Reform movement in Germany, Abraham Geiger, published as his inaugural dissertation at the University of Bonn an essay entitled *Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judenthume aufgenommen?* Since that time a considerable number of monographs have attempted to enlarge on Geiger's thesis of the indebtedness of Judaism to Islam. Christian as well as Jewish scholars have pointed to the terminology and contents of the Koran and its most important commentaries as proof of the influence that both biblical and rabbinic Judaism exercised on the Mohammedan Bible and on the religion of which it was the foundation. None of them has carried out this task more systematically, comprehensively and successfully than Professor Katsh, Chairman of the Department of Hebrew Culture and Education of the School of Education of New York University, in his recent work *Judaism in Islam*.

Taking as his basic text the second Sura or chapter, which has been described as the "Koran in miniature," supplemented by the third, he analyzes verse after verse of the literary legacy of Mohammed and shows how it is related in its explicit sense or its implication to the Hebrew Scriptures or the Halakic or Aggadic sections of the Talmud. The results of this critical analysis, to quote from the introduction, "negate the theories of many historians who claim that the Arabian Jews (from whom Mohammed obtained his information about Jewish practices and beliefs) were uncultured and ignorant and . . . severed from the traditional Judaism that had been flourishing in Palestine and Babylonia."

"The knowledge of Jews and Judaism displayed in Islamic literature," observes Professor Katsh, "not only reflects the excellent relationship between the Jews and the Arabs but also shows that Arabian Judaism was not different from that of other Jewish communities. . . . The unusual number of Aggadic stories quoted in the writings of Zamakhshari, Baidawi and Tabari testify to the fact that the Arabian Jews took an active part in Jewish spiritual life . . . and succeeded in maintaining strong permanent ties with the Jews of Palestine and Babylonia. The Moslem commentators used in this study are thus excellent source material for reconstructing Jewish traditions hitherto unknown and forgotten."

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Dr. Katsh's researches have been most rewarding not only in their main objective, that of uncovering the Jewish background of the important legal, theological and historical pronouncements contained in the passages of the Koran investigated, they are also valuable in the new light they shed on the meaning of terms employed in the Holy Book of Mohammedanism that have never been satisfactorily explained and have thereby left unanswered certain moot questions about the intellectual endowment of its author. It has been thought, for example, that Mohammed was unable to write because he referred to himself as an "ummi." As Dr. Katsh indicates, however, this designation may have been coined by the founder of Islam merely for the purpose of distinguishing him from the Jewish prophets. "Ummi" was used by him, in other words, as the Arabic equivalent of "gentile" and was derived from the Hebrew term *ummot ha'olam* (the nations of the world, i.e. gentiles).

The fact that Suras II and III serve as the basis of the present investigation does not mean that other chapters of the Koran, that parallel their contents, are not touched upon. Nevertheless, an exhaustive study of the remainder of the Mohammedan Bible following the method used for the beginning would be most desirable and Dr. Katsh should be encouraged to make good his promise in that regard.—*Samuel Rosenblatt*, Associate Professor of Oriental Languages, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.



Ethics: Modern Conceptions of the Principles of Right. By JOHN L. MOTHERSHEAD, JR. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1955. 329 pages. \$3.50.

This text book in ethics is divided into two main parts. The first part attempts to lead the student from the disorganized chaos of common sense concern for the right into the organized chaos of ethical theory. The second part provides a summary statement and left-handed criticism of eleven types of ethical theory which are live options today. Either part might have been expanded into a full volume of considerable merit. Together the result rises no higher than the average college course in ethics. A third possible approach to the study of ethics is suggested in seven pages of bibliographical notes indicating the writings of the theorists themselves.

Part I, "Introduction to Ethical Theory," moves very slowly, but with an astringency of definition which is good. A summary of each chapter obviates the necessity for laborious reading. This will prove tempting to busy college students. They will then rely upon the class lectures. Another virtue in this section is the objectivity with which the writer proceeds. It is impossible to discern his own disposition except to infer from that objectivity that he is not an existentialist, nor a positivist, nor a Marxist. Thus, he has achieved at least one purpose.

Part II, "Modern Conceptions of the Principles of Right," is the more valuable section. The writer is both frank and fearless in his presentations. He makes a good case for theories as diverse as contemporary positivism and ethical idealism, Marxist ethics and the ethics of Immanuel Kant, the ethics of modern Aristotelianism and the ethics of exist-

tentialism. In all there are eleven different theories presented. The criticisms of them are referred to above as left-handed. At the conclusion of each chapter is a section entitled "Objections You Must Meet If You Wish to Defend. . . ." In this way the frank criticisms are made without appearing to be prejudices of the writer against the particular theory. It is a good device.

Not all eleven theories are really modern. They are, of course, live options since one does not have to be modern. Perhaps the word "modern" has been used to make the dose more palatable for this "modern" generation. In any case it provides an excellent survey of the types together with penetrating criticisms. For this reason it ought to be read by *Religious Education* readers. It is accurate, succinct, objective, and stimulating—especially from page 111 on.—*John Frederick Olson*, Associate Professor, Department of Bible and Religion, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York.



Living and Working Together As Christians. By ALICE GEER KELSEY. ("Cooperative Vacation Church School Text.") Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1954. Teacher's book, 172 pages. \$2.00; Pupil's book, 50c.

This course of ten sessions designed for a two week school is basically concerned with helping boys and girls to practice the teachings of Jesus in every day relationship of family and community living as well as in world-wide relationships of life. This text is developed as part of the current national vacation church school theme on Personal and Group living.

The author makes the reader conscious of the social-religious development of nine, ten, and eleven year old children and quotes from our leading child psychologists. She assumes the child has an elementary knowledge of Jesus' life and teachings. There is integration with the child's experiences in the social studies of the public school curriculum emphasizing citizenship. There is provision for considerable flexibility in schedule planning, sequence of sessions and activities.

Session one begins with the boyhood of Jesus to give the student the setting in which he developed his standards of sympathetic understanding of people with whom he came in contact. In Session 2 the principle that Jesus felt every individual was important is shown by his going out of his way to be kind and friendly to those who might be overlooked by others. The author makes great emphasis on helping children experience empathy—"the imaginative projection of one's own consciousness into another being."

The stress on going the second mile is the message of session three giving this command interpretation of going beyond the call of duty in the children's daily living. The Sermon on the Mount is the setting of Session 4 to help the learner to realize the importance of loving one's neighbor. The power of prayer in everyday life is the guidance of session five. Juniors need a true sense of values so in session six the stress is on the joy of sharing rather than piling up possessions individually. One of the Christian principles that everyone one finds difficult to follow is the importance of helping others rather than seeking a personal place of honor. Session seven gives the boys and girls

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an opportunity to role play twentieth century applications of who will be greatest in the terms of Jesus' teaching.

Stewardship of God's gifts is essential in Christian living so juniors are guided in session eight to see this responsibility in terms of their own talents. A Christian chooses what is finest and best for all concerned. Children today live in the midst of conflicting standards so that right and wrong are not easily determined. Session nine emphasizes the kind of choices a Christian must make if he is to follow Jesus. The final session is a challenge to boys and girls to accept their responsibility in making the world Christian. This acceptance is the result of growth but children need chances to live as Christians here and now so that these major decisions are their own, not verbal pledges without meaning.

Mrs. Kelsey provides a rich variety of teaching methods and activity. Her stories are vital and acknowledge the junior's interests and abilities. The inexperienced teacher will find adequate step by step planning while those who have worked in vacation church schools will be stimulated to use the materials creatively. The appendix provides listing of needed materials, ways of teaching and references that will be helpful. The format of the pupil's book is attractive with good print and color line drawings. It is a reading resource and also provides the opportunity for boys and girls to do activities that apply the principles of Jesus' teaching to their own experiences. — *Dorthea Wolcott*, Professor of Religious Education, Findlay College, Findlay, Ohio.



The Life and Ministry of Jesus. By VINCENT TAYLOR. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1955. 240 pages. \$3.00.

This book amplifies Dr. Taylor's article on the same subject in Volume VII of *The Interpreter's Bible*, chiefly by more detailed reference to the historical method and the exegetical principles underlying its main theme. While it is not exhaustive but only illustrates what is pertinent to his major thesis, it is sufficiently comprehensive and stimulating to stir profitable classroom discussion on a mature level.

Following Schweitzer, Dr. Taylor finds the thread of Jesus' ministry in his own messianic concept, and its turning point in the mission of the twelve. Following such scholars as T. W. Manson, William Manson and John W. Bowman, he feels that Jesus interpreted his mission in terms of Daniel 7:13 and the suffering Servant of Isaiah. Jesus sent out the twelve with the confident expectation that the messianic community, the "Son of man" in its communal aspect, would appear at once. When God failed to act, Jesus withdrew, not from fear or unpopularity but to meditate on this failure; and to escape the misplaced enthusiasm of those who wanted simply to throw off the yoke of Rome. He realized then that the Kingdom could not come without suffering, and devoted himself from that time on to the instruction of his disciples in this doctrine. He expected that through his death and the eschatological woes to follow, the new messianic community would triumph at last. But now he used "Son of man" in a personal way, to convey

his own part in this triumph as the servant-king of God's people.

As an exponent of Form Criticism who uses the special viewpoint of each Gospel to separate primary from secondary material, Dr. Taylor must vindicate his obvious conviction that it is possible to penetrate through the *Sitz im Leben* of the early church to Jesus himself. This he does as follows: (1) Mark, while by no means complete, does give a reliable summary of the main events in the ministry of Jesus. (2) Our present written tradition embodies material much earlier than itself, particularly where sources overlap, in the Passion narrative, and in those portions depending on an Aramaic background. (3) There is more independent historical material in the Fourth Gospel than has been realized. (4) The obvious interpretative viewpoint of the Gospels may not be perversion or invention, but may really uncover in a "legitimate" way the latent meaning of the original story. (5) Enlightened inference from the bare records is both a necessity and an obligation. Thus, the strategic nature of the mission of the twelve, long forgotten by the time the Gospels were written, "hidden but visible behind the tradition like the lower writing in a palimpsest," can only be inferred now from "the extraordinary injunctions laid on the disciples."

Many will accuse Dr. Taylor of special pleading both in method and result. In less experienced hands his principles could lead to a facile harmonizing, and they do involve Dr. Taylor himself in contradictions, notably with reference to miracles and the eyewitness quality of Mark. On the other hand, his book amply justifies itself by being constantly aware of the greatness of its theme. If Jesus really was the supreme revelation of God, can any account of his activity avoid the inferences of faith, or be content with simple explanations? — *Irvin W. Batdorf*, Professor of New Testament Literature, United Theological Seminary, Dayton, Ohio.



Worship Ways for Camp. By CLARICE M. BOWMAN. New York: Association Press, 1955. 182 pages. \$3.00.

Every summer hundreds of men and women and older youth are asked to volunteer to be counsellors at camp. Many who have responded to this challenge through the years have looked in vain for specific helps for making the worship experience of the larger group and the cabin fellowship real. Here is a handbook for counsellors. With her deep insights into the spiritual needs of children and young teen agers, Clarice M. Bowman has given a philosophy of worship, followed by materials for these occasions.

When do we worship? When we are relaxed, with time to explore the world around us, to "wonder" at God's creative ability, and to quest for the answers to life's problems. So often camps are set to a specific time schedule, with hours for meals, for rising, for sleeping and set times for worship to be turned on and off. There is no time for plain wondering and thinking. Worship should not be "hung on the camp" at intervals within the day. It should be the spontaneous outgrowth of every camper's experience.

This book not only gives the philosophy of wor-

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A companion to THE STORY OF THE BIBLE

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
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ship for camp counsellors, but also specific helps for those dealing with young children, juniors and young teens. There are many Scripture references, poems, graces, and prayers which can be adapted for use with the entire group or in the cabin fellowship.

This book will help those who are working with these same young people within the home church. — R. S. Hocking, Minister, Methodist Church, Birmingham, Michigan.



The Twos at Church. St. Louis: Bethany Press. Teacher's Guide. 160 pages. 75c. Picture-Story Books: *My Friends; God's Outdoors; My Church; My Home.* 32 pages each. \$1.50 per set of four. *Nursery Songs and Rhythms.* 32 pages. 50c. *A Message to Parents.* 20c per yearly set of four.

The Twos at Church comes as a welcome addition to the too-long neglected field of nursery education in the church. It has attempted to provide a complete set of materials for those who work with the two year olds in the church nursery: A teachers guide, parent education leaflets, four charming picture books, and best of all a song book containing songs the Twos can understand and sing.

The teacher's guide contains much that is sound and helpful in nursery education, the equipment suggestions are practical, and directions are given for a great deal of good home made equipment.

The format of the teacher's guide however, is

unfortunate. The cover is drab and uninviting, the book hard to keep open and the photographs, while good in subject matter, lack clarity.

Much valuable material is buried in unbroken pages of small print. There are some unfortunate references to having the children "imitate" the teacher; "imitate" being a concept that is generally taboo in nursery education circles.

Even so, this is valuable and practical material and will prove a godsend to those who are taking over a class of Twos without having had special training. The little song book stays open on the piano without coaxing, and contains songs not too long or composed of too difficult musical intervals for the twos who will try to sing them. The subject matter of the songs and the picture books is within the range of the children's interest and understanding and the parent education leaflets contain sound, constructive and practical suggestions. — Armilda B. Keiser, Grinnell, Iowa.



Jewish Book Annual, Vol. 12, 5714, 1953-1954. Sponsored by NATIONAL JEWISH WELFARE BOARD. New York: Jewish Book Council of America, 1954. 180 pages. \$3.00.

This is the tercentenary volume reviewing the Jewish literary achievements in America during the three hundred years since the first twenty-three Jews came to New Amsterdam, now New York. They came from Recife, Brazil, fleeing from the inquisition, where the Portuguese had succeeded the Dutch.

Not only Jews but all who are interested in historic research will be grateful to the editors of the Jewish Book Council and the Jewish Welfare Board for one of the finest contributions made to the tercentenary celebration, and for many years to come students will find much valuable information in Prof. Sol Liptzin's fine essay "After Three Hundred Years," the Literary Legend of the Jew — and the Reality. This essay should be a must reading for all our young people of high school age and particularly for those who are in the upper grades in our thousands of Jewish schools, and the tens of thousands of youngsters in Jewish community centers, Hillel Foundations, in American universities and B'nai B'rith Youth Organizations. Dr. Liptzin at the end of his brilliant essay tells us that this is one of those rare historic moments when the "guardian of our destiny puts our fate in our hands and gives us the opportunity freely to choose our future. The choice we make involving the character of our cultural survival as Jews in America will reecho down the generations and will affect the lives of our descendants until the end of time."

Dr. Joshua Block contributes a much worthwhile tercentenary review of "American Jewish Literature." Dr. Eisig Selborschlag, Hebrew poet and dean of Hebrew Teachers College of Boston, contributes an essay on "Hebrew Literature in America at the Tercentenary." B. J. Bialostortzky has an essay on American Yiddish Literature. The essay is translated by Philip Rubin. The author of this essay is a poet and literary critic. Dr. Lee M. Friedman, honorary President of the Jewish Historical Society, contributes an essay "American Jewish Literary Firsts."

Dr. Mordecai Soltes has an essay on the "Literary Contributions of Jewish Community Centers during the last 100 Years." "Love of Books As Revealed in Jewish Bookplates," is an interesting essay by Rabbi Philip Goodman, who also records the activities of the Jewish Book Council of America, 1952-1954; and Dr. Solomon Grayzel tells the story of "A Hundred Years of the Block Publishing Company." — *Philip L. Seman*, University of Judaism, Los Angeles, California.



And Crown Thy Good; A Manual on Inter-religious Co-operation on the College Campuses. New York: National Conference of Christians and Jews. 48 pages. 25c.

This important booklet sets forth and faithfully explains the basic presuppositions as well as the aims and methods of the relatively new movement in university and college circles felicitously described as "co-operation without compromise."

There are many things which the three major religious groups — Protestant, Catholic and Jewish — can do together for the manifold benefit of the students as well as of the institutions which prepare them for responsible and active citizenship. Programs are available, and experience will suggest additional, up-to-date programs.

In the past such activities have been limited and often hampered by the domination of the Protestant group. This attitude is being changed, and deep religious devotion is seen to be perfectly compatible with inter-religious work on the campuses under a common ethical code.

The pamphlet is issued by the NCCJ, but leading priests and rabbis have heartily endorsed the movement and programs presented. — *Victor S. Yarros*, La Jolla, California.



What Time Is It? By Rita F. Snowden. London: Epworth Press, 1953. 96 pages. \$5.00.

Here is a book of stories by a well-known English writer, the author of many popular books, which children will read, or listen to, with pleasure and interest. Parents and teachers, too, will enjoy them, because they are quite different from the familiar varieties of insipid tales with "moral" lessons meant to teach children to behave properly and nicely on all occasions. These tales are not too good to be true and not too sentimental. They are decidedly not namby-pamby.

It requires skill, talent, good sense and experience to write stories of this superior sort. The author possesses such qualifications, and the collection can be recommended to modern parents — or children — without reservations — *Victor S. Yarros*, La Jolla, California.



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